碳税政策下制造商竞争的供应链定价策略和社会福利研究
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摘要
本文在考虑消费者环境意识下,探讨了制造商竞争情形下基于碳税政策的供应链成员定价策略和社会福利问题。研究表明,碳税政策的实施均会使得普通产品和低碳产品的批发价格和零售价格上升,且普通产品的价格变化总是较低碳产品更加明显;实施碳税政策前后,清洁型制造商面临的产品需求和利润变化总是较普通制造商更具有相对优势;制造商竞争有利于碳税政策引导制造商降低单位产品的碳排放量,实现绿色转型;碳税政策下,不论是清洁型制造商还是普通制造商,他们降低自身产品的单位碳排放量对提升自身产品在需求上的优势或减少自身产品在需求上的劣势都是有益的。当制造商之间的竞争性较小时,实施最优的碳税政策可以显著改善社会福利;特别是当消费者环境意识水平较低时,实施最优的碳税政策更为必要。当制造商之间的竞争强度较大时,不论消费者环境意识高低,直观税率值1可以作为一个近似最优的碳税政策,用以改善社会福利。
In recent years,global warming and greenhouse effect have received increasing attention.Countries have also put forward corresponding regulations and policies to curb carbon emissions.Carbon tax,as one of the important policy tools for controlling carbon emissions,is widely adopted by many countries and local governments.Meanwhile,the environmental awareness of consumers is also increasing.Therefore,the optimal carbon tax policy is formulated based on the government's goal of maximizing social welfare,and the pricing decisions of companies under the carbon tax and increasingly rising consumer environmental awareness,which is of great practical significance for enterprises and policy makers.Due to the fact that the manufacturers are in the complete monopoly situation is relatively rare,they are generally faced with fierce competition in the market,such as electronic and electrical industry.Thus,this research will be conducted in the situation with two competing manufacturers.Specifically,a two-level supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer is taken as the research object and a three-stage Stackelberg game model with government participation is built.The Stackelberg game model consists of three stages.First,the government decides the carbon tax rate;then the manufacturers decide the wholesale price of their own products;finally the retailer decides the selling price of each product.The problem is solved by the backward induction.The study results show that:(1)when the carbon tax policy is imposed,the wholesale and retail prices of both ordinary product and low-carbon product will rise,and the rising trend of price in ordinary product is more obvious than that in low-carbon product.Compared with the scenario with no carbon tax policy,in the scenario with carbon tax,low-carbon manufacturer has a comparative advantage over ordinary manufacturer in product demand and profit changes.(2)Competition between manufacturers is conducive to carbon tax policy to guide manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions per unit of product and achieve green transformation.In the industry with competing manufacturers,it's beneficial for both low-carbon manufacturer and ordinary manufacturer to reduce their respective carbon emissions per unit of product.(3)When the competition between manufacturers is not intensive,the implementation of optimal carbon tax policy can significantly improve social welfare;especially when the consumer environmental awareness is low,the implementation of optimal carbon tax policy is more necessary.(4)When the competitiveness between manufacturers is large,the intuitive tax rate of 1 can be regarded as an approximate optimal carbon tax policy to improve the social welfare,regardless of the consumer environmental awareness.In this paper,the issues about the formulation of government's carbon tax policy and the adjustment of the firms' operational decisions in scenario with competing manufacturers are answered.Further,the relevant research is enriched under the conditions with manufacturers' competition,which can provide a basic research framework and idea for low-carbon supply chain that considers upstream competition.
In recent years,global warming and greenhouse effect have received increasing attention.Countries have also put forward corresponding regulations and policies to curb carbon emissions.Carbon tax,as one of the important policy tools for controlling carbon emissions,is widely adopted by many countries and local governments.Meanwhile,the environmental awareness of consumers is also increasing.Therefore,the optimal carbon tax policy is formulated based on the government's goal of maximizing social welfare,and the pricing decisions of companies under the carbon tax and increasingly rising consumer environmental awareness,which is of great practical significance for enterprises and policy makers.Due to the fact that the manufacturers are in the complete monopoly situation is relatively rare,they are generally faced with fierce competition in the market,such as electronic and electrical industry.Thus,this research will be conducted in the situation with two competing manufacturers.Specifically,a two-level supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer is taken as the research object and a three-stage Stackelberg game model with government participation is built.The Stackelberg game model consists of three stages.First,the government decides the carbon tax rate;then the manufacturers decide the wholesale price of their own products;finally the retailer decides the selling price of each product.The problem is solved by the backward induction.The study results show that:(1)when the carbon tax policy is imposed,the wholesale and retail prices of both ordinary product and low-carbon product will rise,and the rising trend of price in ordinary product is more obvious than that in low-carbon product.Compared with the scenario with no carbon tax policy,in the scenario with carbon tax,low-carbon manufacturer has a comparative advantage over ordinary manufacturer in product demand and profit changes.(2)Competition between manufacturers is conducive to carbon tax policy to guide manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions per unit of product and achieve green transformation.In the industry with competing manufacturers,it's beneficial for both low-carbon manufacturer and ordinary manufacturer to reduce their respective carbon emissions per unit of product.(3)When the competition between manufacturers is not intensive,the implementation of optimal carbon tax policy can significantly improve social welfare;especially when the consumer environmental awareness is low,the implementation of optimal carbon tax policy is more necessary.(4)When the competitiveness between manufacturers is large,the intuitive tax rate of 1 can be regarded as an approximate optimal carbon tax policy to improve the social welfare,regardless of the consumer environmental awareness.In this paper,the issues about the formulation of government's carbon tax policy and the adjustment of the firms' operational decisions in scenario with competing manufacturers are answered.Further,the relevant research is enriched under the conditions with manufacturers' competition,which can provide a basic research framework and idea for low-carbon supply chain that considers upstream competition.
引文
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[24]叶同,关志民,陶瑾,等.考虑消费者低碳偏好和参考低碳水平效应的供应链联合减排动态优化与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):52-61.
[25]Eurobarometer F.Europeans'attitudes towards the issue of sustainable consumption and production[J/OL].Flash Eurobarometer,2009,http://globalsustain.org/files/eurobametre_summary.pdf.
[26]智研数据研究中心网讯.2013年中国绿色消费市场发展分析[EB/OL].(2013-04-20)[2019-05-23].http://www.abaogao.com/c/qita/338477 TIKJ.html.
[27]中国产业信息网.2016年度中国绿色消费市场规模及发展情况分析[EB/OL].(2016-08-29)[2019-05-23].http://www.chyxx.com/industry/20 1608/442669.html.
[28]中国碳排放交易网.苹果公司碳排放分析[EB/OL].http://www.tanpaifang.com/jienenjianpai/2015/0306/42879.html.
[29]Park S J,Cachon G P,Lai G,et al.Supply chain design and carbon penalty:monopoly vs.monopolistic competition[J].Production and Operations Management,2015,24(9):1494-1508.
[30]Tol R S J.The social cost of carbon:Trends,outliers and catastrophes[J].Economics:The Open-Access,Open-Assessment E-Journal,2008,2(25):1-24.
[31]Frank R H.Carbon tax silence,overtaken by events[N].The New York times,2012-8-25.
[32]Cachon G P.Retail store density and the cost of greenhouse gas emissions[J].Management Science,2014,60(8):1907-1925.
[2]Parry M L,Canziani O F,Palutikof J P,et al.Climate change 2007:Impacts,adaptation and vulnerability[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2007.
[3]Haszeldine R S.Carbon capture and storage:how green can black be?[J].Science,2009,325(5948):1647-1652.
[4]Ellerman A D,Buchner B K.The European Union emissions trading scheme:origins,allocation,and early results[J].Review of environmental economics and policy,2007,1(1):66-87.
[5]碳排放交易网.哪些国家已开征碳税[EB/OL].(2013-12-23)[2019-05-23].http://www.tanpai fang.com/tanshui/2013/1223/27315.html.
[6]He Ping,Zhang Wei,Xu Xiaoyan,et al.Production lot-sizing and carbon emissions under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2015(103):241-248.
[7]Bai Qingguo,Chen Mingyuan.The distributionally robust newsvendor problem with dual sourcing under carbon tax and cap-and-trade regulations[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2016(98):260-274.
[8]Xu Xiaoyan,Xu Xiaoping,He Ping.Joint production and pricing decisions for multiple products with capand-trade and carbon tax regulations[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016(112):4093-4106.
[9]Tamura H,Abe M,Tomiyama S,et al.A model of evaluating the effectiveness of carbon tax for regulation total emission of carbon dioxide[J].Transactions of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers,1997,33(7):687-692.
[10]Chen Zhanming,Liu Yu,Qin Ping,et al.Environmental externality of coal use in China:Welfare effect and tax regulation[J].Applied Energy,2015(156):16-31.
[11]刘名武,万谧宇,付红.碳交易和低碳偏好下供应链低碳技术选择研究[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(1):152-162.
[12]Chen Xu,Hao Gang.Sustainable pricing and production policies for two competing firms with carbon emissions tax[J].International Journal of Production Research,2015,53(21):6408-6420.
[13]Liu Yu,Lu Yingying.The Economic impact of different carbon tax revenue recycling schemes in China:Amodel-based scenario analysis[J].Applied Energy,2015(141):96-105.
[14]K9k A G,Shang K,Yücel爦.Impact of electricity pricing policies on renewable energy investments and carbon emissions[J].Management Science,2018,64(1):131-148.
[15]周艳菊,胡凤英,周正龙,等.最优碳税税率对供应链结构和社会福利的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(4):886-900.
[16]Vol N.Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer[J].Marketing Science,2011,10(4):271-296.
[17]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下具竞争制造商的废旧产品回收决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(5):50-56.
[18]王文宾,陈琴,达庆利.奖惩机制下制造商竞争的闭环供应链决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(6):57-63.
[19]邓万江,马士华,关旭.碳交易背景下存在顾客环保偏好的双企业竞争策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(12):17-26.
[20]Liu Zugang,Anderson T D,Cruz J M.Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,218(3):602-613.
[21]Yu Yugang,Han Xiaoya,Hu Guiping.Optimal production for manufacturers considering consumer environmental awareness and green subsidies[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016(182):397-408.
[22]Zhang Linhong,Zhang Jie.Optimal Subsidy and Tax Policies for Green Product with Consumer Environmental Awareness[C].//Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,Hawaii,Jan 4-7,2017.
[23]Zhang Linhong,Wang Jinggno,You Jianxin.Consumer environmental awareness and channel coordination with two substitutable products[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,241(1):63-73.
[24]叶同,关志民,陶瑾,等.考虑消费者低碳偏好和参考低碳水平效应的供应链联合减排动态优化与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(10):52-61.
[25]Eurobarometer F.Europeans'attitudes towards the issue of sustainable consumption and production[J/OL].Flash Eurobarometer,2009,http://globalsustain.org/files/eurobametre_summary.pdf.
[26]智研数据研究中心网讯.2013年中国绿色消费市场发展分析[EB/OL].(2013-04-20)[2019-05-23].http://www.abaogao.com/c/qita/338477 TIKJ.html.
[27]中国产业信息网.2016年度中国绿色消费市场规模及发展情况分析[EB/OL].(2016-08-29)[2019-05-23].http://www.chyxx.com/industry/20 1608/442669.html.
[28]中国碳排放交易网.苹果公司碳排放分析[EB/OL].http://www.tanpaifang.com/jienenjianpai/2015/0306/42879.html.
[29]Park S J,Cachon G P,Lai G,et al.Supply chain design and carbon penalty:monopoly vs.monopolistic competition[J].Production and Operations Management,2015,24(9):1494-1508.
[30]Tol R S J.The social cost of carbon:Trends,outliers and catastrophes[J].Economics:The Open-Access,Open-Assessment E-Journal,2008,2(25):1-24.
[31]Frank R H.Carbon tax silence,overtaken by events[N].The New York times,2012-8-25.
[32]Cachon G P.Retail store density and the cost of greenhouse gas emissions[J].Management Science,2014,60(8):1907-1925.
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