“长江经济带”背景下政府补贴与企业生态建设行为分析
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摘要
【目的】从演化博弈视角研究地方政府与当地企业之间的行为演化过程,探究绿色发展中政府与企业之间协同合作的行为机制。【方法】构建了政府企业行为策略博弈模型,采用系统动力学对政企之间的利益互动关系进行博弈仿真和分析。【结果】政企双方初始意愿、采取措施成本以及双方合作时风险系数的变化都对博弈双方的策略行为有着显著影响;降低政企双方环境治理成本与减小合作时的风险系数能有效抑制双方行为波动,促使博弈达到理想状态。【结论】研究结果为长江经济带生态补偿政策提供了参考依据。
[Purposes]It studies the behavior evolution process between local government and local enterprises from the perspective of evolutionary game,and explores the cooperative behavior mechanism between government and enterprises in green development.[Methods]The game model of government enterprise behavior strategy is constructed and the game simulation and analysis of the benefit interaction between government and enterprise are carried out by using system dynamics.[Findings]The initial willingness of the government and the enterprise,the cost of measures taken and the change of the risk coefficient during the cooperation all have a significant influence on the strategic behavior of both sides of the game.Reducing the environmental governance cost of government and enterprise and reducing the change of risk coefficient in cooperation can effectively restrain the behavior fluctuation of both sides and promote the game to reach the ideal state.[Conclusions]The research results provide a reference for the ecological compensation policy of the Yangtze river economic belt.
[Purposes]It studies the behavior evolution process between local government and local enterprises from the perspective of evolutionary game,and explores the cooperative behavior mechanism between government and enterprises in green development.[Methods]The game model of government enterprise behavior strategy is constructed and the game simulation and analysis of the benefit interaction between government and enterprise are carried out by using system dynamics.[Findings]The initial willingness of the government and the enterprise,the cost of measures taken and the change of the risk coefficient during the cooperation all have a significant influence on the strategic behavior of both sides of the game.Reducing the environmental governance cost of government and enterprise and reducing the change of risk coefficient in cooperation can effectively restrain the behavior fluctuation of both sides and promote the game to reach the ideal state.[Conclusions]The research results provide a reference for the ecological compensation policy of the Yangtze river economic belt.
引文
[1]中华人民共和国审计署办公厅.中华人民共和国审计署审计结果公告2018年第3号:长江经济带生态环境保护审计结果[EB/OL].(2018-06-19)[2019-02-25].http://www.audit.gov.cn/n5/n25/c123511/content.html.General Office of the National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China.Announcement of audit results of the national audit office of the People’s Republic of China No.3of 2018:the Yangtze river economic belt of the ecological environment protection audit results[EB/OL].(2018-06-19)[2019-02-25].http://www.audit.gov.cn/n5/n25/c123511/content.html.
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[11]张学刚,钟茂初.政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(2):31-35.ZHANG X G,ZHONG M C.Game analysis and countermeasures of government environmental supervision and enterprise pollution[J].China Population,Resources and Environment,2011,21(2):31-35.
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[14]GUAN X J,LIU W K,WANG H L.Study on the ecological compensation standard for river basin based on a coupling model of TPC-WRV[J].Water Science&Technology Water Supply,2017,18(4):1196-1205.
[15]MARROQUIN M R S,de O FONTES C H,FREIRES FG M.Sustainable and renewable energy supply chain:a system dynamics overview[J].Renewable&Sustainable Energy Reviews,2018,82:247-259.
[16]KIRILYUK A P.Universal science of complexity:consistent understanding of ecological,living and intelligent system dynamics[EB/OL].(2014-07-06)[2018-10-08].https:arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0706/0706.3219.pdf.
[17]刘加伶,伍星旭.基于委托代理理论的企业信息共享激励机制[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学),2014,28(7):97-101.LIU J L,WU X X.Incentive mechanism of enterprise information sharing based on principal-agent theory[J].Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Natural Science),2014,28(7):97-101.
[18]周李磊,官冬杰,杨华.重庆经济-资源-环境发展的系统动力学分析及不同情景模拟[J].重庆师范大学学报(自然科学版),2015,32(3):59-67.ZHOU L L,GUAN D J,YANG H.Systematic dynamic analysis and different scenario simulation of economic,resource-environmental development in chongqing[J].Journal of Chongqing Normal University(Natural Science),2015,32(3):59-67.
[2]潘峰,西宝,王琳.基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(6):1393-1404.PAN F,XI B,WANG L.Analysis of local government environmental regulation strategies based on evolutionary game[J].Systems Engineering Theory and Practice,2015,35(6):1393-1404.
[3]杨林,高宏霞.基于经济视角下环境监管部门和厂商之间的博弈研究[J].统计与决策,2012(21):51-55.YANG L,GAO H X.A study on the game between environmental regulators and manufacturers from an economic perspective[J].Statistics and Decision-Making,2012(21):51-55.
[4]卢方元.环境污染问题的演化博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(9):148-152.LU F Y.Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution problems[J].Systems Engineering Theory and Practice,2007,27(9):148-152.
[5]CHEN W Y,HOU D.Game theory approach to optimal capital cost allocation in pollution control[J].JournalofEnviornmental Sciences,1998,10(2):231-237.
[6]蒋丹璐,曹国华.流域污染治理中政企合谋现象研究[J].系统工程学报,2015,30(5):584-593.JIANG D L,CAO G H.The phenomenon of collusion between government and enterprise in pollution control in river basin[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2015,30(5):584-593.
[7]马小明,赵月炜.环境管制政策的局限性与变革:自愿性环境政策的兴起[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2005,15(6):19-23.MA X M,ZHAO Y W.Limitations and changes of environmental regulation policies:the rise of voluntary environmental policies[J].China Population,Resources and Environment,2005,15(6):19-23.
[8]许家云,毛其淋.政府补贴、治理环境与中国企业生存[J].世界经济,2016,39(2):75-99.XU J Y,MAO Q L.Government subsidies,governance environment and the survival of Chinese enterprises[J].World Economy,2016,39(2):75-99.
[9]TAO J G,XUE H F,HAN J X,et al.Complexity and evolutionary stability analysis in environmental pollution treatment games[J].Environmental Science&Technology,2009,32(7):89-93.
[10]俞杰.环境税“双重红利”与我国环保税制改革取向[J].宏观经济研究,2013(8):3-7.YU J."Double dividend"of environmental tax and the orientation of China’s environmental tax reform[J].Macroeconomic Research,2013(8):3-7.
[11]张学刚,钟茂初.政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(2):31-35.ZHANG X G,ZHONG M C.Game analysis and countermeasures of government environmental supervision and enterprise pollution[J].China Population,Resources and Environment,2011,21(2):31-35.
[12]MARSHALL G A,JONKER B P,MORGAN M K,et al.Prospective study of neuropsychological and psychosocial outcome following surgical excision of intracerebral arteriovenous malformations[J].Journal of Clinical Neuroscience,2003,10(1):42-47.
[13]STERMAN J D.Learning in and about complex systems[J].System Dynamics Review,2010,10(2/3):291-330.
[14]GUAN X J,LIU W K,WANG H L.Study on the ecological compensation standard for river basin based on a coupling model of TPC-WRV[J].Water Science&Technology Water Supply,2017,18(4):1196-1205.
[15]MARROQUIN M R S,de O FONTES C H,FREIRES FG M.Sustainable and renewable energy supply chain:a system dynamics overview[J].Renewable&Sustainable Energy Reviews,2018,82:247-259.
[16]KIRILYUK A P.Universal science of complexity:consistent understanding of ecological,living and intelligent system dynamics[EB/OL].(2014-07-06)[2018-10-08].https:arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0706/0706.3219.pdf.
[17]刘加伶,伍星旭.基于委托代理理论的企业信息共享激励机制[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学),2014,28(7):97-101.LIU J L,WU X X.Incentive mechanism of enterprise information sharing based on principal-agent theory[J].Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Natural Science),2014,28(7):97-101.
[18]周李磊,官冬杰,杨华.重庆经济-资源-环境发展的系统动力学分析及不同情景模拟[J].重庆师范大学学报(自然科学版),2015,32(3):59-67.ZHOU L L,GUAN D J,YANG H.Systematic dynamic analysis and different scenario simulation of economic,resource-environmental development in chongqing[J].Journal of Chongqing Normal University(Natural Science),2015,32(3):59-67.