中国化工产业园区化的驱动机制:基于社会——生态系统框架下的博弈论分析
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摘要
化工产业园区化是政府合理规范化工园区且将化工园区外化工生产企业关停并搬迁至化工园区内的产业集聚化,是解决目前中国化工产业安全事故频发、环境污染严重等问题,推进化工产业转型升级的重要政策之一。中国化工产业园区化的社会—生态系统框架刻画了化工园区、化工产品、化工园区管委会、企业和公众四个核心子系统的关联,在此基础上,中国化工产业园区化的博弈模型将参与者简化为政府(包括化工园区管委会)、企业(化工生产企业)和公众(化工生产企业现址影响半径内的居民群体),并分别构建了政府与企业间的博弈模型与公众参与下的政府与企业间的博弈模型。根据模型推论,此两类情景博弈的纳什均衡都可以为(政府行政政策,企业按期搬迁入园)或(政府经济政策,企业按期搬迁入园)。中国化工产业园区化的驱动机制,是在作为外在驱动主体的政府和公众的引导和监督下,作为内在驱动主体的化工生产企业,在各驱动因素的协同作用下,实现其"按期搬迁入园"的机制。进而得出化工生产企业与化工园区"按期匹配搬迁入园"、提升化工园区公共服务能力、差异化地一企一策及建立公众和企业与政府的三方对话机制的四点政策建议。
Chemical industry zonation is the industrial agglomeration process which the government regulates chemical park reasonably and relocates chemical manufacturing firms to the chemical park. It is one of the substantial policies to prevent frequent security incidents, regulate severe environmental pollution, and quicken the transformation and upgrading of China's chemical industry. The social-ecological system(SES) framework of China's chemical industry zonation depicted the relations of four core subsystems which are a chemical park, chemical products, chemical park administration committee,firms and the public. Based on SES framework, the game model of China's chemical industry zonation simplified chemical park administration committee and other departments to the government, chemical manufacturing firm to the firm, and residents living in the influence radius of chemical manufacturing firm's current site to the public, and established the game between the government and the firm, and the game between the government and the firm yet including the public. The Nash equilibriums of two both games could be "administration policy of the government, punctual relocation to a chemical park of the firm" or "economic policy of the government, punctual relocation to a chemical park of the firm". Furthermore, the driving mechanism of China's chemical industry zonation is that chemical manufacturing firm which is the internal driving agent relocates to chemical park punctually under the integrated effects of all driving elements under the guide or supervision of government or the public which both are exterior driving agents. The four policy suggestions are matching relocation between chemical manufacturing firm and chemical park, enhancement of public service in chemical park, specific government policy design for each chemical manufacturing firm, dialogue mechanism design among the public, firm and government.
Chemical industry zonation is the industrial agglomeration process which the government regulates chemical park reasonably and relocates chemical manufacturing firms to the chemical park. It is one of the substantial policies to prevent frequent security incidents, regulate severe environmental pollution, and quicken the transformation and upgrading of China's chemical industry. The social-ecological system(SES) framework of China's chemical industry zonation depicted the relations of four core subsystems which are a chemical park, chemical products, chemical park administration committee,firms and the public. Based on SES framework, the game model of China's chemical industry zonation simplified chemical park administration committee and other departments to the government, chemical manufacturing firm to the firm, and residents living in the influence radius of chemical manufacturing firm's current site to the public, and established the game between the government and the firm, and the game between the government and the firm yet including the public. The Nash equilibriums of two both games could be "administration policy of the government, punctual relocation to a chemical park of the firm" or "economic policy of the government, punctual relocation to a chemical park of the firm". Furthermore, the driving mechanism of China's chemical industry zonation is that chemical manufacturing firm which is the internal driving agent relocates to chemical park punctually under the integrated effects of all driving elements under the guide or supervision of government or the public which both are exterior driving agents. The four policy suggestions are matching relocation between chemical manufacturing firm and chemical park, enhancement of public service in chemical park, specific government policy design for each chemical manufacturing firm, dialogue mechanism design among the public, firm and government.
引文
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(1)资料来源:中国石油和化学工业联合会化工园区工作委员会:2018中国化工园区30强。
(2)资料来源:http://www.sdein.gov.cn/dtxx/hbyw/201805/t20180529_1333096.html。
(1)资料来源:https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3340194。
(2)资料来源:http://www.aqsc.cn/news/201703/14/c7348.html。
[2]李寿生.开创下一个未来:中国石油和化学工业2030年展望[M].北京:化学工业出版社,2018.
[3]OSTROME,Adiagnostic appnostic for going beyond Panaceas[J].Proceedings of the national academy of the United States of America,2007,104(39):15181-15187.
[4]付立华.社会生态系统理论视角下的社区矫正与和谐社区建设[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2009,19(4):125-128.
[5]宋春艳.社会生态系统理论框架下我国社会企业发展的困境及对策[J].求索,2015(3):24-27.
[6]张晓玲.基于社会-生态系统框架下的小城镇转型治理机制研究[J].环境经济研究,2018(1):150-160.
[7]任旭东.环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的激励机制:一个两阶段博弈分析[J].产业经济评论(山东大学),2015,14(4):17-47.
[8]张学刚,钟茂初.政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(2):31-35.
[9]CHEN Y J,SHEU J B.Environmental-regulation pricing strategies for green supply chain management[J].Transportation research part E:logistics and transportation review,2009,45(5):667-677.
[10]TIAN Y H,GOVINDAN K,ZHU Q H.A system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for green supply chain management diffusion among Chinese manufacturers[J].Journal of cleaner production,2014,80:96-105.
[11]HE G Z,BOAS I J C,MOL A P J,et al.What drives public acceptance of chemical industrial park policy and project in China?[J].Resources,conservation and recycling,2018,138:1-12.
(1)资料来源:中国石油和化学工业联合会化工园区工作委员会:2018中国化工园区30强。
(2)资料来源:http://www.sdein.gov.cn/dtxx/hbyw/201805/t20180529_1333096.html。
(1)资料来源:https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3340194。
(2)资料来源:http://www.aqsc.cn/news/201703/14/c7348.html。