摘要
进口国政府的关税政策会影响创新厂商许可模式的选择,当进口国政府的目标是最大化消费者福利时,国外创新厂商应在固定费用与可变费用许可模式间进行选择,而当进口国政府的目标是最大化社会总福利时,国外创新厂商的最优选择是固定费用许可模式;当技术创新程度较高时,关税政策可以解决社会总福利与消费者福利最大化之间的矛盾,而当技术创新程度较低时,关税政策难以协调二者间的冲突。
引文
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