海洋渔业资源萎缩的博弈分析
|
摘要
以博弈理论为基础,将海洋渔业资源的特性纳入考虑,以渔民、中央政府、地方政府三个利益主体为代表构建了渔民之间、渔民与政府之间、同级政府之间和上下级政府之间四个不同的非合作博弈模型。博弈分析表明,因渔业资源变化、政策变动、渔民劳动力变化等因素造成的不确定性会引发渔民的短视行为,导致其对渔业资源的过度捕捞;由于渔民与政府的最优捕捞规模不一致,因此渔民可能不会服从政府政策,需由地方政府施加监管并依靠高额罚金等手段进行有效规范;由中央政府制定统一政策比地方政府分而治之能更好地保护海洋渔业资源,但地方政府有背离中央政府选择较宽松罚金制度的激励。
Based on game theory, this paper takes the characteristics of marine fishery resources into consideration, and constructs four different non-cooperative game models around fishermen,central government and local government. They are fishermen's game, game between fishermen and government, governments' game and the game between the central government and local government.The study found that the uncertainties would lead fishermen to act short sighted and over fish. The objectives of government and the fishermen to maximize their income is inconsistent, so fishermen may not obey the policy, and local government have to regulation with high fines. Unified policy developed by central government will do better to protect fishery resources than the rule developed by local government alone, though it may not work.
Based on game theory, this paper takes the characteristics of marine fishery resources into consideration, and constructs four different non-cooperative game models around fishermen,central government and local government. They are fishermen's game, game between fishermen and government, governments' game and the game between the central government and local government.The study found that the uncertainties would lead fishermen to act short sighted and over fish. The objectives of government and the fishermen to maximize their income is inconsistent, so fishermen may not obey the policy, and local government have to regulation with high fines. Unified policy developed by central government will do better to protect fishery resources than the rule developed by local government alone, though it may not work.
引文
[1]Gordon H S.An Economic Approach to the Optimum Utilization of Fishery Resources[J].Journal of the Fisheries Board of Canada,1953,10(7):442-457.
[2]Hardin G.The tragedy of the commons[J].science,1968,162(5364):1243-1248.
[3]袁庆明.资源枯竭型公地悲剧的原因及对策研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2007,(5):9-13.
[4]慕永通,韩立民.渔业问题及其根源剖析[J].中国海洋大学学报(社会科学版),2003,(6):66-74.
[5]Munro G R.The optimal management of transboundary renewable resources[J].Canadian Journal of Economics,1979,12(3):355-376.
[6]Clark C W,Munro G R.Fisheries and the processing sector:some implications for management policy[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(2):603-616.
[7]Sumaila U R.Irreversible capital investment in a two-stage bimatrix fishery game model[J].Marine Resource Economics,1995,10(3):263-283.
[8]Sumaila U R.A review of game theoretic models of fishing[J].Marine policy,1999,23(1):1-10.
[9]Trisak J.Applying game theory to analyze the influence of biological characteristics on fishers’cooperation in fisheries co-management[J].Fisheries research,2005,75(1):164-174.
[10]李雍容.基于博弈论的海洋捕捞业政府规制研究[D].厦门大学,2009.
[11]顾湘,张继平.中国海洋渔业资源管理的博弈分析和制度改进[J].中国行政管理,2011,(10):30-33.
[12]许志华.区域海洋渔业合作博弈研究[D].中国海洋大学,2014.
[13]徐敬俊.跨界海洋渔业管理研究——一个博弈论的分析框架[J].中国海洋大学学报:社会科学版,2011,(3):33-35.
[14]王淼,秦曼.海洋渔业资源开发利益相关者的行为博弈[J].中国渔业经济,2007,(3):19-23.
[15]王淼,秦曼.从渔民经济行为看渔业管理制度安排[J].中国渔业经济,2008,26(5):12-15.
[16]杨立敏,潘克厚.渔民合作组织——渔业经济可持续发展的重要载体[J].中国渔业经济,2005,(1):31-33.
[17]杨瑞龙,杨其静.阶梯式的渐进制度变迁模型——再论地方政府在我国制度变迁中的作用[J].经济研究,2000,(3):24-31,80.
[18]黄硕琳.渔权即是海权[J].中国法学,2012,(6):68-77.
[2]Hardin G.The tragedy of the commons[J].science,1968,162(5364):1243-1248.
[3]袁庆明.资源枯竭型公地悲剧的原因及对策研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2007,(5):9-13.
[4]慕永通,韩立民.渔业问题及其根源剖析[J].中国海洋大学学报(社会科学版),2003,(6):66-74.
[5]Munro G R.The optimal management of transboundary renewable resources[J].Canadian Journal of Economics,1979,12(3):355-376.
[6]Clark C W,Munro G R.Fisheries and the processing sector:some implications for management policy[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(2):603-616.
[7]Sumaila U R.Irreversible capital investment in a two-stage bimatrix fishery game model[J].Marine Resource Economics,1995,10(3):263-283.
[8]Sumaila U R.A review of game theoretic models of fishing[J].Marine policy,1999,23(1):1-10.
[9]Trisak J.Applying game theory to analyze the influence of biological characteristics on fishers’cooperation in fisheries co-management[J].Fisheries research,2005,75(1):164-174.
[10]李雍容.基于博弈论的海洋捕捞业政府规制研究[D].厦门大学,2009.
[11]顾湘,张继平.中国海洋渔业资源管理的博弈分析和制度改进[J].中国行政管理,2011,(10):30-33.
[12]许志华.区域海洋渔业合作博弈研究[D].中国海洋大学,2014.
[13]徐敬俊.跨界海洋渔业管理研究——一个博弈论的分析框架[J].中国海洋大学学报:社会科学版,2011,(3):33-35.
[14]王淼,秦曼.海洋渔业资源开发利益相关者的行为博弈[J].中国渔业经济,2007,(3):19-23.
[15]王淼,秦曼.从渔民经济行为看渔业管理制度安排[J].中国渔业经济,2008,26(5):12-15.
[16]杨立敏,潘克厚.渔民合作组织——渔业经济可持续发展的重要载体[J].中国渔业经济,2005,(1):31-33.
[17]杨瑞龙,杨其静.阶梯式的渐进制度变迁模型——再论地方政府在我国制度变迁中的作用[J].经济研究,2000,(3):24-31,80.
[18]黄硕琳.渔权即是海权[J].中国法学,2012,(6):68-77.