奖惩机制下废弃电器电子产品回收处理商合作研发决策研究
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摘要
为研究奖惩机制与回收处理商创新研发决策之间的相互影响,考虑存在技术溢出效应和回收竞争,构建有无奖惩机制下回收处理商独立研发与合作研发的4种决策模型。研究表明:无论政府是否实施奖惩,回收处理商合作研发时的利润始终不小于独立研发时的利润,而研发水平的相对高低与技术溢出率和奖惩力度有关;当回收处理商合作研发时,奖惩机制总可以激励回收处理商提高研发水平,而回收处理商是否获得更优的利润,受到技术溢出率和奖惩力度的影响。
In order to study the interaction between reward and punishment mechanisms and recycling processors' innovative R&D decisions,considering technology spillover effect and recycling competition,four decision-making models for independent R&D and cooperative R&D of the recycling processor under reward and punishment mechanism and without reward and punishment mechanism are established. The research shows that,whether the government implements rewards and penalties or not,the profits from the cooperative R&D of the recycling processors are always not less than those from the independent R&D; the relative size of R&D level is related to the rate of technology spillovers and rewards and punishments.When recycling processors cooperate innovate together,the implementation of rewards and punishments by the government can always encourage recycling processors to improve their R&D level,but whether the recycler gets better profit or not,is affected by technology spillover rate and rewards and penalties.
In order to study the interaction between reward and punishment mechanisms and recycling processors' innovative R&D decisions,considering technology spillover effect and recycling competition,four decision-making models for independent R&D and cooperative R&D of the recycling processor under reward and punishment mechanism and without reward and punishment mechanism are established. The research shows that,whether the government implements rewards and penalties or not,the profits from the cooperative R&D of the recycling processors are always not less than those from the independent R&D; the relative size of R&D level is related to the rate of technology spillovers and rewards and punishments.When recycling processors cooperate innovate together,the implementation of rewards and punishments by the government can always encourage recycling processors to improve their R&D level,but whether the recycler gets better profit or not,is affected by technology spillover rate and rewards and penalties.
引文
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[18]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):36-41.
[19]王文宾,邓雯雯,白拓,等.碳排放约束下制造商竞争的逆向供应链政府奖惩机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(2):188-194.
[20]易余胤,梁家密.奖惩机制下的闭环供应链混合回收模式[J].计算机集成制造系统,2014,20(1):215-223.
[2]GEORGIADIS P,BESIOU M.Environmental and economical sustainability of WEEE closed-loop supply chains with recycling:a system dynamics analysis[J].International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology,2010,47(5/8):475-493.
[3]HAMMOND D,BEULLENS P.Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under legislation[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,183(2):895-908.
[4]胡书,马祖军,代颖.基于蛛网模型的WEEE处理补贴策略分析[J].管理评论,2017,29(1):240-249.
[5]梁喜,熊中楷.产品回收再利用率对闭环供应链利润的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2009,14(5):36-40.
[6]郭军华,朱文正,倪明,等.考虑可再利用率的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策[J].华东交通大学学报,2016,33(2):139-146.
[7]D'ASPREMONT C,JACQUEMIN A.Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J].American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137.
[8]GE Z H,HU Q Y.Collaboration in R&D activities:firm-specific decisions[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,185(2):864-883.
[9]GILBERT S M,CVSA V.Strategic commitment to price to stimulate downstream innovation in a supply chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2003,150(3):617-639.
[10]段楠楠,徐福缘,倪明.考虑知识溢出效应的绿色技术创新企业关系演化分析[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(20):157-163.
[11]王玮,陈丽华,巩天啸.技术溢出下的批发价承诺与研发合作策略[J].系统工程,2015(1):81-87.
[12]李星北,齐二石.考虑溢出效应的供应链合作创新演化博弈分析[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2014(2):8-14.
[13]葛泽慧,胡奇英.上下游企业间的研发协作与产销竞争共存研究[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(4):12-22.
[14]徐运保,韦铁.技术外溢条件下中小企业自主创新投入博弈分析[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(4):81-85.
[15]WANG Y,CHANG X,CHEN Z,et al.Impact of subsidy policies on recycling and remanufacturing using system dynamics methodology:a case of auto parts in China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2014,74(7):161-171.
[16]WANG W,ZHANG Y,ZHANG K,et al.Reward–penalty mechanism for closed-loop supply chains under responsibility-sharing and different power structures[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015(170):178-190.
[17]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下电子类产品制造商回收再制造决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(5):57-63.
[18]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):36-41.
[19]王文宾,邓雯雯,白拓,等.碳排放约束下制造商竞争的逆向供应链政府奖惩机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(2):188-194.
[20]易余胤,梁家密.奖惩机制下的闭环供应链混合回收模式[J].计算机集成制造系统,2014,20(1):215-223.
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