竞争环境下B2C平台增值服务投资决策
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摘要
为提高竞争环境下的平台经济效益,讨论平台企业对双边用户的增值服务投资问题,在考虑用户多归属条件下构建B2C平台竞争模型.通过比较分析发现,在双边单归属或一边多归属条件下,平台企业的最优投资满足一个区间策略:若投资资源小于该区间的下界,则根据边际投资成本小于或大于某一阈值,平台企业选择投资全部或部分资源;若投资资源大于该区间的上界,则最优投资存在两个纯策略均衡;若投资资源位于该区间内,则最优投资存在唯一纳什均衡.此外,在双边多归属条件下,平台企业的最优投资满足一个单阈值策略:根据边际投资成本小于或大于某一阈值,平台企业选择投资全部或部分资源.
In order to improve economic benefits of platforms in competition, this paper discusses the problem on valueadded service investment. The B2 C platform competition model based on multi-homing is built. The result shows that,when platforms' two sides are single-homing or the platforms' one side is multi-homing, the optimal investment meets on an interval strategy: If investment resources are less than the lower bound, the total resources or partial resources will be applied to value-added service according to one threshold of the marginal cost of investment. If investment resources are more than the upper bound, it will result in two pure strategy equilibriums. If investment resources are within the interval, a unique Nash equilibrium can be achieved. Moreover, when platforms' two sides are multi-homing, the optimal investment meets a single threshold strategy: If the marginal cost of investment is less than a threshold, the total resources of platform enterprise will be applied to value-added service, if not, partial resources will be applied.
In order to improve economic benefits of platforms in competition, this paper discusses the problem on valueadded service investment. The B2 C platform competition model based on multi-homing is built. The result shows that,when platforms' two sides are single-homing or the platforms' one side is multi-homing, the optimal investment meets on an interval strategy: If investment resources are less than the lower bound, the total resources or partial resources will be applied to value-added service according to one threshold of the marginal cost of investment. If investment resources are more than the upper bound, it will result in two pure strategy equilibriums. If investment resources are within the interval, a unique Nash equilibrium can be achieved. Moreover, when platforms' two sides are multi-homing, the optimal investment meets a single threshold strategy: If the marginal cost of investment is less than a threshold, the total resources of platform enterprise will be applied to value-added service, if not, partial resources will be applied.
引文
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[3] Belleflamme P, Peitz M. Platform competition and seller investment incentives[J]. European Economic Review,2010, 54(8):1059-1076.
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[6]梁玉婉.双边平台的性能投资与定价研究[D].合肥:中国科学技术大学管理学院, 2016.(Liang Y W. A study on performance investment and pricing for two-sided platforms[D]. Hefei:School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, 2016.)
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[9]柴双.网商在C2C电子商务平台上建立竞争优势的投资决策研究—–以淘宝网为例[D].上海:复旦大学管理学院, 2013.(Cha S. Study on investment decision of the e-businessman on C2C e-commerce platform—Based on taobao[D]. Shanghai:School of Management, Fudan University, 2013.)
[10]黄文妍,段文奇.双边市场平台战略投资决策—–技术创新导向型还是人工服务导向型[J].中国管理科学, 2015, 23(S1):686-689.(Huang W Y, Duan W Q. Technology-intensive—Strategy investment for two-sided market platforms[J].China J of Management Science, 2015, 23(S1):686-689.)
[11] Caillaud B, Jullien B. Chicken&egg:Competition among intermediation service providers[J]. Rand J of Economics, 2003, 34(2):309-328.
[12] Doganoglu T, Wright J. Multihoming and compatibility[J]. International J of Industrial Organization, 2006, 24(1):45-67.
[13]纪汉霖,张永庆.用户多归属条件下的双边市场平台竞争策略[J].经济问题探索, 2009(5):101-107.(Ji H L, Zhang Y Q. The competition strategy of two-sided market platform under multihoming[J]. Inquiry into Economic Issues, 2009(5):101-107.)
[14] Poolsombat R, Vernasca G. Partial multihoming in two-sided markets[EB/OL].[2017-08-05]. http://ideas.repec.org/p/yor/yorken/06-10.html.
[15] Rasch A. Platform competition with partial multihoming under differentiation:A note[J]. Infection&Immunity,2007, 79(4):1489-1497.
[16]曹俊浩.基于双边市场理论的B2B平台运行策略及其演化研究[D].上海:上海交通大学安泰经济管理学院, 2010.(Cao J H. On operation strategies and evolution of B2B platform based on the theory of two-sided markets[D].Antai School of Economics and Management. Shanghai:Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2010.)
[2] Chang J R, Hung M W. Optimal timing to invest in e-commerce[J]. Psychology&Marketing, 2006, 23(4):335–348.
[3] Belleflamme P, Peitz M. Platform competition and seller investment incentives[J]. European Economic Review,2010, 54(8):1059-1076.
[4] Hagiu A, Spulber D. First-party content and coordination in two-sided markets[J]. Management Science, 2013,59(4):933-949.
[5] Anderson E G Jr, Parker G G, Tan B. Platform performance investment in the presence of network externalities[J]. Ssrn Electronic J, 2013, 25(1):152-172.
[6]梁玉婉.双边平台的性能投资与定价研究[D].合肥:中国科学技术大学管理学院, 2016.(Liang Y W. A study on performance investment and pricing for two-sided platforms[D]. Hefei:School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, 2016.)
[7]豆国威.双边平台增值服务的投资和定价策略研究[D].合肥:中国科学技术大学管理学院, 2016.(Dou G W. The value-added services investment and pricing strategy on bilateral platform[D]. Hefei:School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, 2016.)
[8]谢兆霞.面向用户忠诚的B2B电子中介投资决策研究[D].南京:南京理工大学经济管理学院, 2012.(Xie Z X. Investment strategy analysis of B2B E-intermediary oriented to user loyalty[D]. Nanjing:School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science&Technology, 2012.)
[9]柴双.网商在C2C电子商务平台上建立竞争优势的投资决策研究—–以淘宝网为例[D].上海:复旦大学管理学院, 2013.(Cha S. Study on investment decision of the e-businessman on C2C e-commerce platform—Based on taobao[D]. Shanghai:School of Management, Fudan University, 2013.)
[10]黄文妍,段文奇.双边市场平台战略投资决策—–技术创新导向型还是人工服务导向型[J].中国管理科学, 2015, 23(S1):686-689.(Huang W Y, Duan W Q. Technology-intensive—Strategy investment for two-sided market platforms[J].China J of Management Science, 2015, 23(S1):686-689.)
[11] Caillaud B, Jullien B. Chicken&egg:Competition among intermediation service providers[J]. Rand J of Economics, 2003, 34(2):309-328.
[12] Doganoglu T, Wright J. Multihoming and compatibility[J]. International J of Industrial Organization, 2006, 24(1):45-67.
[13]纪汉霖,张永庆.用户多归属条件下的双边市场平台竞争策略[J].经济问题探索, 2009(5):101-107.(Ji H L, Zhang Y Q. The competition strategy of two-sided market platform under multihoming[J]. Inquiry into Economic Issues, 2009(5):101-107.)
[14] Poolsombat R, Vernasca G. Partial multihoming in two-sided markets[EB/OL].[2017-08-05]. http://ideas.repec.org/p/yor/yorken/06-10.html.
[15] Rasch A. Platform competition with partial multihoming under differentiation:A note[J]. Infection&Immunity,2007, 79(4):1489-1497.
[16]曹俊浩.基于双边市场理论的B2B平台运行策略及其演化研究[D].上海:上海交通大学安泰经济管理学院, 2010.(Cao J H. On operation strategies and evolution of B2B platform based on the theory of two-sided markets[D].Antai School of Economics and Management. Shanghai:Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2010.)
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