考虑声誉效应的存货质押融资中银行对物流企业的激励机制研究
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摘要
物流企业在存货质押融资中处于重要地位,其努力水平关系到该融资业务能否成功运作。本文引入声誉效应,建立了一个关于物流企业声誉机制与显性机制相结合的委托代理模型。通过与未考虑声誉效应的委托代理模型进行比较,发现如下现象:考虑声誉效应后,物流企业的努力水平、银行的单期收入及对物流企业的激励系数都会提高,银行给予物流企业的固定报酬下降。同时发现,银行与物流企业建立长期稳定的合作关系,能进一步激励物流企业提高努力水平。最后,通过数值算例验证了相关结论,并针对银行如何有效激励物流企业提出了相应建议。
The logistics company plays an important role in the inventory financing business.The effort level of the logistics company is one of key factors related to the successful operation of inventory financing.In this paper,aprincipal-agent model that combines explicit incentive mechanism with implicit incentive mechanism is established by considering reputation effects.A comparison between two scenarios considering reputation effect and not considering reputation effect is made.It is found that the effort level,the single stage income of bank,and the incentive coefficient will increase as considering reputation effect.However,the fixed payment to the logistics companiesby the bank will decrease.Furthermore,the logistics company will improve effort level more positively if the bank establishes a long-term relationship withthe logistics company.Finally,the relevant conclusions are verified by a numerical exampleand some recommendations are provided.
The logistics company plays an important role in the inventory financing business.The effort level of the logistics company is one of key factors related to the successful operation of inventory financing.In this paper,aprincipal-agent model that combines explicit incentive mechanism with implicit incentive mechanism is established by considering reputation effects.A comparison between two scenarios considering reputation effect and not considering reputation effect is made.It is found that the effort level,the single stage income of bank,and the incentive coefficient will increase as considering reputation effect.However,the fixed payment to the logistics companiesby the bank will decrease.Furthermore,the logistics company will improve effort level more positively if the bank establishes a long-term relationship withthe logistics company.Finally,the relevant conclusions are verified by a numerical exampleand some recommendations are provided.
引文
[1]李毅学,冯耕中,屠惠远.供应链金融创新中下侧风险规避银行的贷款额度分析[J].系统科学与数学,2009,29(11):1552-1558.
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[3]Chan C K,Lee Y C E.A co-ordination model combining incentive scheme and co-ordination policy for a singlevendor-multi-buyer supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(1):136-143.
[4]Yin Zhe,Ma Shihua.Incentives to improve the service level in a random yield supply chain:The role of bonus contracts[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,244(3):778-791.
[5]Chen Yuangao,Zhang W Y,Yang Shuiqing,et al.Referral service and customer incentive in online retail supply Chain[J].Journal of Applied Research and Technology,2014,12(2):261-269.
[6]Corbett C J,Zhou Deming,Tang C S.Designing supply contracts:contract type and information asymmetry[J].Management Science,2004,50(4):550-559.
[7]郎艳怀.非对称信息和弹性需求下的供应链激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):106-111.
[8]王新辉,汪贤裕.考虑销售商风险规避的双边信息不对称的供应链协调[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(3):97-107.
[9]He Juan,Jiang Xianglin,Wang Jian,et al.VaR methods for the dynamic impawn rate of steel in inventory financing under autocorrelative return[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,223(1):106-115.
[10]匡海波,张一凡,张连如.低碳港口存货质押贷款利率定价理论和模型[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):1-10.
[11]张燃,徐爽,王凤敏.质押贷款质押率决定的期权定价方法[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(1):16-22.
[12]匡海波,张一凡,张连如.低碳港口物流质押贷款组合优化决策模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(6):1468-1479.
[13]何娟,王建,蒋祥林.存货质押业务质物组合价格风险决策[J].管理评论,2013,25(11):163-176.
[14]李毅学,冯耕中,张媛媛.委托监管下存货质押融资的关键风险控制指标[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(4):587-598.
[15]Sun Xuehua,Chu XueJian,Wu Zhongdai.Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing[J].Advances in Manufacturing.2014,2(2):150-157.
[16]于萍,徐渝.存货质押三方契约中银行对物流企业的激励[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(3):94-99.
[17]白少布,刘洪.供应链融资运作中的委托代理激励机制研究[J].软科学,2011,25(2):40-46.
[18]Kreps D M.,Wilson R.Sequential equilibria[J].Econometrica,1982,50(4):863-895.
[19]Kreps D M,Milgrom P,Roberts J,et al.Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’dilemma[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1982,27(2):245-253.
[20]Alexander W.Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2011,73(2):595-607.
[21]Ozdogan A.Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2014,88:211-220.
[22]孔峰,张微.基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):133-140.
[23]Holmstrom B,Milgrom P.Multi task principal agent analysis:Incentive contracts,asset ownership and job design[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,1991,7:24-52.
[24]Taylor TA.Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects[J].Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007.
[25]姬小利.伴随销售商促销努力的供应链契约设计[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(4):46-49.
[2]陈祥锋,朱道立.资金约束供应链中物流提供商的系统价值研究[J].系统工程学报,2008,23(6):667-674.
[3]Chan C K,Lee Y C E.A co-ordination model combining incentive scheme and co-ordination policy for a singlevendor-multi-buyer supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(1):136-143.
[4]Yin Zhe,Ma Shihua.Incentives to improve the service level in a random yield supply chain:The role of bonus contracts[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,244(3):778-791.
[5]Chen Yuangao,Zhang W Y,Yang Shuiqing,et al.Referral service and customer incentive in online retail supply Chain[J].Journal of Applied Research and Technology,2014,12(2):261-269.
[6]Corbett C J,Zhou Deming,Tang C S.Designing supply contracts:contract type and information asymmetry[J].Management Science,2004,50(4):550-559.
[7]郎艳怀.非对称信息和弹性需求下的供应链激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(5):106-111.
[8]王新辉,汪贤裕.考虑销售商风险规避的双边信息不对称的供应链协调[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(3):97-107.
[9]He Juan,Jiang Xianglin,Wang Jian,et al.VaR methods for the dynamic impawn rate of steel in inventory financing under autocorrelative return[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,223(1):106-115.
[10]匡海波,张一凡,张连如.低碳港口存货质押贷款利率定价理论和模型[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):1-10.
[11]张燃,徐爽,王凤敏.质押贷款质押率决定的期权定价方法[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(1):16-22.
[12]匡海波,张一凡,张连如.低碳港口物流质押贷款组合优化决策模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(6):1468-1479.
[13]何娟,王建,蒋祥林.存货质押业务质物组合价格风险决策[J].管理评论,2013,25(11):163-176.
[14]李毅学,冯耕中,张媛媛.委托监管下存货质押融资的关键风险控制指标[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(4):587-598.
[15]Sun Xuehua,Chu XueJian,Wu Zhongdai.Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing[J].Advances in Manufacturing.2014,2(2):150-157.
[16]于萍,徐渝.存货质押三方契约中银行对物流企业的激励[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(3):94-99.
[17]白少布,刘洪.供应链融资运作中的委托代理激励机制研究[J].软科学,2011,25(2):40-46.
[18]Kreps D M.,Wilson R.Sequential equilibria[J].Econometrica,1982,50(4):863-895.
[19]Kreps D M,Milgrom P,Roberts J,et al.Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’dilemma[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1982,27(2):245-253.
[20]Alexander W.Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2011,73(2):595-607.
[21]Ozdogan A.Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2014,88:211-220.
[22]孔峰,张微.基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):133-140.
[23]Holmstrom B,Milgrom P.Multi task principal agent analysis:Incentive contracts,asset ownership and job design[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,1991,7:24-52.
[24]Taylor TA.Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects[J].Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007.
[25]姬小利.伴随销售商促销努力的供应链契约设计[J].中国管理科学,2006,14(4):46-49.
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