审计约谈有效吗?——基于企业内部控制质量的实证检验
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摘要
审计约谈对防范审计风险的作用是明显的,但是约谈的压力传导效应是否影响企业内部控制质量,目前尚缺少应有的经验证据。以内部控制缺陷及其修复作为衡量内部控制质量的替代变量,理论分析与实证检验审计约谈对改善和提高企业内部控制质量的价值,以及这种价值在不同产权属性和市场环境的企业可能存在的差异。研究发现:存在与约谈提示内容对应问题的上市公司内部控制缺陷更多,约谈后内部控制缺陷明显得到了修复,这表明审计约谈制度提高了企业内部控制的质量。进一步研究发现:审计约谈制度对内部控制质量的提升作用在国有企业和市场化进程较快地区的企业更加显著。鉴此,内部控制质量的提升既是企业内部自我持续改进的结果,同时需要包括审计约谈在内的外部监管机制的作用发挥,只有内外部多方力量的共同作用以及市场环境的优化,内部控制才能真正发挥风险免疫功能,保证企业战略目标的实现。
The effect of audit interview on preventing audit risk is obvious, but the empirical evidence whether the pressure transmission effect of the interview can help improve the internal control quality of enterprises is still lacking. Taking internal control deficiencies and their rehabilitation as two alternative variables to measure internal control quality, analyzing and testing the value of audit interview to improve the internal control quality, as well as the possible differences of such value in enterprises with different property right attributes and market environment. The study found that there are more internal control deficiencies in listed companies that correspond to the content of audit interview tips, and the internal control deficiencies are obviously repaired after the interview, which indicate that the audit interview system can help improve the quality of internal control of enterprises. Further, we have found that the improvement of internal control quality by the audit interview system is more significant for state-owned enterprises and the enterprises in areas where the market process is faster. Research shows that the improvement of internal control quality is not only the result of the continuous improvement by enterprise itself, but also the function of external supervision mechanism including the audit interview. Only by the joint action of internal and external forces and the optimization of market environment, can internal control truly play the immunologic function to avoid risk and ensure the realization of enterprise strategic objectives.
The effect of audit interview on preventing audit risk is obvious, but the empirical evidence whether the pressure transmission effect of the interview can help improve the internal control quality of enterprises is still lacking. Taking internal control deficiencies and their rehabilitation as two alternative variables to measure internal control quality, analyzing and testing the value of audit interview to improve the internal control quality, as well as the possible differences of such value in enterprises with different property right attributes and market environment. The study found that there are more internal control deficiencies in listed companies that correspond to the content of audit interview tips, and the internal control deficiencies are obviously repaired after the interview, which indicate that the audit interview system can help improve the quality of internal control of enterprises. Further, we have found that the improvement of internal control quality by the audit interview system is more significant for state-owned enterprises and the enterprises in areas where the market process is faster. Research shows that the improvement of internal control quality is not only the result of the continuous improvement by enterprise itself, but also the function of external supervision mechanism including the audit interview. Only by the joint action of internal and external forces and the optimization of market environment, can internal control truly play the immunologic function to avoid risk and ensure the realization of enterprise strategic objectives.
引文
[1] 吴溪,杨育龙,张俊生.预防性监管伴随着更严格的审计结果吗?—来自中注协年报审计风险约谈的证据[J].审计研究,2014(4):63-71.
[2] 王兵,李晶,苏文兵,等.行政处罚能改进审计质量吗?——基于中国证监会处罚的证据[J].会计研究,2011(12):86-92.
[3] John R, Graham,Campbell R, et al.The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1):3-73.
[4] 王良成,宋娟,曹强.监管者识别盈余管理的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2015,36(2):59-65.
[5] 程安林.内部控制制度变迁演化的动因选择:外力驱动还是内生驱动?[J].审计与经济研究,2015,30(3):49-57.
[6] 黄益雄,李长爱.行业自律监管能改进审计质量吗?——基于中注协约谈的证据[J].会计研究,2016(11):84-91+96.
[7] 刘文欢,何亚南,张继勋.审计监管约谈方式与投资者感知的会计信息可信性——一项实验证据[J].审计研究,2017(3):59-64.
[8] 刘文军.会计师事务所执业质量检查提高审计质量了吗?[J].审计研究,2016(6):98-104.
[9] Carcello J V,Hermanson D R,Ye Z. Corporate governance research in accounting and auditing: insights, practice implications, and future research directions[J]. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,2011,30(3):1-31.
[10] Gunny K A,Zhang T C.Pcaob inspection reports and audit quality[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2013,32(2):136-160.
[11] Geiger M A,Raghunandan K,Rama D V.Auditor decision-making in different litigation environments:the private securities litigation reform act,audit reports and audit firm size[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2006,25(3):332-353.
[12] Venkataraman R,Weber J P,Willenborg M.Litigation risk,audit quality,and audit fees:evidence from initial public offerings[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(5):1315-1345.
[13] 朱红军,何贤杰,孙跃,等.市场在关注审计师的职业声誉吗?——基于“科龙电器事件”的经验与启示[J].审计研究,2008(4):44-52.
[14] 王震,彭敬芳.中国上市公司治理结构与审计意见的相关性研究[J].审计与经济研究,2007(6):16-19+30.
[15] 袁晓波.内部控制与财务风险—来自中国沪市制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2010(5):60-68.
[16] 张继勋,周冉,孙鹏.内部控制披露、审计意见、投资者的风险感知和投资决策:一项实验证据[J].会计研究,2011(9):66-73.
[17] 毛新述,孟杰.内部控制与诉讼风险[J].管理世界,2013(11):155-165.
[18] Ogneva M,Subramanyam K R,Raghunandan K.Internal control weakness and cost of equity:evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures[J].Accounting Review,2007,82(5):1255-1297.
[19] 杨清香,俞麟,宋丽.内部控制信息披露与市场反应研究—来自中国沪市上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(1):123-130.
[20] 叶建芳,李丹蒙,章斌颖.内部控制缺陷及其修正对盈余管理的影响[J].审计研究,2012(6):50-59.
[21] 褚剑,方军雄. 政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?[J].会计研究,2016(9):82-89.
[22] 李志斌.内部控制、股权集中度与投资者关系管理—来自A股上市公司投资者关系调查的证据[J].会计研究,2013(12):72-78+97.
[23] 樊纲,王小鲁.消费条件模型和各地区消费条件指数[J].经济研究,2004(5):13-21.
[24] 王永海,石青梅.内部控制规范体系对公司风险承受是否具有抑制效应?—中国版“萨班斯”法案强制实施的风险后果分析[J].审计研究,2016(3):90-97.
[25] 赵渊贤,吴伟荣.企业外部规制影响内部控制有效性研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2014(4):126-137.
[2] 王兵,李晶,苏文兵,等.行政处罚能改进审计质量吗?——基于中国证监会处罚的证据[J].会计研究,2011(12):86-92.
[3] John R, Graham,Campbell R, et al.The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1):3-73.
[4] 王良成,宋娟,曹强.监管者识别盈余管理的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2015,36(2):59-65.
[5] 程安林.内部控制制度变迁演化的动因选择:外力驱动还是内生驱动?[J].审计与经济研究,2015,30(3):49-57.
[6] 黄益雄,李长爱.行业自律监管能改进审计质量吗?——基于中注协约谈的证据[J].会计研究,2016(11):84-91+96.
[7] 刘文欢,何亚南,张继勋.审计监管约谈方式与投资者感知的会计信息可信性——一项实验证据[J].审计研究,2017(3):59-64.
[8] 刘文军.会计师事务所执业质量检查提高审计质量了吗?[J].审计研究,2016(6):98-104.
[9] Carcello J V,Hermanson D R,Ye Z. Corporate governance research in accounting and auditing: insights, practice implications, and future research directions[J]. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,2011,30(3):1-31.
[10] Gunny K A,Zhang T C.Pcaob inspection reports and audit quality[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2013,32(2):136-160.
[11] Geiger M A,Raghunandan K,Rama D V.Auditor decision-making in different litigation environments:the private securities litigation reform act,audit reports and audit firm size[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2006,25(3):332-353.
[12] Venkataraman R,Weber J P,Willenborg M.Litigation risk,audit quality,and audit fees:evidence from initial public offerings[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(5):1315-1345.
[13] 朱红军,何贤杰,孙跃,等.市场在关注审计师的职业声誉吗?——基于“科龙电器事件”的经验与启示[J].审计研究,2008(4):44-52.
[14] 王震,彭敬芳.中国上市公司治理结构与审计意见的相关性研究[J].审计与经济研究,2007(6):16-19+30.
[15] 袁晓波.内部控制与财务风险—来自中国沪市制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2010(5):60-68.
[16] 张继勋,周冉,孙鹏.内部控制披露、审计意见、投资者的风险感知和投资决策:一项实验证据[J].会计研究,2011(9):66-73.
[17] 毛新述,孟杰.内部控制与诉讼风险[J].管理世界,2013(11):155-165.
[18] Ogneva M,Subramanyam K R,Raghunandan K.Internal control weakness and cost of equity:evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures[J].Accounting Review,2007,82(5):1255-1297.
[19] 杨清香,俞麟,宋丽.内部控制信息披露与市场反应研究—来自中国沪市上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2012,15(1):123-130.
[20] 叶建芳,李丹蒙,章斌颖.内部控制缺陷及其修正对盈余管理的影响[J].审计研究,2012(6):50-59.
[21] 褚剑,方军雄. 政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?[J].会计研究,2016(9):82-89.
[22] 李志斌.内部控制、股权集中度与投资者关系管理—来自A股上市公司投资者关系调查的证据[J].会计研究,2013(12):72-78+97.
[23] 樊纲,王小鲁.消费条件模型和各地区消费条件指数[J].经济研究,2004(5):13-21.
[24] 王永海,石青梅.内部控制规范体系对公司风险承受是否具有抑制效应?—中国版“萨班斯”法案强制实施的风险后果分析[J].审计研究,2016(3):90-97.
[25] 赵渊贤,吴伟荣.企业外部规制影响内部控制有效性研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2014(4):126-137.