合作创新的领导权博弈与利益协调研究
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摘要
研究了合作创新的权力结构对知识创造及创新绩效的作用机理.考虑上下游企业合作创新的知识共享、创造及利益分配过程,界定权力均衡(LS)、上游企业领导(UL)、下游企业领导(DL)等领导权博弈模型并进行创新效率分析.研究发现:权力结构影响合作创新效率,LS模式下企业的知识产出与供应链利润优于UL、DL模式;企业的知识溢出既可提高合作伙伴的知识产出与创新利润,也存在知识外溢损失风险,UL、DL模式下领导者(跟随者)知识溢出与其创新利润正(负)相关,LS模式下企业的知识溢出与其创新利润呈"倒U型"关系;创新贡献率是引起合作利益冲突的主要原因,使用Nash协商模型检验了通过协商机制解决利益协调问题的有效性,比较发现LS模式的利益协调效果优于UL、DL模式.最后,讨论了研究的管理启示.
This study investigates the effect of power structure on cooperative innovation performance between upstream and downstream firms. Based on resource dependence theory, 3 modes of power structure are defined as power balance or leaderless structure(LS), upstream firm leading(UL) and downstream firm leading(DL), in order to analyze the efficiency of knowledge sharing, knowledge creation and benefit distribution. Results indicate that the 'symmetric dependence relationship' of LS mode has innovation efficiency advantage compared to the 'asymmetric dependence relationship'of UL/DL modes; power structure affects knowledge spillover efficiency, in UL and DL modes leader's(follower) profit is positively(negatively) related to its knowledge spillover, in LS mode firm's knowledge spillover and profit show an 'inverted U-shaped' trajectory; contribution level of innovation is the main factor causing benefit conflicts among cooperative organizations; using Nash bargaining model as coordination mechanism can lead to a Pareto improvement of cooperative innovation performance, the benefit coordination effect of LS mode is better than UL and DL mode. Finally, we discuss the implications of our study for the issue of open innovation governance.
This study investigates the effect of power structure on cooperative innovation performance between upstream and downstream firms. Based on resource dependence theory, 3 modes of power structure are defined as power balance or leaderless structure(LS), upstream firm leading(UL) and downstream firm leading(DL), in order to analyze the efficiency of knowledge sharing, knowledge creation and benefit distribution. Results indicate that the 'symmetric dependence relationship' of LS mode has innovation efficiency advantage compared to the 'asymmetric dependence relationship'of UL/DL modes; power structure affects knowledge spillover efficiency, in UL and DL modes leader's(follower) profit is positively(negatively) related to its knowledge spillover, in LS mode firm's knowledge spillover and profit show an 'inverted U-shaped' trajectory; contribution level of innovation is the main factor causing benefit conflicts among cooperative organizations; using Nash bargaining model as coordination mechanism can lead to a Pareto improvement of cooperative innovation performance, the benefit coordination effect of LS mode is better than UL and DL mode. Finally, we discuss the implications of our study for the issue of open innovation governance.
引文
[1]Chesbrough H W. The era of open innovation[J]. MIT Sloan Management Review, 2003, 44(3):35-41.
[2]Gassmann O, Enkel E, Chesbrough H. The future of open innovation[J]. R&D Management, 2010, 40(3):213-221.
[3]Casciaro T, Piskorski M J. Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption:A closer look at resource dependence theory[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2005, 50(2):167-199.
[4]Drees J M, Heugens P P. Synthesizing and extending resource dependence theory:A metaranalysis[J]. Journal of Management, 2013, 39(6):1666-1698.
[5]Pfeffer J, Salancik G R. The external control of organizations:A resource dependence perspective[M]. Palo Alto,CA:Stanford University Press, 2003.
[6]Perez-Nordtvedt L, Kedia B L, Datta D K, et al. Effectiveness and efficiency of cross-border knowledge transfer:An empirical examination[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2008, 45(4):714-744.
[7]党兴华,刘立.技术创新网络中企业知识权力测度研究[J].管理评论,2014, 26(6):67-73.Dang X H, Liu L. Research on enterprise's knowledge power measurement in technological innovation network[J].Management Review, 2014, 26(6):67-73.
[8]韩莹,陈国宏.集群企业网络权力与创新绩效关系研究——基于双元式知识共享行为的中介作用[J].管理学报,2016,13(6):855-862.Han Y, Chen G H. Research on the relationship between network power and innovation performance of clusterenterprises—Based on ambidextrous knowledge sharing as intermediary[J]. Chinese Journal of Management,2016, 13(6):855-862.
[9]芮正云,罗瑾琏.新创企业联盟能力、网络位置跃迁对其知识权力的影响——基于知识网络嵌入视角[J].管理评论,2017, 29(8):187-197.Rui Z Y, Luo J L. Effects of new venture's alliance capability and network position transition on knowledge power:Based on perspective of knowledge network embeddedness[J]. Management Review, 2017, 29(8):187-197.
[10]Aggarwal V A, Siggelkow N,Singh H. Governing collaborative activity:Interdependence and the impact of coordination and exploration[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2011, 32(7):705-730.
[11]易明.产业集群治理结构与网络权力关系配置[J].宏观经济研究,2010(3):42-47.Yi M. Governance structure and network power allocation of industrial cluster[J]. Macroeconomics, 2010(3):42-47.
[12]Perrons R K. The open kimono:How Intel balances trust and power to maintain platform leadership[J]. Research Policy, 2009, 38(8):1300-1312.
[13]王文宾,达庆利,聂锐.考虑渠道权力结构的闭环供应链定价与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(5):29-36.Wang W B, Da Q L, Nie R. The study on pricing and coordination of closed-loop supply chain considering channel power structure[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2011, 19(5):29-36.
[14]易余胤.具竞争零售商的再制造闭环供应链模型研究[J].管理科学学报,2009, 12(6):45-54.Yi Y Y. Closed-loop supply chain game models with product remanufacturing in a duopoly retailer channel[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2009, 12(6):45-54.
[15]张廷龙,梁樑.不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链定价和销售努力决策[J].中国管理科学,2012, 20(2):68-77.Zhang Y L, Liang L. Pricing and sales efforts decisions for a supply chain under different channel power structures and information structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, 20(2):68-77.
[16]Luo Z, Chen X, Kai M. The effect of customer value and power structure on retail supply chain product choice and pricing decisions[J]. Omega, 2018, 77(7):115-126.
[17]李新然,刘媛媛,俞明南.不同权力结构下考虑搭便车行为的闭环供应链决策研究[J].科研管理,2018, 39(3):45-58.Li X R, Liu Y Y, Yu M N. A research on the closed-loop supply chain decision-making considering free riding behavior under different authority structure[J]. Science Research Management, 2018, 39(3):45-58.
[18]Chen L G, Ding D, Ou J. Power structure and profitability in assembly supply chains[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(9):1599-1616.
[19]Ahuja G. Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation:A longitudinal study[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2000, 45(3):425-455.
[20]Operti E, Carnabuci G. Public knowledge, private gain:The effect of spillover networks on firms'innovative performance[J]. Journal of Management, 2014, 40(4):1042-1074.
[21]杨皎平,侯楠,王乐.集群内知识溢出、知识势能与集群创新绩效[J].管理工程学报,2016, 30(3):27-35.Yang J P, Hou N, Wang L. Knowledge spillover、 knowledge energy and cluster innovation performance[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2016, 30(3):27-35.
[22]张华.协同创新、知识溢出的演化博弈机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016, 24(2):92-99.Zhang H. Study on evolutionary game mechanism of collaborative innovation and knowledge spillover[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(2):92-99.
[23]曹勇,蒋振宇,孙合林.创新开放度对新兴企业知识溢出效应的影响研究[J]·科学学与科学技术管理,2015, 36(1):151-161.Cao Y, Jiang Z Y, Sun H L. Study on the impact mechanism of innovation openness on knowledge spillovers in emerging enterprises[J]. Science of Science and Management of S&T, 2015, 36(1):151-161.
[24]Phene A, Tallman S. Knowledge spillovers and alliance formation[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2014, 51(7):1058-1090.
[25]Ge Z, Hu Q, Xia Y. Firms'R&D cooperation behavior in a supply chain[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(4):599-609.
[26]Ding X H, Huang R H. Effects of knowledge spillover on inter-organizational resource sharing decision in collaborative knowledge creation[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 201(3):949-959.
[27]熊榆,张雪斌,熊中楷.合作新产品开发资金及知识投入决策研究[J].管理科学学报,2013, 16(9):53-63.Xiong Y, Zhang X B, Xiong Z K. Capital and knowledge input decision on collaborative new product development[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2013, 16(9):53-63.
[28]刘丛,黄卫来,郑本荣,等.考虑营销努力和创新能力的制造商激励供应商创新决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(12):3040-3051.Liu C, Huang W L, Zheng B R, et al. The decision-making of manufacturer stimulating supplier innovation considering marketing effort and innovation capability[J], Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017,37(12):3040-3051.
[29]黄波,孟卫东,李宇雨.基于双边激励的产学研合作最优利益分配方式[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(7):31-42.Huang B, Meng W D, Li Y Y. The optimal profit sharing arrangement in industry-university-institution cooperation based on double-sided incentive[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2011, 14(7):31-42.
[30]贺一堂,谢富纪,陈红军.产学研合作创新利益分配的激励机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017, 37(9):2244-2255.He Y T, Xie F J, Chen H J. Research on the incentive mechanism of profit allocation in the industry-universityinstitute collaboration innovation[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017, 37(9):2244-2255.
[31]Yenipazarli A. To collaborate or not to collaborate:Prompting upstream eco-efficient innovation in a supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 260(2):571-587.
[32]Bhaskaran S R, Krishnan V. Effort, revenue, and cost sharing mechanisms for collaborative new product development[J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(7):1152-1169.
[33]Martimort D, Poudou J C, Sand-Zantman W. Contracting for an inno-vation under bilateral asymmetric information[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, 58(2):324-348.
[34]Xiao W, Xu Y. The impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic R&D alliance[J]. Management Science, 2012, 58(12):2251-2271.
[35]Macneil I R. The many futures of contracts[J]. Southern California Law Review, 1974, 47(3):691-816.
[36]Williamson O E. The economic institutions of capitalism[M]. New York:The Free Press, 1985.
[37]Cao Z, Lumineau F. Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance:A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation[J]. Journal of Operations Management, 2015, 33(1):15-42.
[38]Gulati R, Lavie D, Singh H. The nature of partnering experience and the gains from alliances[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2009, 30(11):1213-1233.
[39]Crama P, De Reyck B, Taneri N. Licensing contracts:Control rights, options, and timing[J]. Management Science, 2016, 63(4):1131-1149.
[40]Lawler E J, Thye S R, Yoon J. Social exchange and micro social order[J]. American Sociological Review, 2008,73(4):519-542.
[41]熊中楷,申成然,彭志强.专利保护下再制造闭环供应链协调机制研究[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(6):76-85.Xiong Z K, Shen C R, Peng Z Q. Closed-loop supply chain coordination research with remanufacturing under patent protection[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2011, 14(6):76-85.
[42]D'Aspremont C, Jacquemin A. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J]. American Economic Review, 1988, 78(5):1133-1137.
[43]Gupta S. Channel structure with knowledge spillovers[J]. Marketing Science,2008, 27(2):247-261.
[44]Nash Jr J F. The bargaining problem[J]. Econometrica, 1950, 18(2):155-162.
[45]Howe J. The rise of crowdsourcing[J]. Wired Magazine, 2006, 14(6):1-4.
[46]Afuah A, Tucci C L. Crowdsourcing as a solution to distant search[J]. Academy of Management Review, 2012,37(3):355-375.
[47]Bullis K. How Tesla is driving electric car innovation[EB/OL].[2013-08-07]. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/516961.
[48]GE Global Research. GE, MIT building crowdsourcing software platform to revolutionize product design and manufacturing[EB/OL].[2012-04-05]. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120405006106/en.
[2]Gassmann O, Enkel E, Chesbrough H. The future of open innovation[J]. R&D Management, 2010, 40(3):213-221.
[3]Casciaro T, Piskorski M J. Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption:A closer look at resource dependence theory[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2005, 50(2):167-199.
[4]Drees J M, Heugens P P. Synthesizing and extending resource dependence theory:A metaranalysis[J]. Journal of Management, 2013, 39(6):1666-1698.
[5]Pfeffer J, Salancik G R. The external control of organizations:A resource dependence perspective[M]. Palo Alto,CA:Stanford University Press, 2003.
[6]Perez-Nordtvedt L, Kedia B L, Datta D K, et al. Effectiveness and efficiency of cross-border knowledge transfer:An empirical examination[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2008, 45(4):714-744.
[7]党兴华,刘立.技术创新网络中企业知识权力测度研究[J].管理评论,2014, 26(6):67-73.Dang X H, Liu L. Research on enterprise's knowledge power measurement in technological innovation network[J].Management Review, 2014, 26(6):67-73.
[8]韩莹,陈国宏.集群企业网络权力与创新绩效关系研究——基于双元式知识共享行为的中介作用[J].管理学报,2016,13(6):855-862.Han Y, Chen G H. Research on the relationship between network power and innovation performance of clusterenterprises—Based on ambidextrous knowledge sharing as intermediary[J]. Chinese Journal of Management,2016, 13(6):855-862.
[9]芮正云,罗瑾琏.新创企业联盟能力、网络位置跃迁对其知识权力的影响——基于知识网络嵌入视角[J].管理评论,2017, 29(8):187-197.Rui Z Y, Luo J L. Effects of new venture's alliance capability and network position transition on knowledge power:Based on perspective of knowledge network embeddedness[J]. Management Review, 2017, 29(8):187-197.
[10]Aggarwal V A, Siggelkow N,Singh H. Governing collaborative activity:Interdependence and the impact of coordination and exploration[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2011, 32(7):705-730.
[11]易明.产业集群治理结构与网络权力关系配置[J].宏观经济研究,2010(3):42-47.Yi M. Governance structure and network power allocation of industrial cluster[J]. Macroeconomics, 2010(3):42-47.
[12]Perrons R K. The open kimono:How Intel balances trust and power to maintain platform leadership[J]. Research Policy, 2009, 38(8):1300-1312.
[13]王文宾,达庆利,聂锐.考虑渠道权力结构的闭环供应链定价与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(5):29-36.Wang W B, Da Q L, Nie R. The study on pricing and coordination of closed-loop supply chain considering channel power structure[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2011, 19(5):29-36.
[14]易余胤.具竞争零售商的再制造闭环供应链模型研究[J].管理科学学报,2009, 12(6):45-54.Yi Y Y. Closed-loop supply chain game models with product remanufacturing in a duopoly retailer channel[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2009, 12(6):45-54.
[15]张廷龙,梁樑.不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链定价和销售努力决策[J].中国管理科学,2012, 20(2):68-77.Zhang Y L, Liang L. Pricing and sales efforts decisions for a supply chain under different channel power structures and information structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, 20(2):68-77.
[16]Luo Z, Chen X, Kai M. The effect of customer value and power structure on retail supply chain product choice and pricing decisions[J]. Omega, 2018, 77(7):115-126.
[17]李新然,刘媛媛,俞明南.不同权力结构下考虑搭便车行为的闭环供应链决策研究[J].科研管理,2018, 39(3):45-58.Li X R, Liu Y Y, Yu M N. A research on the closed-loop supply chain decision-making considering free riding behavior under different authority structure[J]. Science Research Management, 2018, 39(3):45-58.
[18]Chen L G, Ding D, Ou J. Power structure and profitability in assembly supply chains[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(9):1599-1616.
[19]Ahuja G. Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation:A longitudinal study[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2000, 45(3):425-455.
[20]Operti E, Carnabuci G. Public knowledge, private gain:The effect of spillover networks on firms'innovative performance[J]. Journal of Management, 2014, 40(4):1042-1074.
[21]杨皎平,侯楠,王乐.集群内知识溢出、知识势能与集群创新绩效[J].管理工程学报,2016, 30(3):27-35.Yang J P, Hou N, Wang L. Knowledge spillover、 knowledge energy and cluster innovation performance[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2016, 30(3):27-35.
[22]张华.协同创新、知识溢出的演化博弈机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2016, 24(2):92-99.Zhang H. Study on evolutionary game mechanism of collaborative innovation and knowledge spillover[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(2):92-99.
[23]曹勇,蒋振宇,孙合林.创新开放度对新兴企业知识溢出效应的影响研究[J]·科学学与科学技术管理,2015, 36(1):151-161.Cao Y, Jiang Z Y, Sun H L. Study on the impact mechanism of innovation openness on knowledge spillovers in emerging enterprises[J]. Science of Science and Management of S&T, 2015, 36(1):151-161.
[24]Phene A, Tallman S. Knowledge spillovers and alliance formation[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2014, 51(7):1058-1090.
[25]Ge Z, Hu Q, Xia Y. Firms'R&D cooperation behavior in a supply chain[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(4):599-609.
[26]Ding X H, Huang R H. Effects of knowledge spillover on inter-organizational resource sharing decision in collaborative knowledge creation[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 201(3):949-959.
[27]熊榆,张雪斌,熊中楷.合作新产品开发资金及知识投入决策研究[J].管理科学学报,2013, 16(9):53-63.Xiong Y, Zhang X B, Xiong Z K. Capital and knowledge input decision on collaborative new product development[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2013, 16(9):53-63.
[28]刘丛,黄卫来,郑本荣,等.考虑营销努力和创新能力的制造商激励供应商创新决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(12):3040-3051.Liu C, Huang W L, Zheng B R, et al. The decision-making of manufacturer stimulating supplier innovation considering marketing effort and innovation capability[J], Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017,37(12):3040-3051.
[29]黄波,孟卫东,李宇雨.基于双边激励的产学研合作最优利益分配方式[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(7):31-42.Huang B, Meng W D, Li Y Y. The optimal profit sharing arrangement in industry-university-institution cooperation based on double-sided incentive[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2011, 14(7):31-42.
[30]贺一堂,谢富纪,陈红军.产学研合作创新利益分配的激励机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017, 37(9):2244-2255.He Y T, Xie F J, Chen H J. Research on the incentive mechanism of profit allocation in the industry-universityinstitute collaboration innovation[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017, 37(9):2244-2255.
[31]Yenipazarli A. To collaborate or not to collaborate:Prompting upstream eco-efficient innovation in a supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 260(2):571-587.
[32]Bhaskaran S R, Krishnan V. Effort, revenue, and cost sharing mechanisms for collaborative new product development[J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(7):1152-1169.
[33]Martimort D, Poudou J C, Sand-Zantman W. Contracting for an inno-vation under bilateral asymmetric information[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, 58(2):324-348.
[34]Xiao W, Xu Y. The impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic R&D alliance[J]. Management Science, 2012, 58(12):2251-2271.
[35]Macneil I R. The many futures of contracts[J]. Southern California Law Review, 1974, 47(3):691-816.
[36]Williamson O E. The economic institutions of capitalism[M]. New York:The Free Press, 1985.
[37]Cao Z, Lumineau F. Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance:A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation[J]. Journal of Operations Management, 2015, 33(1):15-42.
[38]Gulati R, Lavie D, Singh H. The nature of partnering experience and the gains from alliances[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2009, 30(11):1213-1233.
[39]Crama P, De Reyck B, Taneri N. Licensing contracts:Control rights, options, and timing[J]. Management Science, 2016, 63(4):1131-1149.
[40]Lawler E J, Thye S R, Yoon J. Social exchange and micro social order[J]. American Sociological Review, 2008,73(4):519-542.
[41]熊中楷,申成然,彭志强.专利保护下再制造闭环供应链协调机制研究[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(6):76-85.Xiong Z K, Shen C R, Peng Z Q. Closed-loop supply chain coordination research with remanufacturing under patent protection[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2011, 14(6):76-85.
[42]D'Aspremont C, Jacquemin A. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J]. American Economic Review, 1988, 78(5):1133-1137.
[43]Gupta S. Channel structure with knowledge spillovers[J]. Marketing Science,2008, 27(2):247-261.
[44]Nash Jr J F. The bargaining problem[J]. Econometrica, 1950, 18(2):155-162.
[45]Howe J. The rise of crowdsourcing[J]. Wired Magazine, 2006, 14(6):1-4.
[46]Afuah A, Tucci C L. Crowdsourcing as a solution to distant search[J]. Academy of Management Review, 2012,37(3):355-375.
[47]Bullis K. How Tesla is driving electric car innovation[EB/OL].[2013-08-07]. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/516961.
[48]GE Global Research. GE, MIT building crowdsourcing software platform to revolutionize product design and manufacturing[EB/OL].[2012-04-05]. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120405006106/en.