政府补助是否会影响企业避税行为?
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摘要
传统"理性经济人"假定是西方经济学研究的基础,认为一切从事社会经济活动的个体的行为均以利益最大化为目的,这直接影响了后来的学术研究和理论发展,也使得目前在讨论政企互惠关系时倾向于将其置于合谋的理论框架下,从政企利益交换的角度及催生出的负面影响去解读,但文章认为政企互惠概念并非完全包括在政企合谋之中,并以政府补助与企业避税的关系为切入点来研究政企互动过程,选取中国沪深A股上市公司2008-2016年的数据作为研究样本,提出并实证检验了企业获得的补贴与其避税行为之间存在负相关关系。同时发现,企业减少避税这一机会主义行为会使其下一期获得更多的政府补助支持。由此可知,政企之间的这种互惠行为是符合经济规律的。以上结果在排除了反向因果和变量衡量误差等内生性问题以及样本选择性问题后依然成立。文章的进一步研究还发现,这种互惠关系会受企业自身产权属性和内部盈余管理动机的影响,同时也会影响市场投资者对于该企业投资价值认知的变化。文章的研究结论对于转轨时期我国市场经济的有序运行有着重要的启示意义。
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is a reciprocal relationship between the government and enterprises. The previous literature in the field tends to put it under the framework of the collusion theory,to interpret from the perspective of the exchange of interests,and to explain the negative consequences caused by the collusion when discussing the reciprocal relationship between the government and enterprises previously. However,we believe that the reciprocity between the government and enterprises is not completely involved in the concept of collusion between the government and enterprises,and the two should be cross-cutting. Therefore,through studying the relationship between government subsidies and corporate tax avoidance behaviors,we find the mutual support between the government and enterprises,that is,enterprises plan to establish and maintain the mutual trust between the government and enterprises,and the higher degree of government subsidy support makes the lower degree of tax avoidance. The tax avoidance of enterprises as an opportunistic behavior reduces the outflow of economic benefits in the short term,which is in line with the short-term interests of enterprises,but in the long run,it encourages its short-sighted behavior,reduces the quality of financial information of enterprises,and damages the credibility of enterprises in government departments. It is not conducive to the sustainable development of enterprises. From this point of view,the tax avoidance motive weakened by the current government subsidies is in line with objective reality and economic law,and enterprises show an economic and rational side in their behavior.Considering that there may be a reverse causal problem between government subsidies and corporate tax avoidance in this paper,we use the instrumental variable method and the method of establishing the simultaneous equations model to further verify the hypotheses of this paper.The results still support our conjectures.In addition,the conclusions of this paper are still robust after controlling the individual’s fixed effects,the measurement error of the variables,and the sample selection problem.In further research,we find that the role of government subsidies in suppressing the tax avoidance of enterprises is only significant in the sample of nonstate-owned enterprises.The reason why government subsidies can reduce corporate tax avoidance is partly because government subsidies can weaken the incentives for corporate earnings management,thus improving the information environment of enterprises.We also find that when the higher amount of government subsidies received the higher level of tax avoidance in the current period induces the greater level of damage to their market value.Market investors have a negative attitude towards the behavior of enterprises which undermines the reciprocal relationship with the government.This paper verifies that there is a positive reciprocal relationship between the government and enterprises,and proposes amendments and supplements to the research conclusions of the predecessors based on the principal-agent theory and the rent-seeking theory.The research in this paper has certain enlightenment for the orderly operation of China’s market economy,which is still in the transitional economy period.Enterprises actively and orderly participate in,the government adjusts in a fair and orderly manner,market resources can be allocated reasonably and orderly,and finally,we can effectively safeguard the interests of market investors.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is a reciprocal relationship between the government and enterprises. The previous literature in the field tends to put it under the framework of the collusion theory,to interpret from the perspective of the exchange of interests,and to explain the negative consequences caused by the collusion when discussing the reciprocal relationship between the government and enterprises previously. However,we believe that the reciprocity between the government and enterprises is not completely involved in the concept of collusion between the government and enterprises,and the two should be cross-cutting. Therefore,through studying the relationship between government subsidies and corporate tax avoidance behaviors,we find the mutual support between the government and enterprises,that is,enterprises plan to establish and maintain the mutual trust between the government and enterprises,and the higher degree of government subsidy support makes the lower degree of tax avoidance. The tax avoidance of enterprises as an opportunistic behavior reduces the outflow of economic benefits in the short term,which is in line with the short-term interests of enterprises,but in the long run,it encourages its short-sighted behavior,reduces the quality of financial information of enterprises,and damages the credibility of enterprises in government departments. It is not conducive to the sustainable development of enterprises. From this point of view,the tax avoidance motive weakened by the current government subsidies is in line with objective reality and economic law,and enterprises show an economic and rational side in their behavior.Considering that there may be a reverse causal problem between government subsidies and corporate tax avoidance in this paper,we use the instrumental variable method and the method of establishing the simultaneous equations model to further verify the hypotheses of this paper.The results still support our conjectures.In addition,the conclusions of this paper are still robust after controlling the individual’s fixed effects,the measurement error of the variables,and the sample selection problem.In further research,we find that the role of government subsidies in suppressing the tax avoidance of enterprises is only significant in the sample of nonstate-owned enterprises.The reason why government subsidies can reduce corporate tax avoidance is partly because government subsidies can weaken the incentives for corporate earnings management,thus improving the information environment of enterprises.We also find that when the higher amount of government subsidies received the higher level of tax avoidance in the current period induces the greater level of damage to their market value.Market investors have a negative attitude towards the behavior of enterprises which undermines the reciprocal relationship with the government.This paper verifies that there is a positive reciprocal relationship between the government and enterprises,and proposes amendments and supplements to the research conclusions of the predecessors based on the principal-agent theory and the rent-seeking theory.The research in this paper has certain enlightenment for the orderly operation of China’s market economy,which is still in the transitional economy period.Enterprises actively and orderly participate in,the government adjusts in a fair and orderly manner,market resources can be allocated reasonably and orderly,and finally,we can effectively safeguard the interests of market investors.
引文
[1]陈德球,陈运森,董志勇.政策不确定性、税收征管强度与企业税收规避[J].管理世界,2016,(5):151-163.
[2]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].管理世界,2016,(5):46-63.
[3]范子英,田彬彬.政企合谋与企业逃税:来自国税局长异地交流的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(4):1303-1328.
[4]郭玥.政府创新补助的信号传递机制与企业创新[J].中国工业经济,2018,(9):98-116.
[5]金太军,袁建军.政府与企业的交换模式及其演变规律--观察腐败深层机制的微观视角[J].中国社会科学,2011,(1):102-118.
[6]刘行,叶康涛.企业的避税活动会影响投资效率吗?[J].会计研究,2013,(6):47-53.
[7]聂辉华,李金波.政企合谋与经济发展[J].经济学(季刊),2007,(1):75-90.
[8]王亮亮.金融危机冲击、融资约束与公司避税[J].南开管理评论,2016,(1):155-168.
[9]汪秋明,韩庆潇,杨晨.战略性新兴产业中的政府补贴与企业行为--基于政府规制下的动态博弈分析视角[J].财经研究,2014,(7):43-53.
[10]温忠麟,侯杰泰,张雷.调节效应与中介效应的比较和应用[J].心理学报,2005,(2):268-274.
[11]张亚斌,朱虹,范子杰.地方补贴性竞争对我国产能过剩的影响--基于倾向匹配倍差法的经验分析[J].财经研究,2018,(5):36-47,152.
[12]Alchian A A.Uncertainty,evolution,and economic theory[J].Journal of Political Economy,1950,58(3):211-221.
[13]Balakrishnan K,Blouin J,Guay W R.Tax aggressiveness and corporate transparency[J].The Accounting Review,2018.
[14]Chen S P,Chen X,Cheng Q,et al.Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(1):41-61.
[15]Gouldner A W.The norm of reciprocity:A preliminary statement[J].American Sociological Review,1960,25(2):161-178.
[16]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,Agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[17]Lach S.Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D?Evidence from Israel[J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,2002,50(4):369-390.
[18]Sethi R,Somanathan E.Understanding reciprocity[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2003,50(1):1-27.
(1)来自习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会开幕会上的报告内容。
(2)详情请参见http://news.youth.cn/gn/201405/t20140521_5231972.htm与http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2014/1120/c385474-26058992.html等报道。
(1)限于篇幅,稳健性检验的部分结果未列示,如有需要可向作者索要。
[2]陈冬,孔墨奇,王红建.投我以桃,报之以李:经济周期与国企避税[J].管理世界,2016,(5):46-63.
[3]范子英,田彬彬.政企合谋与企业逃税:来自国税局长异地交流的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(4):1303-1328.
[4]郭玥.政府创新补助的信号传递机制与企业创新[J].中国工业经济,2018,(9):98-116.
[5]金太军,袁建军.政府与企业的交换模式及其演变规律--观察腐败深层机制的微观视角[J].中国社会科学,2011,(1):102-118.
[6]刘行,叶康涛.企业的避税活动会影响投资效率吗?[J].会计研究,2013,(6):47-53.
[7]聂辉华,李金波.政企合谋与经济发展[J].经济学(季刊),2007,(1):75-90.
[8]王亮亮.金融危机冲击、融资约束与公司避税[J].南开管理评论,2016,(1):155-168.
[9]汪秋明,韩庆潇,杨晨.战略性新兴产业中的政府补贴与企业行为--基于政府规制下的动态博弈分析视角[J].财经研究,2014,(7):43-53.
[10]温忠麟,侯杰泰,张雷.调节效应与中介效应的比较和应用[J].心理学报,2005,(2):268-274.
[11]张亚斌,朱虹,范子杰.地方补贴性竞争对我国产能过剩的影响--基于倾向匹配倍差法的经验分析[J].财经研究,2018,(5):36-47,152.
[12]Alchian A A.Uncertainty,evolution,and economic theory[J].Journal of Political Economy,1950,58(3):211-221.
[13]Balakrishnan K,Blouin J,Guay W R.Tax aggressiveness and corporate transparency[J].The Accounting Review,2018.
[14]Chen S P,Chen X,Cheng Q,et al.Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(1):41-61.
[15]Gouldner A W.The norm of reciprocity:A preliminary statement[J].American Sociological Review,1960,25(2):161-178.
[16]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,Agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[17]Lach S.Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D?Evidence from Israel[J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,2002,50(4):369-390.
[18]Sethi R,Somanathan E.Understanding reciprocity[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2003,50(1):1-27.
(1)来自习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会开幕会上的报告内容。
(2)详情请参见http://news.youth.cn/gn/201405/t20140521_5231972.htm与http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2014/1120/c385474-26058992.html等报道。
(1)限于篇幅,稳健性检验的部分结果未列示,如有需要可向作者索要。