制造商竞争与合作下双渠道供应链联合减排的微分博弈分析
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摘要
以两个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,分析制造商竞争与合作模型下供应链的最优均衡策略,并探讨系统关键参数对供应链各成员利润的影响.研究发现,只有当减排效率差异水平满足一定条件时,两制造商才会同时选择合作,且合作模型下制造商的利润总和增大,而减排努力、广告分担率、广告努力和零售商的利润减小.随着传统渠道市场占有率、减排竞争和广告竞争的增大,竞争模型下零售商的利润增大,而合作模型下的利润与广告竞争无关;制造商的利润变化取决于减排效率、网络渠道和传统渠道的边际利润.
Considering a dual-channel supply chain based on a differential game involving two competing manufacturers and one retailer, we study the optimal equilibrium strategies in both competition and cooperation models, and analyze how the key coefficients affect supply chain members' profits. The results suggest that, the cooperation between the two manufacturers will occur only if the emission reduction efficiency difference is limited, and the two manufacturers' total profits are higher, but their emission reduction efforts and advertising participation rates, as well as retailer's advertising efforts and profit are lower in the cooperation model. Furthermore, as the degree of customer loyalty to the retail channel increases and competition intensifies, retailer's profit in the competition model will increase, while the profit in the cooperation model is independent of advertising competition; the two manufactures' profits are both depending on their emission reduction efficiencies, direct channel and retail channel's marginal profits.
Considering a dual-channel supply chain based on a differential game involving two competing manufacturers and one retailer, we study the optimal equilibrium strategies in both competition and cooperation models, and analyze how the key coefficients affect supply chain members' profits. The results suggest that, the cooperation between the two manufacturers will occur only if the emission reduction efficiency difference is limited, and the two manufacturers' total profits are higher, but their emission reduction efforts and advertising participation rates, as well as retailer's advertising efforts and profit are lower in the cooperation model. Furthermore, as the degree of customer loyalty to the retail channel increases and competition intensifies, retailer's profit in the competition model will increase, while the profit in the cooperation model is independent of advertising competition; the two manufactures' profits are both depending on their emission reduction efficiencies, direct channel and retail channel's marginal profits.
引文
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[3]Du S, Hu L, Song M. Production optimization considering environmental performance and preference in the cap-and-trade system[J]. J of Cleaner Production,2016, 112(20):1600-1607.
[4]Du S, Tang W, Song M. Low-carbon production with low-carbon premium in cap-and-trade regulation[J]. J of Cleaner Production, 2016, 134(10):652-662.
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[12]Nair A, Narasimhan R. Dynamics of competing with quality-and advertising-based goodwill[J]. European J of Operational Research, 2006, 175(1):462-474.
[13]Ouardighi F E, Pasin F. Quality improvement and goodwill accumulation in a dynamic duopoly[J].European J of Operational Research, 2006, 175(2):1021-1032.
[14]Jorgensen S, Taboubi S, Zaccour G. Cooperative advertising in a marketing channel[J]. J of Optimization Theory and Application, 2001, 110(1):145-158.
[15]Nerlove M, Arrow K. Optimal advertising policy under dynamic conditions[J]. Economica, 1962, 29(114):129-142.
[16]王芹鹏,赵道致.两级供应链减排与促销的合作策略[J].控制与决策, 2014, 29(2):307-314.(Wang Q P, Zhao D Z. Cooperative strategy of carbon emissions reduction and promotion in a two-echelon supply chain[J]. Control and Decision, 2014, 29(2):307-314.)
[17]赵道致,徐春秋,王芹鹏.考虑零售商竞争的联合减排与低碳宣传微分对策[J].控制与决策, 2014, 29(10):1809-1815.(Zhao D Z, Xu C Q, Wang Q P. Differential strategies of joint emission reductions and low-carbon promotion considering competing retails[J]. Control and Decision,2014, 29(10):1809-1815.)
[18]徐春秋,赵道致,原白云.上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型[J].管理科学学报, 2016, 19(2):53-65.(Xu C Q, Zhao D Z, Yuan B Y. Differential game model on joint carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion in supply chains[J]. J of Management Sciences in China, 2016, 19(2):53-65.)
[19]田厚平,刘长贤.双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型[J].管理科学学报, 2011, 14(3):34-47.(Tian H P, Liu C X. Bi-objective incentive model in distribution channel under the framework of dual information asymmetry[J]. J of Management Science in China, 2011, 14(3):34-47.)
[20]Liu G, Zhang J, Tang W. Strategic transfer pricing in a marketing–operations interface with quality level and advertising dependent goodwill[J]. Omega, 2015, 56(10):1-15.
[2]Liu Z, Anderson T D, Cruz J M. Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J].European J of Operational Research, 2012, 218(3):602-613.
[3]Du S, Hu L, Song M. Production optimization considering environmental performance and preference in the cap-and-trade system[J]. J of Cleaner Production,2016, 112(20):1600-1607.
[4]Du S, Tang W, Song M. Low-carbon production with low-carbon premium in cap-and-trade regulation[J]. J of Cleaner Production, 2016, 134(10):652-662.
[5]Luo Z, Chen X, Wang X. The role of co-opetition in low carbon manufacturing[J]. European J of Operational Research, 2016, 253(2):392-403.
[6]Hua G, Cheng T C, Wang S. Managing carbon footprints in inventory management[J]. Int J of Production Economics, 2011, 132(2):178-185.
[7]Benjaafar S, Li Y, Daskin M. Carbon footprint and the management of supply chains:Insights from simple models[J]. IEEE Trans on Automation Science and Engineering, 2013, 10(1):99-116.
[8]Carrillo J E, Vakharia A J, Wang R. Environmental implications for online retailing[J]. European J of Operational Research, 2014, 39(13):744-755.
[9]Ji J, Zhang Z, Yang L. Carbon emission reduction decisions in the retail-/dual-channel supply chain with consumers’ preference[J]. J of Cleaner Production, 2017,141:852-867.
[10]熊新生,赵勇.供应链中耐用品的广告投入和零售价策略分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(6):1425-1430.(Xiong X S, Zhao Y. Optimal advertising and retail pricing in a durable goods supply chain[J]. Systems Engineering—–Theory&Practice, 2014, 34(6):1425-1430.)
[11]游达明,朱桂菊.低碳供应链生态研发、合作促销与定价的微分博弈分析[J].控制与决策, 2016, 31(6):1047-1056.(You D M, Zhu G J. Differential game analysis of ecological R&D, cooperative promotion and pricing in the low-carbon supply chain[J]. Control and Decision,2016, 31(6):1047-1056.)
[12]Nair A, Narasimhan R. Dynamics of competing with quality-and advertising-based goodwill[J]. European J of Operational Research, 2006, 175(1):462-474.
[13]Ouardighi F E, Pasin F. Quality improvement and goodwill accumulation in a dynamic duopoly[J].European J of Operational Research, 2006, 175(2):1021-1032.
[14]Jorgensen S, Taboubi S, Zaccour G. Cooperative advertising in a marketing channel[J]. J of Optimization Theory and Application, 2001, 110(1):145-158.
[15]Nerlove M, Arrow K. Optimal advertising policy under dynamic conditions[J]. Economica, 1962, 29(114):129-142.
[16]王芹鹏,赵道致.两级供应链减排与促销的合作策略[J].控制与决策, 2014, 29(2):307-314.(Wang Q P, Zhao D Z. Cooperative strategy of carbon emissions reduction and promotion in a two-echelon supply chain[J]. Control and Decision, 2014, 29(2):307-314.)
[17]赵道致,徐春秋,王芹鹏.考虑零售商竞争的联合减排与低碳宣传微分对策[J].控制与决策, 2014, 29(10):1809-1815.(Zhao D Z, Xu C Q, Wang Q P. Differential strategies of joint emission reductions and low-carbon promotion considering competing retails[J]. Control and Decision,2014, 29(10):1809-1815.)
[18]徐春秋,赵道致,原白云.上下游联合减排与低碳宣传的微分博弈模型[J].管理科学学报, 2016, 19(2):53-65.(Xu C Q, Zhao D Z, Yuan B Y. Differential game model on joint carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion in supply chains[J]. J of Management Sciences in China, 2016, 19(2):53-65.)
[19]田厚平,刘长贤.双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型[J].管理科学学报, 2011, 14(3):34-47.(Tian H P, Liu C X. Bi-objective incentive model in distribution channel under the framework of dual information asymmetry[J]. J of Management Science in China, 2011, 14(3):34-47.)
[20]Liu G, Zhang J, Tang W. Strategic transfer pricing in a marketing–operations interface with quality level and advertising dependent goodwill[J]. Omega, 2015, 56(10):1-15.
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