P2P网贷中风险备用金机制对投资人行为的影响研究
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摘要
基于"拍拍贷"和"人人贷"平台的交易数据,运用Probit回归模型分析了中国P2P网络借贷中风险备用金机制对投资人投资决策的影响。实证分析表明:风险备用金机制能够激励投资人投资,提升借款成功率;同时能够调节投资人对借款人风险等级的感知,为历史风险信息差的借款人提供保障,借款成功率提升效果尤为明显。因此,风险备用金机制能够有效保障借贷双方利益,增强投资人的投资信心;平台应积极响应国家监管要求,保证风险备用金账户运转规范透明。
Using the the transaction data from "PPDai"and "renrendai",the Probit regression model was conducted to analyze the effect of risk guarantee fund mechanism on investors' investment decision in online peer-to-peer loans. The empirical study shows that: the risk guarantee fund can encourage investors to invest and improve the success rate of the borrowing,and has an effect on the investors' perception of the borrowers' risk level; it provides guarantee for the borrowers with information regarding negative record; the success rate of the borrowing markedly increases. These findings suggest that risk guarantee fund mechanism can effectively protect the interests of both borrowers and investors and enhance the investor's confidence in investment. The platform should actively respond to national regulatory requirements and ensure that the operation of the fund is transparent.
Using the the transaction data from "PPDai"and "renrendai",the Probit regression model was conducted to analyze the effect of risk guarantee fund mechanism on investors' investment decision in online peer-to-peer loans. The empirical study shows that: the risk guarantee fund can encourage investors to invest and improve the success rate of the borrowing,and has an effect on the investors' perception of the borrowers' risk level; it provides guarantee for the borrowers with information regarding negative record; the success rate of the borrowing markedly increases. These findings suggest that risk guarantee fund mechanism can effectively protect the interests of both borrowers and investors and enhance the investor's confidence in investment. The platform should actively respond to national regulatory requirements and ensure that the operation of the fund is transparent.
引文
[1]杨建辉,林焰.我国P2P平台的发展问题与风险防范研究[J].华南理工大学学报(社会科学版),2017,19(4):20-30.
[2] CHEN D,HAN C. A comparative study of online P2P lending in the USA and China[C]. Journal of internet banking and commerce,2012,17(2):1-15.
[3] LIN M,PRABHALA N R,VISWANATHAN S. Judging borrowers by the company they keep:Friendship networks and information asymmetry in online peer-to-peer lending[J]. Management Science,2013,59(1):17-35.
[4] IYER R,KHWAJA A I,LUTTMER E F P,et al. Screening peers softly:inferring the quality of small borrowers[J].Management science,2015,62(6):1554-1577.
[5] XU Y,QIU J,LIN Z. How does social capital influence online P2P lending? a cross-country analysis[C]//2011International Conference on Management of e-Commerce and e-Government. IEEE,Hubei; 2011:238-245.
[6] RAVINA E. Beauty,personal characteristics,and trust in credit markets[BE/OL].(2011-08-27)[2018-10-16].https://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=972801.
[7] HERZENSTEIN M,ANDREWS R L,DHOLAKIA U M,et al. The democratization of personal consumer loans? Determinants of success in online peer-to-peer loan aucitions[J]. Bulletin of the university of delaware,2008,15(3):274-277.
[8]廖理,李梦然,王正位.中国互联网金融的地域歧视研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2014,31(5):54-70.
[9] POPE D G,SYDNOR J R. What's in a picture? Evidence of discrimination from prosper. com[J]. Journal of human resources,2011,46(1):53-92.
[10] DORFLEITNER G,PRIBERNY C,SCHUSTER S,et al. Description-text related soft information in peer-to-peer lendingEvidence from two leading European platforms[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2016,64(3):169-187.
[11] FREEDMAN S M,JIN G Z. The signaling value of online social networks:lessons from peer-to-peer lending[J].International Journal of industrial organization,2017,51(3):185-222.
[12] LIU D,BRASS D,LU Y,et al. Friendships in online peer-to-peer lending:pipes,prisms,and relational herding[BE/OL].(2015-08-26)[2018-10-16]. https://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=2251155.
[13] AKERLOF G A. The market for “lemons”:quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[M]//Uncertainty in Economics. 1978:235-251.
[14] BARRO R J. The loan market,collateral,and rates of interest[J]. Journal of money,Credit and banking,1976,8(4):439-456.
[15] STIGLITZ J E,WEISS A. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information[J]. The American economic review,1981,71(3):393-410.
[16] CHAN Y S,KANATAS G. Asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements[J]. Journal of money,credit and banking,1985,17(1):84-95.
[17] BOOT A W A,THAKOR A V. Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game[J].International Economic Review,1994,35(4):899-920.
[18] BESTER H. The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information[J]. European Economic Review,1987,31(4):887-899.
[19] BESANKO D,THAKOR A V. Collateral and rationing:sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets[J]. International economic review,1987,28(3):671-689.
[20] CHAN Y S,THAKOR A V. Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information[J]. The Journal of finance,1987,42(2):345-363.
[21] POZZOLO A F. The role of guarantees in bank lending[EB/OL].(2004-05-12)[2018-10-16]. https://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=498982.
[22]彭宁. P2P网络借贷平台担保问题研究[J].法制与社会,2016(3):101-102.
[23]郑迎飞,陈晓静. P2P网贷平台本息保障与投资者反应[J].金融论坛,2018,23(1):66-80.
[24] MENKHOFF L,NEUBERGER D,SUWANAPORN C. Collateral-based lending in emerging markets:evidence from Thailand[J]. Journal of banking&finance,2006,30(1):1-21.
[25] BERGER A N,FRAME W S,IOANNIDOU V. Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information[J]. Journal of financial economics,2011,100(1):85-97.
[26] BUSETTA G,ZAZZARO A. Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection[J].Journal of financial stability,2012,8(1):15-24.
[27] SMITH JR C W,WARNER J B. On financial contracting:an analysis of bond covenants[J]. Journal of financial economics,1979,7(2):117-161.
[28] GREINER M E,WANG H. Building consumer-to-consumer trust in e-finance marketplaces:An empirical analysis[J].International journal of electronic commerce,2010,15(2):105-136.
[29] PTZSCH S,BHME R. The role of soft information in trust building:evidence from online social lending[C]//Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Berlin:Springer,2010.
[30] FENG Y,FAN X,YOON Y. Lenders and borrowers'strategies in online peer-to-peer lending market:an empirical analysis of ppdai. com[J]. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research,2015,16(3):242.
(1)LIN M F. Peer-to-peer lending:an empirical study[J]. AMCIS 2009 Doctoral Consortium,2009,17:1-7.
(1)由于“拍拍贷”和“人人贷”借款人的风险信息(包括风险等级、历史借款次数以及历史借款成功次数)会根据借款人的借款及还款行为同步更新,即借款人发布借款项目时的风险信息在本文抓取数据时可能发生了变化且难以追踪,这将会导致本文所搜集的同一借款人发布的所有借款项目的风险信息完全一样。因此,本文从所搜集的数据中筛选出理论上描述借款人风险信息最为准确的最后一条作为研究样本。
[2] CHEN D,HAN C. A comparative study of online P2P lending in the USA and China[C]. Journal of internet banking and commerce,2012,17(2):1-15.
[3] LIN M,PRABHALA N R,VISWANATHAN S. Judging borrowers by the company they keep:Friendship networks and information asymmetry in online peer-to-peer lending[J]. Management Science,2013,59(1):17-35.
[4] IYER R,KHWAJA A I,LUTTMER E F P,et al. Screening peers softly:inferring the quality of small borrowers[J].Management science,2015,62(6):1554-1577.
[5] XU Y,QIU J,LIN Z. How does social capital influence online P2P lending? a cross-country analysis[C]//2011International Conference on Management of e-Commerce and e-Government. IEEE,Hubei; 2011:238-245.
[6] RAVINA E. Beauty,personal characteristics,and trust in credit markets[BE/OL].(2011-08-27)[2018-10-16].https://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=972801.
[7] HERZENSTEIN M,ANDREWS R L,DHOLAKIA U M,et al. The democratization of personal consumer loans? Determinants of success in online peer-to-peer loan aucitions[J]. Bulletin of the university of delaware,2008,15(3):274-277.
[8]廖理,李梦然,王正位.中国互联网金融的地域歧视研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2014,31(5):54-70.
[9] POPE D G,SYDNOR J R. What's in a picture? Evidence of discrimination from prosper. com[J]. Journal of human resources,2011,46(1):53-92.
[10] DORFLEITNER G,PRIBERNY C,SCHUSTER S,et al. Description-text related soft information in peer-to-peer lendingEvidence from two leading European platforms[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2016,64(3):169-187.
[11] FREEDMAN S M,JIN G Z. The signaling value of online social networks:lessons from peer-to-peer lending[J].International Journal of industrial organization,2017,51(3):185-222.
[12] LIU D,BRASS D,LU Y,et al. Friendships in online peer-to-peer lending:pipes,prisms,and relational herding[BE/OL].(2015-08-26)[2018-10-16]. https://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=2251155.
[13] AKERLOF G A. The market for “lemons”:quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[M]//Uncertainty in Economics. 1978:235-251.
[14] BARRO R J. The loan market,collateral,and rates of interest[J]. Journal of money,Credit and banking,1976,8(4):439-456.
[15] STIGLITZ J E,WEISS A. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information[J]. The American economic review,1981,71(3):393-410.
[16] CHAN Y S,KANATAS G. Asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements[J]. Journal of money,credit and banking,1985,17(1):84-95.
[17] BOOT A W A,THAKOR A V. Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game[J].International Economic Review,1994,35(4):899-920.
[18] BESTER H. The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information[J]. European Economic Review,1987,31(4):887-899.
[19] BESANKO D,THAKOR A V. Collateral and rationing:sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets[J]. International economic review,1987,28(3):671-689.
[20] CHAN Y S,THAKOR A V. Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information[J]. The Journal of finance,1987,42(2):345-363.
[21] POZZOLO A F. The role of guarantees in bank lending[EB/OL].(2004-05-12)[2018-10-16]. https://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=498982.
[22]彭宁. P2P网络借贷平台担保问题研究[J].法制与社会,2016(3):101-102.
[23]郑迎飞,陈晓静. P2P网贷平台本息保障与投资者反应[J].金融论坛,2018,23(1):66-80.
[24] MENKHOFF L,NEUBERGER D,SUWANAPORN C. Collateral-based lending in emerging markets:evidence from Thailand[J]. Journal of banking&finance,2006,30(1):1-21.
[25] BERGER A N,FRAME W S,IOANNIDOU V. Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information[J]. Journal of financial economics,2011,100(1):85-97.
[26] BUSETTA G,ZAZZARO A. Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection[J].Journal of financial stability,2012,8(1):15-24.
[27] SMITH JR C W,WARNER J B. On financial contracting:an analysis of bond covenants[J]. Journal of financial economics,1979,7(2):117-161.
[28] GREINER M E,WANG H. Building consumer-to-consumer trust in e-finance marketplaces:An empirical analysis[J].International journal of electronic commerce,2010,15(2):105-136.
[29] PTZSCH S,BHME R. The role of soft information in trust building:evidence from online social lending[C]//Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Berlin:Springer,2010.
[30] FENG Y,FAN X,YOON Y. Lenders and borrowers'strategies in online peer-to-peer lending market:an empirical analysis of ppdai. com[J]. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research,2015,16(3):242.
(1)LIN M F. Peer-to-peer lending:an empirical study[J]. AMCIS 2009 Doctoral Consortium,2009,17:1-7.
(1)由于“拍拍贷”和“人人贷”借款人的风险信息(包括风险等级、历史借款次数以及历史借款成功次数)会根据借款人的借款及还款行为同步更新,即借款人发布借款项目时的风险信息在本文抓取数据时可能发生了变化且难以追踪,这将会导致本文所搜集的同一借款人发布的所有借款项目的风险信息完全一样。因此,本文从所搜集的数据中筛选出理论上描述借款人风险信息最为准确的最后一条作为研究样本。
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