管理者自信会影响在职消费吗?——兼论融资融券制度的公司外部治理效应
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摘要
本文以我国2008-2015年A股上市公司数据为样本,研究融资融券和管理者自信对在职消费的影响。结果发现,管理者自信与在职消费之间呈"U"型关系,即当管理者自信程度相对较低时,管理者自信与在职消费之间呈负相关关系;当管理者自信程度相对较高时,管理者自信与在职消费之间呈正相关关系。然后利用2010年我国开始实施的融资融券制度这一准自然实验,采用双重差分模型研究融资融券对在职消费的影响,发现在引入融资融券制度后,与控制组样本相比,处理组中的融资融券标的企业降低了超额在职消费水平;将管理者自信对在职消费的影响置于融资融券背景下研究,结果发现融资融券会削弱管理者自信对在职消费总额以及超额在职消费的抑制作用。上述结果表明融资融券制度具有显著的公司外部治理效应,这为我国深化相关金融制度改革、加强企业监管和完善薪酬契约提供了一定的理论参考。
We investigate the influence of managers' confidence and margin trading on perks,using listed companies from 2008 to 2015 in China. The results show that the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is U shaped. Namely,when managers' confidence level is relatively low,the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is negative. However,when managers' confidence level is relatively high,the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is positive. At the same time,drawing upon the margin trading system that China introduced in 2010,which is a qusi-natural experiment,we use difference-in-differences to study the effect of margin trading on perks and find that after the introduction of margin trading system,compared with the control samples,companies in the treatment group reduce the excess perks. Based on this,under the background of margin trading,we find that the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is weakened. These results suggest that margin trading plays a certain external governance effect,which provides certain theory reference for deepening the financial reform in China.
We investigate the influence of managers' confidence and margin trading on perks,using listed companies from 2008 to 2015 in China. The results show that the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is U shaped. Namely,when managers' confidence level is relatively low,the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is negative. However,when managers' confidence level is relatively high,the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is positive. At the same time,drawing upon the margin trading system that China introduced in 2010,which is a qusi-natural experiment,we use difference-in-differences to study the effect of margin trading on perks and find that after the introduction of margin trading system,compared with the control samples,companies in the treatment group reduce the excess perks. Based on this,under the background of margin trading,we find that the relationship between managers' confidence and perks is weakened. These results suggest that margin trading plays a certain external governance effect,which provides certain theory reference for deepening the financial reform in China.
引文
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[2]Luo W.,Zhang Y.,Zhu N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370
[3]冯根福,赵珏航.管理者薪酬、在职消费与公司绩效---基于合作博弈的分析视角[J].中国工业经济,2012,(6):147-158
[4]陈怡秀,孙世敏,屠立鹤.在职消费经济效应的影响因素---基于高管异质性视角的研究[J].经济管理,2017,(5):85-100
[5]徐细雄,谭瑾.高管薪酬契约、参照点效应及其治理效果:基于行为经济学的理论解释与经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(4):36-45
[6]褚剑,方军雄.政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?[J].会计研究,2016,(9):82-89
[7]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(5):85-92
[8]盛明泉,车鑫.管理层权力、高管薪酬与公司绩效[J].中央财经大学学报,2016,36(5):97-104
[9]Weinstein N.D.Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events[J].Journal of Personality&Social Psychology,1980,39(5):806-820
[10]Simon M.,Houghton S.M.The Relationship between Overconfidence and the Introduction of Risky Products:Evidence from a Field Study[J].Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(2):139-149
[11]Hilary G.,Menzly L.Does Past Success Lead Analysts to Become Overconfident[J].Management Science,2006,52(4):489-500
[12]何金耿,丁加华.上市公司投资决策行为的实证分析[J].证券市场导报,2001,(9):44-47
[13]Jensen M.C.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,2001,76(2):323-329
[14]Fama E.F.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307
[15]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010,(11):56-64
[16]Hart O.Financial Contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(4):1079-1100
[17]张力,潘青.董事会结构、在职消费与公司绩效---来自民营上市公司的经验证据[J].经济学动态,2009,50(3):82-85
[18]Li H.Will the Information Disclosure Quality Reduce the Executives’Excess Perks?---Evidence from China[J].International Journal of Financial Research,2016,7(2)73-83
[19]Adithipyangkul P.,Alon I.,Zhang T.Executive Perks:Compensation and Corporate Performance in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2011,28(2):401-425
[20]Chen D.,Li O.Z.,Liang S.Perk Consumption as a Suboptimal Outcome under Pay Regulations[J].Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting&Economics,2016,23(4):1-27
[21]陈烜,吴春雷,张秋生.国企高管超控制权薪酬、薪酬替代与经济后果[J].经济与管理研究,2013,34(5):28-35
[22]梅洁,葛扬.国有企业管理层在职消费的政策干预效果研究---基于2012年“八项规定”出台所构建的拟自然实验[J].经济学家,2016,(2):75-83
[23]李宝宝,黄寿昌.国有企业管理层在职消费的决定因素及经济后果[J].统计研究,2012,29(6):76-81
[24]贾婧,周晓苏,吴锡皓.所有权性质、稳健性与代理成本---基于在职消费的视角[J].预测,2017,36(1):47-53
[25]陈效东,周嘉南.非激励型高管股权激励、企业投资方式与控制人收益[J].管理评论,2016,28(5):161-174
[26]Carrothers A.G.An Empirical Evaluation of the Determinants of Executive Perks at S&P 500 Firms[J].Global Journal of Research in Management,2017,7(2):1-27
[27]杨蓉.“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016,48(1):138-148
[28]陶萍,张睿,朱佳.高管薪酬、企业绩效激励效应与政府限薪令影响---133家A股国有控股公司的实证研究[J].现代财经:天津财经大学学报,2016,(6):17-29
[29]耿云江,王海雯.在职消费粘性与媒体监督---基于产权视角的实证检验[J].财经问题研究,2017,39(3):42-48
[30]Malmendier U.,Tate G.CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(6):2661-2700
[31]Doukas J.A.,Petmezas D.Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self-attribution Bias[J].European Financial Management,2007,13(3):531-577
[32]邓路,徐睿阳,谷宇.管理者过度自信、海外收购及其经济后果---基于“兖州煤业”的案例研究[J].管理评论,2016,28(11):252-263
[33]Fama E.F.The Behavior of Stock Market Price[J].Journal of Business,1965,38(1):34-105
[34]Miller E.M.Risk,Uncertainty and Divergence of Opinion[J].Journal of Finance,1977,32(4):1151-1168
[35]Cassell C.A.,Drake M.S.,Rasmussen S.J.Short Interest as a Signal of Audit Risk[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(4):70-92
[36]Drake M.S.,Rees L.L.,Swanson E.P.Should Investors Follow the Prophets or the Bears?Evidence on the Use of Public Information by Analysts and Short Sellers[J].The Accounting Review,2011,86(1):101-130
[37]黄洋,李宏泰,罗乐,等.融资融券交易与市场价格发现---基于盈余公告漂移的实证分析[J].上海金融,2013,34(2):75-81
[38]陈晖丽,刘峰.融资融券的治理效应研究---基于公司盈余管理的视角[J].会计研究,2014,(9):45-52
[39]肖浩,孔爱国.融资融券对股价特质性波动的影响机理研究:基于双重差分模型的检验[J].管理世界,2014,(8):30-43
[40]Keiber K.L.Managerial Compensation Contracts and Overconfidence[R].SSRN Working Paper,2002
[41]Paredes T.Too Much Pay,Too Much Deference:Is CEO Overconfidence the Product of Corporate Governance[R].SSRN Working Paper,2004
[42]Goel A.M.,Thakor A.V.Overconfidence,CEO Selection,and Corporate Governance[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(6):2737-2784
[43]Holmstrom B.Moral Hazard and Observability[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1979,10(1):74-91
[44]陈其安,杨秀苔.基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(1):110-116
[45]Gervais S.,Heaton J.B.,Odean T.Overconfidence,Investment Policy,and Executive Stock Options[R].SSRN Working Paper,2003
[46]杨涛,黄健柏.基于过度自信的股权激励模型[J].系统工程,2007,25(10):27-32
[47]陈其安,陈亮.过度自信条件下的上市公司经理股票期权补偿[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,28(5):11-19
[48]廖歆欣,刘运国.企业避税、信息不对称与管理层在职消费[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(2):87-99
[49]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87
[50]Luo W.,Zhang Y.,Zhu N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370
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