中国上市公司“小股民行动”现象的影响因素与经济后果
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摘要
本文利用近年来中小股东提出不同于控股股东的新议案和否决其旧议案的"小股民行动"事件,考察了中国上市公司中小股东如何主动参与上市公司治理的问题。研究发现,当中小股东相对力量较大、缺乏可依靠且独立性较高的董事会时,中小股东发起提案的可能性将增加;而中小股东否决旧议案主要受公司绩效的影响。小股民行动通过促使董事会成员变更改善公司治理结构,最终提高公司长期绩效。上述实现路径在非国有企业、股权结构较分散、制衡度较高的企业中更加显著。因而,小股民行动成为中国资本市场进入股权分散时代潜在的外部治理机制之一。
This paper empirically examines the influential factors and the economic consequences of "minority shareholders' decisions" on listed companies in China, taking advantage of the phenomenon of recent years whereby these decisions have materialised from the proposal of new motions different from those of the controlling shareholders and the vetoing of their old proposed motions. The study shows that minority shareholders submit proposals with greater ease in companies whose ownership structures are relatively decentralised-they have relatively greater power when balancing controlling shareholder decisions. At the same time, it is noted that the lack of a board of directors with a high level of independence to be relied upon is also an incentive for such decisions being carried out. On the other hand, corporate performance has a significant impact on minority shareholders when it comes to vetoing the old motions. We also find that "minority shareholders' decisions" improve the corporate governance structure by promoting change implementation among the members of the board of directors, and ultimately enhance the company's long-term performance, although this leads to a short-term negative market response. This mechanism is more obvious and efficient in non-state-owned enterprises or companies where the ownership structure is more dispersed-the checks and balances are higher. "Minority shareholders' decisions", therefore, are one of the potential corporate governance mechanisms in the Chinese capital market when accessing the diffuse ownership era.
This paper empirically examines the influential factors and the economic consequences of "minority shareholders' decisions" on listed companies in China, taking advantage of the phenomenon of recent years whereby these decisions have materialised from the proposal of new motions different from those of the controlling shareholders and the vetoing of their old proposed motions. The study shows that minority shareholders submit proposals with greater ease in companies whose ownership structures are relatively decentralised-they have relatively greater power when balancing controlling shareholder decisions. At the same time, it is noted that the lack of a board of directors with a high level of independence to be relied upon is also an incentive for such decisions being carried out. On the other hand, corporate performance has a significant impact on minority shareholders when it comes to vetoing the old motions. We also find that "minority shareholders' decisions" improve the corporate governance structure by promoting change implementation among the members of the board of directors, and ultimately enhance the company's long-term performance, although this leads to a short-term negative market response. This mechanism is more obvious and efficient in non-state-owned enterprises or companies where the ownership structure is more dispersed-the checks and balances are higher. "Minority shareholders' decisions", therefore, are one of the potential corporate governance mechanisms in the Chinese capital market when accessing the diffuse ownership era.
引文
白重恩、刘俏、陆洲、宋敏、张俊喜(2005):《中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究》,《经济研究》第2期。
陈信元、汪辉(2004):《股东制衡与公司价值:模型及经验证据》,《数量经济技术经济研究》第11期。
冯根福、韩冰、闫冰(2002):《中国上市公司股权集中度变动的实证分析》,《经济研究》第8期。
姜国华、岳衡(2005):《大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究》,《管理世界》第9期。
孔东民、刘莎莎、黎文靖(2013):《冷漠是理性的吗?中小股东参与、公司治理与投资者保护》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
李培功、沈艺峰(2010):《媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据》,《经济研究》第4期。
李增泉、孙铮、王志伟(2004):《“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据》,《会计研究》第12期。
李增泉、余谦、王晓坤(2005):《掏空、支持与并购重组》,《经济研究》第1期。
黎文靖、孔东民、刘莎莎、邢精平(2012):《中小股东仅能“搭便车”吗——来自深交所社会公众股东网络投票的经验证据》,《金融研究》第3期。
王鹏(2008):《投资者保护、代理成本与公司绩效》,《经济研究》第2期。
叶康涛、陆正飞、张志华(2007):《独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”》,《经济研究》第4期。
张华、张俊喜、宋敏(2004):《所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究》,《经济学(季刊)》第10期。
郑志刚(2017):《从万科到阿里:分散股权时代的公司治理》,北京:北京大学出版社。
Acharya, V.V.; Gottschalg, O.F.; Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. “Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity.” Review of Financial Studies, 2013, 26(2), pp.68-402.
Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D. “The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58(1), pp.113-139.
Berglof, E. and Pajuste, A. “Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets? Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe,” in P.K. Cornelius and B. Kogut eds., Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Burkart, M.; Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A.“Family Firms.” The Journal of Finance, 2003, 59 (5), pp.2167-2202.
Claessens, S.; Djankov, S. and Lang, L. H. P. “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58(1), pp.81-112.
Cornelli, F. and Karakas, O. “Corporate Governance of LBOs: The Role of Boards.” SSRN working paper, 2012.
Eriksson,T.; Madsen, E.S.; Dilling-Hansen, M. and Smith, V. “Determinants of CEO and Board Turnover.” Empirica, 2001, 28(3), pp.243-257.
Faccio, M. and Lang, L. H. “The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 65(3), pp.365-395.
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26(2), pp.327-349.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. “Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4), pp.305-360.
Jiang, G.; Lee, C. M. C. and Yue, H. “Tunneling through Interoperate Loans: The China Experience.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, 98(1), pp.1-20.
Johnson, S.; La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. “Tunneling.” The American Economic Review, 2000, 90(2), pp.22-27.
La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. “Corporate Ownership around the World.” The Journal of Finance,1999, 54(2), pp.471-517.
La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106(6), pp.1113-1155.
Maury, B. and Pajuste, A. “Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 2005, 29(7), pp.1813-1834.
Parrino,R. “CEO Turnover and Outside Succession a Cross-Sectional Analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1997, 46(2), pp.165-197.
Pfeffer, J. “Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization and Its Environment.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 1972,17(2), pp.218-228.
Pugliese, A.; Bezemer, P.; Zattoni, A.; Huse, M.; Van den Bosch, F.A.J. and Volberda, H.W. “Boards of Directors' Contribution to Strategy: A Literature Review and Research Agenda.” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17(3), pp.292-306.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and Rubin, D. B. “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrika, 1983, 70(1), pp.41-55.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.” The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(3), pp.461-488.
Wu, S.; Xu, N. and Yuan, Q. “State Control, Legal Investor Protection, and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from China.” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 317(2), pp.176-192.
(1)见《南方周末》2014年7月4日“股票就是选票,股民也是股东”的报道。网址http://search.infzm.com/search.php?q=小股民“起义”&sitesearch=infzm.com&page=0。
(2)2013年12月28日发布的新《公司法》第102条规定,“单独或者合计持有公司百分之三以上股份的股东,可以在股东大会召开十日前提出临时提案并书面提交董事会;董事会应当在收到提案后二日内通知其他股东,并将该临时提案提交股东大会审议。临时提案的内容应当属于股东大会职权范围,并有明确议题和具体决议事项。”
(3)中国上市公司股东权利保护的事实改善和风险分担意识的加强使原控股股东倾向于选择股权分散的股权结构。2005-2007年进行的股权分置改革使股票自由流通,甚至使控制权变更成为可能。随着可投资股票等资金比例上限不断提高,险资等机构投资者开始大举进入资本市场,甚至通过在二级市场公开举牌一度成为一些上市公司的第1大股东。在上述3个因素的共同促进下,从2015年开始中国上市公司第1大股东的平均持股比例低于代表相对控股权的1/3。中国资本市场以2015年爆发的万科股权之争为标志进入分散股权时代(郑志刚,2017)。
(4)隧道挖掘指最终所有者通过金字塔结构、交叉持股和发行不平等投票权,以资产出售、转移定价、资金占用等方式实现资源转移,从而侵吞外部分散股东利益的行为(Johnson等,2000)。
(5)指无论对经理人还是控股股东,中小股东由于处于生产经营管理信息的劣势而成为委托人。
(6)作者感谢匿名审稿专家在模型设定中增加控制变量问题上提出的建设性意见和建议。
(7)该变量是(3)式的主要解释变量。对照组样本的取值依据其所处时间对应实验组样本事件发生前后来取值,例如对照组样本所处年份在对应实验组样本发生后,则After取1。
陈信元、汪辉(2004):《股东制衡与公司价值:模型及经验证据》,《数量经济技术经济研究》第11期。
冯根福、韩冰、闫冰(2002):《中国上市公司股权集中度变动的实证分析》,《经济研究》第8期。
姜国华、岳衡(2005):《大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究》,《管理世界》第9期。
孔东民、刘莎莎、黎文靖(2013):《冷漠是理性的吗?中小股东参与、公司治理与投资者保护》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
李培功、沈艺峰(2010):《媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据》,《经济研究》第4期。
李增泉、孙铮、王志伟(2004):《“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据》,《会计研究》第12期。
李增泉、余谦、王晓坤(2005):《掏空、支持与并购重组》,《经济研究》第1期。
黎文靖、孔东民、刘莎莎、邢精平(2012):《中小股东仅能“搭便车”吗——来自深交所社会公众股东网络投票的经验证据》,《金融研究》第3期。
王鹏(2008):《投资者保护、代理成本与公司绩效》,《经济研究》第2期。
叶康涛、陆正飞、张志华(2007):《独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”》,《经济研究》第4期。
张华、张俊喜、宋敏(2004):《所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究》,《经济学(季刊)》第10期。
郑志刚(2017):《从万科到阿里:分散股权时代的公司治理》,北京:北京大学出版社。
Acharya, V.V.; Gottschalg, O.F.; Hahn, M. and Kehoe, C. “Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity.” Review of Financial Studies, 2013, 26(2), pp.68-402.
Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D. “The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58(1), pp.113-139.
Berglof, E. and Pajuste, A. “Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets? Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe,” in P.K. Cornelius and B. Kogut eds., Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Burkart, M.; Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A.“Family Firms.” The Journal of Finance, 2003, 59 (5), pp.2167-2202.
Claessens, S.; Djankov, S. and Lang, L. H. P. “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58(1), pp.81-112.
Cornelli, F. and Karakas, O. “Corporate Governance of LBOs: The Role of Boards.” SSRN working paper, 2012.
Eriksson,T.; Madsen, E.S.; Dilling-Hansen, M. and Smith, V. “Determinants of CEO and Board Turnover.” Empirica, 2001, 28(3), pp.243-257.
Faccio, M. and Lang, L. H. “The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 65(3), pp.365-395.
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26(2), pp.327-349.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. “Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4), pp.305-360.
Jiang, G.; Lee, C. M. C. and Yue, H. “Tunneling through Interoperate Loans: The China Experience.” Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, 98(1), pp.1-20.
Johnson, S.; La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. “Tunneling.” The American Economic Review, 2000, 90(2), pp.22-27.
La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. “Corporate Ownership around the World.” The Journal of Finance,1999, 54(2), pp.471-517.
La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106(6), pp.1113-1155.
Maury, B. and Pajuste, A. “Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 2005, 29(7), pp.1813-1834.
Parrino,R. “CEO Turnover and Outside Succession a Cross-Sectional Analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1997, 46(2), pp.165-197.
Pfeffer, J. “Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization and Its Environment.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 1972,17(2), pp.218-228.
Pugliese, A.; Bezemer, P.; Zattoni, A.; Huse, M.; Van den Bosch, F.A.J. and Volberda, H.W. “Boards of Directors' Contribution to Strategy: A Literature Review and Research Agenda.” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17(3), pp.292-306.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and Rubin, D. B. “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects.” Biometrika, 1983, 70(1), pp.41-55.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.” The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(3), pp.461-488.
Wu, S.; Xu, N. and Yuan, Q. “State Control, Legal Investor Protection, and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from China.” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 317(2), pp.176-192.
(1)见《南方周末》2014年7月4日“股票就是选票,股民也是股东”的报道。网址http://search.infzm.com/search.php?q=小股民“起义”&sitesearch=infzm.com&page=0。
(2)2013年12月28日发布的新《公司法》第102条规定,“单独或者合计持有公司百分之三以上股份的股东,可以在股东大会召开十日前提出临时提案并书面提交董事会;董事会应当在收到提案后二日内通知其他股东,并将该临时提案提交股东大会审议。临时提案的内容应当属于股东大会职权范围,并有明确议题和具体决议事项。”
(3)中国上市公司股东权利保护的事实改善和风险分担意识的加强使原控股股东倾向于选择股权分散的股权结构。2005-2007年进行的股权分置改革使股票自由流通,甚至使控制权变更成为可能。随着可投资股票等资金比例上限不断提高,险资等机构投资者开始大举进入资本市场,甚至通过在二级市场公开举牌一度成为一些上市公司的第1大股东。在上述3个因素的共同促进下,从2015年开始中国上市公司第1大股东的平均持股比例低于代表相对控股权的1/3。中国资本市场以2015年爆发的万科股权之争为标志进入分散股权时代(郑志刚,2017)。
(4)隧道挖掘指最终所有者通过金字塔结构、交叉持股和发行不平等投票权,以资产出售、转移定价、资金占用等方式实现资源转移,从而侵吞外部分散股东利益的行为(Johnson等,2000)。
(5)指无论对经理人还是控股股东,中小股东由于处于生产经营管理信息的劣势而成为委托人。
(6)作者感谢匿名审稿专家在模型设定中增加控制变量问题上提出的建设性意见和建议。
(7)该变量是(3)式的主要解释变量。对照组样本的取值依据其所处时间对应实验组样本事件发生前后来取值,例如对照组样本所处年份在对应实验组样本发生后,则After取1。