管理者过度自信、代理成本与成本粘性
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摘要
研究企业成本粘性有助于打开成本管理的"黑箱"。本文以成本粘性的驱动因素为切入点,将2012—2016年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,探究管理者过度自信、两类代理成本与成本粘性之间的关系。研究结果表明,管理者过度自信与成本粘性显著正相关,第一类代理成本与成本粘性显著正相关,第二类代理成本与成本粘性的关系不显著。进一步利用因果逐步回归法和Bootstrap回归方法研究发现,第一类代理成本在管理者过度自信与成本粘性中存在显著的中介效应。
Studying cost stickiness of enterprise could open the "black box" of cost management. Based on driving factors of the cost stickiness,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2016 as the research samples to explore the relationship between managerial overconfidence,two types of agency costs and cost stickiness. The results show that managerial overconfidence is significantly positively correlated with the cost stickiness. The first type of agency cost is significantly positively correlated with the cost stickiness. The relationship between the second type of agency cost and the cost stickiness is not significant. Further studies using causal stepwise regression and Bootstrap regression find that the first type of agency cost has a significant mediating effect both on managerial overconfidence and cost stickiness.
Studying cost stickiness of enterprise could open the "black box" of cost management. Based on driving factors of the cost stickiness,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2016 as the research samples to explore the relationship between managerial overconfidence,two types of agency costs and cost stickiness. The results show that managerial overconfidence is significantly positively correlated with the cost stickiness. The first type of agency cost is significantly positively correlated with the cost stickiness. The relationship between the second type of agency cost and the cost stickiness is not significant. Further studies using causal stepwise regression and Bootstrap regression find that the first type of agency cost has a significant mediating effect both on managerial overconfidence and cost stickiness.
引文
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[2]Banker R.,Byzalov D.,Plehn-Dujowich J.Sticky Cost Behavior:Theory and Evidence,2010,Working paper.
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[7]Jensen,Michael,C.and William H.Meckling,Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
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[9]文芳.管理者信心与公司治理的有效性——基于我国上市公司管理者变更的经验证据[J].财经研究,2011(1):38-47.
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[11]张泽南.政治关联、管理者过度自信与成本粘性——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].财经论丛,2016(10):67-75.
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[15]万鹏,曲晓辉.董事长个人特征、代理成本与营收计划的自愿披露——来自沪深上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012(7):15-23
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[17]S Claessens,S Djankov,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2741-2771.
[18]SE Taylor,JD Brown,Illusion and Well-being:A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health[J].Psychological Bulletin,1988,103(2):193-210.
[19]S Gervais,JB Heaton,T Odean,The Positive Role of Overconfidence and Optimism in Investment Policy,2002,working paper.
[20]KL Keiber,Managerial Compensation Contracts and Overconfidence,EFA Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper,2002.
[21]陈其安,杨秀苔.基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2007(1):110-116.
[22]康开托,向小东.基于过度自信的多代理人委托代理模型研究[J].科技和产业,2013(1):107-111.
[23]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2013(1):149-163.
[24]蔡地,万迪昉.管理者过度自信研究综述[J].华东经济管理,2010(8):143-145.
[25]Dan Weiss,Cost Behavior and Analysts’Earnings Forecasts[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1441-1471.
[26]U Malmendier,G Tate,Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment?CEO Overc-onfidence Measures Revisited[J].European Financial Management,2005,11(5):649-659
[27]MLA Hayward,DC Hambrick,Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions:Evidence of CEO Hubris[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(1):103-127.
[28]James S.Ang and Rebel A.Cole and James Wuh Lin,Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):81-106.
[29]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007(1):102-113.
[30]甄红线,张先治,迟国泰.制度环境、终极控制权对公司绩效的影响——基于代理成本的中介效应检验[J].金融研究,2015(12):162-177.
[31]Baron,R.M.,& Kenny,D.A.The Moderator-mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research:Conceptual,Strategic,and Statistical Considera-tions[J].Journal of Personality & Social Psychology,1986,51:1173-1182
[32]Preacher,K.J.,&Hayes,A.F.SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating Indirect Effects in Simple Mediation Models[J].Behavior Research Methods Instruments,and Computers,2004,36:717-731.
[2]Banker R.,Byzalov D.,Plehn-Dujowich J.Sticky Cost Behavior:Theory and Evidence,2010,Working paper.
[3]Malmendier U,Tate G .CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(6):2661-2700.
[4]Schrand C M,Zechman S L C.Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting[J].Journal of Accounting & Economics,2012,53(1-2):311-329.
[5]Malmendier U,Tate G.Who Makes Acquisitions?CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(1):20-43.
[6]Hribar P,Yang H.CEO Overconfidence and Management Forecasting[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2015,33(1):204-227.
[7]Jensen,Michael,C.and William H.Meckling,Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[8]Landier,Augustin and David Thesmar,Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs:Theory and Evidence,2004,Working Paper.
[9]文芳.管理者信心与公司治理的有效性——基于我国上市公司管理者变更的经验证据[J].财经研究,2011(1):38-47.
[10]M Statman,TT Tyebjee,Optimistic Capital Budgeting Forecasts:An Experiment[J].Financial Management,1985,14(3):27-33.
[11]张泽南.政治关联、管理者过度自信与成本粘性——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].财经论丛,2016(10):67-75.
[12]Banker R.,Ciftci M,Mashruwala D.,Managerial Optimism and Cost Behavior,2010,Working paper.
[13]梁上坤.管理者过度自信、债务约束与成本粘性[J].南开管理评论,2015(3):122-131
[14]姜付秀,黄磊,张敏.产品市场竞争、公司治理与代理成本[J].世界经济,2009(10):46-59.
[15]万鹏,曲晓辉.董事长个人特征、代理成本与营收计划的自愿披露——来自沪深上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012(7):15-23
[16]CX Chen,LU Hai,T Sougiannis,The Agency Problem,Corporate Governance,and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling,General,and Administrative Costs[J].Contempor-ary Accounting Research,2012,29(1):252-282.
[17]S Claessens,S Djankov,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2741-2771.
[18]SE Taylor,JD Brown,Illusion and Well-being:A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health[J].Psychological Bulletin,1988,103(2):193-210.
[19]S Gervais,JB Heaton,T Odean,The Positive Role of Overconfidence and Optimism in Investment Policy,2002,working paper.
[20]KL Keiber,Managerial Compensation Contracts and Overconfidence,EFA Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper,2002.
[21]陈其安,杨秀苔.基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2007(1):110-116.
[22]康开托,向小东.基于过度自信的多代理人委托代理模型研究[J].科技和产业,2013(1):107-111.
[23]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2013(1):149-163.
[24]蔡地,万迪昉.管理者过度自信研究综述[J].华东经济管理,2010(8):143-145.
[25]Dan Weiss,Cost Behavior and Analysts’Earnings Forecasts[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1441-1471.
[26]U Malmendier,G Tate,Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment?CEO Overc-onfidence Measures Revisited[J].European Financial Management,2005,11(5):649-659
[27]MLA Hayward,DC Hambrick,Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions:Evidence of CEO Hubris[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42(1):103-127.
[28]James S.Ang and Rebel A.Cole and James Wuh Lin,Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):81-106.
[29]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007(1):102-113.
[30]甄红线,张先治,迟国泰.制度环境、终极控制权对公司绩效的影响——基于代理成本的中介效应检验[J].金融研究,2015(12):162-177.
[31]Baron,R.M.,& Kenny,D.A.The Moderator-mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research:Conceptual,Strategic,and Statistical Considera-tions[J].Journal of Personality & Social Psychology,1986,51:1173-1182
[32]Preacher,K.J.,&Hayes,A.F.SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating Indirect Effects in Simple Mediation Models[J].Behavior Research Methods Instruments,and Computers,2004,36:717-731.
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