博弈视角下农户信贷扶贫机制研究
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摘要
通过构建担保公司、保险公司、农户和银行等多方主体参与的博弈模型,发现在农户信贷活动中加入保险和担保不仅能够有效转移农业生产中的不确定性风险、保障农户收入的稳定性,而且还可以减少银行等金融机构放贷的风险、有效提高信贷扶贫资金的使用效率。最后提出了应加大政府的财政支持力度,加强农村信用环境建设,以及提高各参与方的交流合作机制,从而提高信贷在金融扶贫中的作用,推动实施信贷精准扶贫。
This paper constructs a game model involving guarantee companies,insurance companies,farmers and banks,and finds that adding insurance and guarantee to farmers' credit activities can not only effectively transfer the uncertain risks in agricultural production,but also ensure farmers' income; it can also reduce the risk of lending of banks and other financial institutions and effectively improve the efficiency of the use of credit poverty alleviation funds. Finally,it is proposed that the government's financial support should be strengthened,the construction of rural credit environment should be strengthened,and the exchange and cooperation mechanism of all parties should be improved,so as to enhance the role of credit in financial poverty alleviation and promote the implementation of credit precision poverty alleviation.
This paper constructs a game model involving guarantee companies,insurance companies,farmers and banks,and finds that adding insurance and guarantee to farmers' credit activities can not only effectively transfer the uncertain risks in agricultural production,but also ensure farmers' income; it can also reduce the risk of lending of banks and other financial institutions and effectively improve the efficiency of the use of credit poverty alleviation funds. Finally,it is proposed that the government's financial support should be strengthened,the construction of rural credit environment should be strengthened,and the exchange and cooperation mechanism of all parties should be improved,so as to enhance the role of credit in financial poverty alleviation and promote the implementation of credit precision poverty alleviation.
引文
[1]祝国平,常燕.农业保险对农村信贷的促进作用研究[J].经济纵横,2014(7):32-35.
[2]龚良红,李增.多重博弈中的农户信贷关系研究[J].农村经济,2010(4):65-67.
[3]孙维.我国农村融资难的症结及其化解[J].农村经济,2015(1):73-77.
[4]林乐芬,法宁.新型农业经营主体融资难的深层原因及化解路径[J].南京社会科学,2015(7):150-156.
[5]刘志荣.农业信贷担保服务体系建设的模式、困境及发展选择[J].江淮论坛,2016,277(3):12-18.
[6]谢艳.基于博弈论视角的扶贫再贷款制度及完善深化[J].福建金融,2017(5):11-15.
[7]张伟.民族地区农业保险补贴政策评价与补贴模式优化——基于反贫困视角[J].中央财经大学学报,2014,1(8):31-38.
[8]吴本健,单希,马九杰.信贷保险、金融机构信贷供给与农户借贷决策——来自F县草莓种植“信贷+保险”的证据[J].保险研究,2013,(8):6-6.
[9]赵瑾璐,张葛仡男,梁怡.论财政对农业信贷担保体系的支持——以甘肃省为例[J].兰州大学学报(社会科学版),2011,39(4):109-114.
[10]冯雷.我国信用担保机构与中小企业融资关系的博弈分析[J].甘肃金融,2016(03):46-48.
[2]龚良红,李增.多重博弈中的农户信贷关系研究[J].农村经济,2010(4):65-67.
[3]孙维.我国农村融资难的症结及其化解[J].农村经济,2015(1):73-77.
[4]林乐芬,法宁.新型农业经营主体融资难的深层原因及化解路径[J].南京社会科学,2015(7):150-156.
[5]刘志荣.农业信贷担保服务体系建设的模式、困境及发展选择[J].江淮论坛,2016,277(3):12-18.
[6]谢艳.基于博弈论视角的扶贫再贷款制度及完善深化[J].福建金融,2017(5):11-15.
[7]张伟.民族地区农业保险补贴政策评价与补贴模式优化——基于反贫困视角[J].中央财经大学学报,2014,1(8):31-38.
[8]吴本健,单希,马九杰.信贷保险、金融机构信贷供给与农户借贷决策——来自F县草莓种植“信贷+保险”的证据[J].保险研究,2013,(8):6-6.
[9]赵瑾璐,张葛仡男,梁怡.论财政对农业信贷担保体系的支持——以甘肃省为例[J].兰州大学学报(社会科学版),2011,39(4):109-114.
[10]冯雷.我国信用担保机构与中小企业融资关系的博弈分析[J].甘肃金融,2016(03):46-48.