财政分权、晋升激励与房价
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摘要
将财政分权、晋升激励及房价纳入同一逻辑框架,为政府频繁调控、房价却持续高涨的异象提供了更充分的证据。通过使用2005～2016年我国31个省份的年度面板数据,发现财政分权对房价有显著的正向作用,而且这种促进作用在三大经济区域间和各省份间均存在显著的差异。研究还发现政治晋升激励会显著扩大财政分权对房价的正向影响。
This paper incorporates fiscal decentralization,promotion incentive and housing price into the same logical framework,which provides sufficient evidence for the fluctuation of housing price in China. Using the annual panel data of 31 provinces in China from 2005 to 2016,this paper finds that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on housing price,and this effect varies among the three major economic regions and different provinces. This paper also finds that political promotion incentive has a significant positive effect to increase the impact of fiscal decentralization on housing price.
This paper incorporates fiscal decentralization,promotion incentive and housing price into the same logical framework,which provides sufficient evidence for the fluctuation of housing price in China. Using the annual panel data of 31 provinces in China from 2005 to 2016,this paper finds that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on housing price,and this effect varies among the three major economic regions and different provinces. This paper also finds that political promotion incentive has a significant positive effect to increase the impact of fiscal decentralization on housing price.
引文
[1]郑世刚,严良.房价波动、调控政策立场估计及其影响效应研究——基于1998-2014年数据的实证分析[J].财经研究,2016,42(6):98-109.
[2]邵新建,巫和懋,江萍,等.中国城市房价的“坚硬泡沫”——基于垄断性土地市场的研究[J].金融研究,2012(12):67-81.
[3]MAYER C J,SOMERVILLE C T,CAPOZZA D,et al.Land use regulation and new construction[J].Regional science&urban economics,2000,30(6):639-662.
[4]MCDONALD J F,STOKES H H.Monetary policy and the housing bubble[J].Journal of real estate finance&economics,2013,46(3):437-451.
[5]况伟大.空间竞争、房价收入比与房价[J].财贸经济,2004(7):79-86.
[6]HOLLAND A S.The baby boom and the housing market:another look at the evidence[J].Regional science&urban economics,2004,21(4):565-571.
[7]徐建炜,徐奇渊,何帆.房价上涨背后的人口结构因素:国际经验与中国证据[J].世界经济,2012(1):24-42.
[8]况伟大.预期、投机与中国城市房价波动[J].经济研究,2010,45(9):67-78.
[9]宫汝凯.分税制改革、财政分权和房价水平[J].经济理论与经济管理,2012(4):45-56.
[10]安勇,王拉娣.财政分权对房价影响的机理分析[J].上海经济研究,2017(1):85-92.
[11]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(3):4-12.
[12]叶林,杨良伟.财政分权与城市扩张——基于省级面板数据的实证研究[J].城市发展研究,2018,25(3):97-103.
[13]刁伟涛.土地财政、地方债务与房价水平——基于省际面板数据的实证研究[J].当代财经,2015(2):34-42.
[14]张双长,李稻葵.“二次房改”的财政基础分析——基于土地财政与房地产价格关系的视角[J].财政研究,2010(7):5-11.
[15]李一花,化兵.财政赤字、土地财政与房价的关系研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2018(11):3-14.
[16]BARDHAN P.Decentralization of governance and development[J].Journal of economic perspectives,2002,16(4):185-205.
[17]刘承礼.中国式财政分权的解释逻辑:从理论述评到实践推演[J].经济学家,2011,7(7):61-69.
[18]JIA J,GUO Q,ZHANG J.Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China[J].China economic review,2014,28(1):107-122.
[19]武康平,闫勇.土地财政:一种“无奈”选择更是一种“冲动”行为——基于地级城市面板数据分析[J].财政研究,2012(10):56-60.
[20]MILLER N,PENG L.Exploring metropolitan housing price volatility[J].The journal of real estate finance and economics,2006(33):5-18.
[21]MIAO H,SANJAY R,MARC W.Return and volatility transmission in U.S.housing markets[J].Real estate economics,2011,39(4):701-741.
[22]YANG J,YU Z L,DENG Y H.Housing price spillovers in China:a high-dimensional generalized var approach[J].Regional science and urban economics,2018,68:98-114.
[23]涂红,徐春发,余子良.货币政策对房价影响的区域差异:来自多层混合效应模型的新证据[J].南开经济研究,2018(5):41-57.
[24]JIN H,QIAN Y,WEINGAST B R.Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives:federalism,Chinese style[J].Journal of public economics,2005,89:1719-1742.
[25]XU C.The fundamental institutions of China's reforms and development[J].Journal of economic literature,2011,49(4):1076-1151.
[26]LI H,ZHOU L A.Political turnover and economic performance:the incentive role of personnel control in China[J].Journal of public economics,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[27]王贤彬,徐现祥.地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长[J].经济科学,2010(6):42-58.
[28]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[29]ZHANG T,ZOU H F.Fiscal decentralization,public spending,and economic growth in China[J].Journal of public economics,1998,67(2):221-240.
[30]CLAYTON J,MILLER N,PENG L.Price-volume correlation in the housing market:causality and co-movements[J].Journal of real estate finance and economics,2010(40):14-40.
[31]WEBB R,YANG J,ZHANG J.Price jump risk in the US housing market[J].Journal of real estate finance and economics,2016(53):29-49.
(1)《中国城市统计年鉴》将31省份划分为三大地区:东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东和海南;中部地区包括山西、吉林、黑龙江、安徽、江西、河南、湖北和湖南;西部地区包括四川、重庆、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏、新疆、广西和内蒙古。
[2]邵新建,巫和懋,江萍,等.中国城市房价的“坚硬泡沫”——基于垄断性土地市场的研究[J].金融研究,2012(12):67-81.
[3]MAYER C J,SOMERVILLE C T,CAPOZZA D,et al.Land use regulation and new construction[J].Regional science&urban economics,2000,30(6):639-662.
[4]MCDONALD J F,STOKES H H.Monetary policy and the housing bubble[J].Journal of real estate finance&economics,2013,46(3):437-451.
[5]况伟大.空间竞争、房价收入比与房价[J].财贸经济,2004(7):79-86.
[6]HOLLAND A S.The baby boom and the housing market:another look at the evidence[J].Regional science&urban economics,2004,21(4):565-571.
[7]徐建炜,徐奇渊,何帆.房价上涨背后的人口结构因素:国际经验与中国证据[J].世界经济,2012(1):24-42.
[8]况伟大.预期、投机与中国城市房价波动[J].经济研究,2010,45(9):67-78.
[9]宫汝凯.分税制改革、财政分权和房价水平[J].经济理论与经济管理,2012(4):45-56.
[10]安勇,王拉娣.财政分权对房价影响的机理分析[J].上海经济研究,2017(1):85-92.
[11]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(3):4-12.
[12]叶林,杨良伟.财政分权与城市扩张——基于省级面板数据的实证研究[J].城市发展研究,2018,25(3):97-103.
[13]刁伟涛.土地财政、地方债务与房价水平——基于省际面板数据的实证研究[J].当代财经,2015(2):34-42.
[14]张双长,李稻葵.“二次房改”的财政基础分析——基于土地财政与房地产价格关系的视角[J].财政研究,2010(7):5-11.
[15]李一花,化兵.财政赤字、土地财政与房价的关系研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2018(11):3-14.
[16]BARDHAN P.Decentralization of governance and development[J].Journal of economic perspectives,2002,16(4):185-205.
[17]刘承礼.中国式财政分权的解释逻辑:从理论述评到实践推演[J].经济学家,2011,7(7):61-69.
[18]JIA J,GUO Q,ZHANG J.Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China[J].China economic review,2014,28(1):107-122.
[19]武康平,闫勇.土地财政:一种“无奈”选择更是一种“冲动”行为——基于地级城市面板数据分析[J].财政研究,2012(10):56-60.
[20]MILLER N,PENG L.Exploring metropolitan housing price volatility[J].The journal of real estate finance and economics,2006(33):5-18.
[21]MIAO H,SANJAY R,MARC W.Return and volatility transmission in U.S.housing markets[J].Real estate economics,2011,39(4):701-741.
[22]YANG J,YU Z L,DENG Y H.Housing price spillovers in China:a high-dimensional generalized var approach[J].Regional science and urban economics,2018,68:98-114.
[23]涂红,徐春发,余子良.货币政策对房价影响的区域差异:来自多层混合效应模型的新证据[J].南开经济研究,2018(5):41-57.
[24]JIN H,QIAN Y,WEINGAST B R.Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives:federalism,Chinese style[J].Journal of public economics,2005,89:1719-1742.
[25]XU C.The fundamental institutions of China's reforms and development[J].Journal of economic literature,2011,49(4):1076-1151.
[26]LI H,ZHOU L A.Political turnover and economic performance:the incentive role of personnel control in China[J].Journal of public economics,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[27]王贤彬,徐现祥.地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长[J].经济科学,2010(6):42-58.
[28]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[29]ZHANG T,ZOU H F.Fiscal decentralization,public spending,and economic growth in China[J].Journal of public economics,1998,67(2):221-240.
[30]CLAYTON J,MILLER N,PENG L.Price-volume correlation in the housing market:causality and co-movements[J].Journal of real estate finance and economics,2010(40):14-40.
[31]WEBB R,YANG J,ZHANG J.Price jump risk in the US housing market[J].Journal of real estate finance and economics,2016(53):29-49.
(1)《中国城市统计年鉴》将31省份划分为三大地区:东部地区包括北京、天津、河北、辽宁、上海、江苏、浙江、福建、山东、广东和海南;中部地区包括山西、吉林、黑龙江、安徽、江西、河南、湖北和湖南;西部地区包括四川、重庆、贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏、新疆、广西和内蒙古。