高管薪酬倒挂与监管体系:2003～2015年A股上市公司样本

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英文篇名：Executive Compensation Upside Down and Regulatory System:Taking the Sample of A Share Listed Companies from 2003 to 2015 as an Example 作者：杜勇 ; 张欢 英文作者：Du Yong;Zhang Huan; 关键词：高管薪酬 ; 政府监管 ; 资本市场发展 英文关键词：executive compensation;;government regulation;;capital market development 中文刊名：REFO 英文刊名：Reform 机构：西南大学经济管理学院; 出版日期：2017-02-15 出版单位：改革 年：2017 期：No.276 基金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“社会资本视域下的中国上市公司亏损逆转质量:结构特征、驱动机理与经济后果”(批准号:71572153) 语种：中文; 页：REFO201702009 页数：10 CN：02 ISSN：50-1012/F 分类号：118-127

摘要

针对我国资本市场存在的薪酬-业绩倒挂现象,将2003~2015年A股上市公司作为研究样本,分析公司盈亏状态对出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象概率的影响。实证结果发现:与盈利上市公司相比,亏损上市公司出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象的概率更大;考虑到产权性质差异,民营亏损公司出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象的概率比国有亏损公司更大;管理者权力较大的亏损公司出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象的概率更大。监管部门应该重点关注亏损公司的高管薪酬激励制度的合理性。
        Based on the phenomenon of pay-performance upside down in China's capital market, using the data of the A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2015, we investigate the impact of the company 's profit and loss on the probability of pay-performance upside down. The empirical results show that: Compared with the profit enterprises,the probability of the pay-performance upside down is higher in the loss-making enterprises. Considering the difference of the property right, the probability of the pay-performance upside down is higher in the loss-making enterprises with state-owned ownership. The probability of the pay-performance upside down is higher in the lossmaking enterprises with greater power of executives. Thus, we argue that regulators should focus on the rationality of the executive compensation incentive system of loss-making enterprises.

引文

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