论国际法视阈下国际货币基金组织贷款条件性的法律属性
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摘要
众多的实践表明,IMF在金融危机初期所提供的金融援助在一定程度上有助于成员国经济的复苏,同时,IMF贷款所附加的条件性要求由于缺乏经济自主权的尊重而备受诟病。IMF设置贷款条件的行为不同于民法意义上的合同签订,其符合意思表示、归因主体和法律后果三个要件中的前两项,但不符合法律后果这一要件。IMF与成员国在贷款条件问题上虽不旨在创设合同法意义上的权利义务关系,但IMF法律体系下设置贷款条件的行为是当事方非协议性意思表示且产生法定效果的准法律行为。IMF贷款条件理应上升为国际法渊源,它不只是IMF为确保成员国回购贷款资金的一项"决定",更体现了国际法上的权利和义务关系。
Numerous practices have shown that the financial assistance provided by the IMF in the early stage of the financial crisis has contributed to the recovery of the local economy to a certain extent. At the same time, the conditional requirements attached to IMF loans have been criticized for lack of respect for economic autonomy. IMF's act of setting loan conditions is different from the signing of contracts in the sense of civil law and is not a legal act in international law because it just conforms to the first two of three elements( expression of will, attribution subject and legal consequence) but does not meet comply with the last one( legal consequence). Although IMF and its member states do not aim at creating right-obligation relationship in the sense of contract law, the act of setting loan conditions under the IMF legal system is the non-consensual expression of will of parties and a quasi-legal act creating legal effect. IMF loan conditions should be regarded as a source of international law because it is not only a "decision" of IMF to ensure the repurchase of loan funds by member countries, but also reflects the rights and obligations under the international law.
Numerous practices have shown that the financial assistance provided by the IMF in the early stage of the financial crisis has contributed to the recovery of the local economy to a certain extent. At the same time, the conditional requirements attached to IMF loans have been criticized for lack of respect for economic autonomy. IMF's act of setting loan conditions is different from the signing of contracts in the sense of civil law and is not a legal act in international law because it just conforms to the first two of three elements( expression of will, attribution subject and legal consequence) but does not meet comply with the last one( legal consequence). Although IMF and its member states do not aim at creating right-obligation relationship in the sense of contract law, the act of setting loan conditions under the IMF legal system is the non-consensual expression of will of parties and a quasi-legal act creating legal effect. IMF loan conditions should be regarded as a source of international law because it is not only a "decision" of IMF to ensure the repurchase of loan funds by member countries, but also reflects the rights and obligations under the international law.
引文
(1)See Black’s Law Dictionary,8th edition,West Publishing Company,2004,p.889.
(2)See Joseph Gold,Conditionality,IMF Pamphlet Series No.31,Washington D.C.,1979.p.2.
(3)See Erik Denters,Law and Practice of IMF Conditionality,Kluwer Law International,1996,p.6.
(4)参见[美]A·W·胡克:《国际货币基金组织:他的演变、组织机构与业务活动》,中国人民银行对外业务管理司译,中国金融出版社1983年版,第41页。
(5)See Ross Leckow,‘Conditionality in the International Monetary Fund’,Current Development in Monetary and Financial Law,Washington DC,Vol.3,2005,p.53
(6)“IMF Conditionality”Press Briefing by Masood Ahmed,Deputy Director,IMF Policy Development and Review Department,March 21,2001.
(7)See Manuel Guitian,Fund Conditionality:Evolution of Principle and Practices,IMF Pamphlet Series No.38,Washington D.C.,1981,p.1
(8)See Rosa M.Lastra ed.,The Reform of the International Financial Architecture,Kluwer Law International,2001,p.80.
(9)See Ibid.
(10)参见鄂晓梅:《析IMF贷款条件的法律效力》,《法学评论》2002年第5期;曹勇:《国际货币基金组织贷款的政治经济学分析:模型与案例》,《国际政治研究》2005年第4期;缪心毫:《世界银行与国际货币基金组织贷款交叉条件的法律分析》,《现代法学》2010年第5期。
(11)李元旭:《金融危机与IMF的贷款条件性改革》,《世界经济文汇》1999年第6期。
(12)See Manuel Guitián,Conditionality:Past,Present and Future,IMF Staff Papers,December 1995.
(13)See Robert Hockett,From Macro to Micro to“Mission-Creep”:Defending the IMF’s Emering Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability,COLUM.J.TRANSNATL L.,Vol.41,No.153,2002,P.178.
(14)See Ibid,p.158.
(15)参见周镇想主编:《法学大辞典》,团结出版社1994年版,第913页。
(16)See H.Lauterpacht,Private Law Sources and Analogies of Internationgal Law.The Cambridge Law Journal,2009,No,02,V01.3,P.322.
(17)参见[苏联]克利缅科等编:《国际法辞典》,程晓霞等译,中国人民大学出版社1987年版,第214页。
(18)日本国际法学会编:《国际法辞典》,外交学院国际法教研室中文版总校订,世界知识出版社1985年版,第601页。
(19)参见[奥]阿·菲德罗斯等:《国际法(上册)》,李浩培译,商务印书馆1981年版,第193页。
(20)王铁崖主编:《中华法学大辞典·国际法卷》,中国检察出版社1996年版,第179页。
(21)李浩培著:《国际法概念和渊源》,贵州人民出版社1994年版,第117页。
(22)参见周忠海、张卫华:《试论国家单方法律行为的若干基本问题》,《河南省政法管理干部学院学报》2007年第6期。
(23)参见慕亚平:《国际法原理》,人民法院出版社2005年版,第143页。
(24)参见前注(18),日本国际法学会编书,第601~602页。
(25)参见梁西:《国际法》,曾令良修订,武汉大学出版社2012年版,第288页。
(26)参见前注(18),日本国际法学会编书,第601页。
(27)参见杨泽伟:《国际法》(第二版),高等教育出版社2012年版,第46~47页。
(28)参见前注(22),周忠海、张卫华文。
(29)例如,补充性贷款便利(Compensatory Financing Facility)中对成员国政策的要求仅仅是“成员国在必要时需要和IMF合作找出解决收支困难的方法”。See Report on Stabilization of Prices of Primary Products,pp.14~15.
(30)See Nuclear Tests Case(Australia v.France),Judgement of 20 December 1974,ICJ Report 1974,pp.267~268;Sergio Carbone,“Promise in International Law:A Confirmation of Its Binding Force”,Italian Yearbook of International Law,Vol.1,1975,pp.166~172.
(31)See E.Lauterpach,t“Gentleman’s Agreements”,Festschrift fuer F.A.Mann,ed.by Werner Flume,et al,Internatioanl Recht und Wirtschafsordnung(International Law and Economic Order),Munich,1977,p.383.
(32)参见[德]迪特尔·施瓦布:《民法导论》,郑冲译,法律出版社2006年版,第345~346页;王泽鉴:《民法总则》,北京大学出版社2009年版,第205页;魏振瀛主编:《民法》,北京大学出版社、高等教育出版社2013年版,第141页。
(33)参见常鹏翱:《对准法律行为的体系化解读》,《环球法律评论》2014年第2期。
(34)参见伊田:《民法典总则之理论与立法研究》,法律出版社2010年版,第467页。
(35)参见常鹏翱:《事实行为的基础规范》,《法学研究》2010年第1期。
(36)See Decision No.2603-(68/132),September 20,1968,Selected Decision of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents,Eighth Issue(Washington,May 10,1976),pp.47~49;Decision No.6056-(79/38),March 2,1979,Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30,1979,pp.136~138.
(37)See Joseph Gold,The Legal Character of the Fund’s Stand-by Arrangement and Why it Matters,IMF Pamphlets No.35,Washington D.C.,1993,p.11.
(38)备用安排不为成员国创设使用IMF资金的权利,仅仅宣誓承认成员国有权使用IMF的资金。参见《IMF协定》第5条第7款;See Fran9oisGianviti,The International Monetary Fund and External Debt,Recueol Des Cours,Vol.215,1989,p.254.
(39)备用安排与贷款协议(Loan agreement)分属两个不同文件。成员国与IMF之间签订的贷款协议属于国际条约,对双方产生权利与义务。备用安排属于贷款协议下的附加文件,并非意在创设双方的权利义务。
(40)See Daniel D.Bradlow ed.,International Borrowing:Negotiating and Structuring International Debt Transactions,3rd ed.,Springer Netherlands,1997,p.405.
(41)See Guidelines on Conditionality(Decision I),para 9,2005.
(42)See Erik Denters,Law and Policy of IMF Conditionality,Kluwer Law International,1996,p.101.
(43)参见前注(33),常鹏翱文。
(44)IMF执行董事会2002年颁布的贷款指导方针的原则部分由8条组成,主要包括贷款条件性的目的、早期预警和防御、所有权和执行计划的能力、会员国的环境、使用基金资源的批准、计划目标的焦点、贷款条件性的范围和基金组织的责任。其形式部分由5条构成,主要对基金安排的本质、会员国的方案文件、执行情况的监控、放弃和浮动部分作出规定。其审查和评估部分由3条构成,主要对方案的计划评估、定期评价及对之前决定的废止作出规定。
(45)See Interpretion of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 berween the WHO and Egypt,Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980,73,ICJ Report,1980,P.88.
(2)See Joseph Gold,Conditionality,IMF Pamphlet Series No.31,Washington D.C.,1979.p.2.
(3)See Erik Denters,Law and Practice of IMF Conditionality,Kluwer Law International,1996,p.6.
(4)参见[美]A·W·胡克:《国际货币基金组织:他的演变、组织机构与业务活动》,中国人民银行对外业务管理司译,中国金融出版社1983年版,第41页。
(5)See Ross Leckow,‘Conditionality in the International Monetary Fund’,Current Development in Monetary and Financial Law,Washington DC,Vol.3,2005,p.53
(6)“IMF Conditionality”Press Briefing by Masood Ahmed,Deputy Director,IMF Policy Development and Review Department,March 21,2001.
(7)See Manuel Guitian,Fund Conditionality:Evolution of Principle and Practices,IMF Pamphlet Series No.38,Washington D.C.,1981,p.1
(8)See Rosa M.Lastra ed.,The Reform of the International Financial Architecture,Kluwer Law International,2001,p.80.
(9)See Ibid.
(10)参见鄂晓梅:《析IMF贷款条件的法律效力》,《法学评论》2002年第5期;曹勇:《国际货币基金组织贷款的政治经济学分析:模型与案例》,《国际政治研究》2005年第4期;缪心毫:《世界银行与国际货币基金组织贷款交叉条件的法律分析》,《现代法学》2010年第5期。
(11)李元旭:《金融危机与IMF的贷款条件性改革》,《世界经济文汇》1999年第6期。
(12)See Manuel Guitián,Conditionality:Past,Present and Future,IMF Staff Papers,December 1995.
(13)See Robert Hockett,From Macro to Micro to“Mission-Creep”:Defending the IMF’s Emering Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability,COLUM.J.TRANSNATL L.,Vol.41,No.153,2002,P.178.
(14)See Ibid,p.158.
(15)参见周镇想主编:《法学大辞典》,团结出版社1994年版,第913页。
(16)See H.Lauterpacht,Private Law Sources and Analogies of Internationgal Law.The Cambridge Law Journal,2009,No,02,V01.3,P.322.
(17)参见[苏联]克利缅科等编:《国际法辞典》,程晓霞等译,中国人民大学出版社1987年版,第214页。
(18)日本国际法学会编:《国际法辞典》,外交学院国际法教研室中文版总校订,世界知识出版社1985年版,第601页。
(19)参见[奥]阿·菲德罗斯等:《国际法(上册)》,李浩培译,商务印书馆1981年版,第193页。
(20)王铁崖主编:《中华法学大辞典·国际法卷》,中国检察出版社1996年版,第179页。
(21)李浩培著:《国际法概念和渊源》,贵州人民出版社1994年版,第117页。
(22)参见周忠海、张卫华:《试论国家单方法律行为的若干基本问题》,《河南省政法管理干部学院学报》2007年第6期。
(23)参见慕亚平:《国际法原理》,人民法院出版社2005年版,第143页。
(24)参见前注(18),日本国际法学会编书,第601~602页。
(25)参见梁西:《国际法》,曾令良修订,武汉大学出版社2012年版,第288页。
(26)参见前注(18),日本国际法学会编书,第601页。
(27)参见杨泽伟:《国际法》(第二版),高等教育出版社2012年版,第46~47页。
(28)参见前注(22),周忠海、张卫华文。
(29)例如,补充性贷款便利(Compensatory Financing Facility)中对成员国政策的要求仅仅是“成员国在必要时需要和IMF合作找出解决收支困难的方法”。See Report on Stabilization of Prices of Primary Products,pp.14~15.
(30)See Nuclear Tests Case(Australia v.France),Judgement of 20 December 1974,ICJ Report 1974,pp.267~268;Sergio Carbone,“Promise in International Law:A Confirmation of Its Binding Force”,Italian Yearbook of International Law,Vol.1,1975,pp.166~172.
(31)See E.Lauterpach,t“Gentleman’s Agreements”,Festschrift fuer F.A.Mann,ed.by Werner Flume,et al,Internatioanl Recht und Wirtschafsordnung(International Law and Economic Order),Munich,1977,p.383.
(32)参见[德]迪特尔·施瓦布:《民法导论》,郑冲译,法律出版社2006年版,第345~346页;王泽鉴:《民法总则》,北京大学出版社2009年版,第205页;魏振瀛主编:《民法》,北京大学出版社、高等教育出版社2013年版,第141页。
(33)参见常鹏翱:《对准法律行为的体系化解读》,《环球法律评论》2014年第2期。
(34)参见伊田:《民法典总则之理论与立法研究》,法律出版社2010年版,第467页。
(35)参见常鹏翱:《事实行为的基础规范》,《法学研究》2010年第1期。
(36)See Decision No.2603-(68/132),September 20,1968,Selected Decision of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents,Eighth Issue(Washington,May 10,1976),pp.47~49;Decision No.6056-(79/38),March 2,1979,Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30,1979,pp.136~138.
(37)See Joseph Gold,The Legal Character of the Fund’s Stand-by Arrangement and Why it Matters,IMF Pamphlets No.35,Washington D.C.,1993,p.11.
(38)备用安排不为成员国创设使用IMF资金的权利,仅仅宣誓承认成员国有权使用IMF的资金。参见《IMF协定》第5条第7款;See Fran9oisGianviti,The International Monetary Fund and External Debt,Recueol Des Cours,Vol.215,1989,p.254.
(39)备用安排与贷款协议(Loan agreement)分属两个不同文件。成员国与IMF之间签订的贷款协议属于国际条约,对双方产生权利与义务。备用安排属于贷款协议下的附加文件,并非意在创设双方的权利义务。
(40)See Daniel D.Bradlow ed.,International Borrowing:Negotiating and Structuring International Debt Transactions,3rd ed.,Springer Netherlands,1997,p.405.
(41)See Guidelines on Conditionality(Decision I),para 9,2005.
(42)See Erik Denters,Law and Policy of IMF Conditionality,Kluwer Law International,1996,p.101.
(43)参见前注(33),常鹏翱文。
(44)IMF执行董事会2002年颁布的贷款指导方针的原则部分由8条组成,主要包括贷款条件性的目的、早期预警和防御、所有权和执行计划的能力、会员国的环境、使用基金资源的批准、计划目标的焦点、贷款条件性的范围和基金组织的责任。其形式部分由5条构成,主要对基金安排的本质、会员国的方案文件、执行情况的监控、放弃和浮动部分作出规定。其审查和评估部分由3条构成,主要对方案的计划评估、定期评价及对之前决定的废止作出规定。
(45)See Interpretion of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 berween the WHO and Egypt,Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980,73,ICJ Report,1980,P.88.