摘要
收费员队伍的服务态度及工作努力程度直接关系到高速公路的服务质量,关系到公司的生存和发展。本文在阐述部分高速公路在该项工作中的不足的基础上,建立了未引入奖惩机制的绩效考评博弈模型和引入惩罚机制的绩效考评博弈模型,分析了奖惩机制对收费员工作积极态度的影响机理,为完善高速公路收费员绩效考评体系,促使收费员选择努力工作行为提供决策辅助支持。
The service attitude and work effort of the toll collector team are directly related to the service quality of the expressway and to the survival and development of the company. On the basis of expounding the shortcomings of some highways in this work, this paper establishes a performance appraisal game model without introducing reward and punishment mechanism and a performance appraisal game model that introduces penalty mechanism, and analyzes the impact mechanism of reward and punishment on the positive attitude of toll collectors, in order to provide decision support for improving the performance appraisal system for highway toll collectors and encourage toll collectors to work hard.
引文
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