突发环境事件中地方政府信息公开行为研究——基于上级政府干预的视角
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摘要
[目的/意义]突发环境事件中地方政府存在推迟公开、选择性公开甚至隐瞒信息等行为,严重侵害了公众的知情权,从演化博弈角度探讨上级政府干预对地方政府在突发环境事件中信息公开作用的行为逻辑,对完善我国突发环境事件信息披露机制,保障公众权益有着重大的理论和现实意义。[方法/过程]构建突发环境事件中地方政府与公众之间的信息公开演化博弈模型,探究上级政府干预(包括标准控制、官媒报道以及惩罚干预)下的博弈演化过程及稳定策略,进而剖析上级政府干预对突发环境事件中地方政府信息公开的作用机理。[结果/结论]研究表明:上级政府的标准控制方式将推动地方政府形成信息公开惯性,并为公众维权行动提供制度环境;官媒报道方式将通过社会影响力约束地方政府有限公开信息行为,并为公众提供参与信息公开的政治机会。此外,适度的惩罚干预也能有效推动地方政府主动公开事件信息,同时在一定程度上实现对公众隐性利益的再分配。
[Purpose/Significance]During environmental incidents, local governments often take passive measures, such as delay, selective and even concealed information disclosure, to respond the public's information demand. To perfect government's information disclosure mechanism during environmental incidents, it is of great significance to explore the role of the superior government intervention in promoting local government's information disclosure from the perspective of evolutionary game theory.[Method/Process]This article constructs an evolutionary game model of environmental accidents between local governments and the public to investigate the progress of regional governments' information disclosure, then analyzes the internal mechanism that the superior government intervention(including standard control, punishment mechanism and official media reporting) affects local government's information disclosure in environmental accidents.[Result/Conclusion]The research shows that the standard control from the superior or central government will push the local government to form the inertia of information disclosure and also provide an institutional environment for the public action. Besides, official media reporting will restrain local government's limited disclosure through its social influence, and provide political opportunities for the public to participate in government's information disclosure progress. Finally, appropriate punishment can also effectively promote local governments to fully disclose information, and redistribute the hidden interests of the public to a certain extent.
[Purpose/Significance]During environmental incidents, local governments often take passive measures, such as delay, selective and even concealed information disclosure, to respond the public's information demand. To perfect government's information disclosure mechanism during environmental incidents, it is of great significance to explore the role of the superior government intervention in promoting local government's information disclosure from the perspective of evolutionary game theory.[Method/Process]This article constructs an evolutionary game model of environmental accidents between local governments and the public to investigate the progress of regional governments' information disclosure, then analyzes the internal mechanism that the superior government intervention(including standard control, punishment mechanism and official media reporting) affects local government's information disclosure in environmental accidents.[Result/Conclusion]The research shows that the standard control from the superior or central government will push the local government to form the inertia of information disclosure and also provide an institutional environment for the public action. Besides, official media reporting will restrain local government's limited disclosure through its social influence, and provide political opportunities for the public to participate in government's information disclosure progress. Finally, appropriate punishment can also effectively promote local governments to fully disclose information, and redistribute the hidden interests of the public to a certain extent.
引文
[1] Gao S,Ling S,Liu W H.The role of social media in promoting information disclosure on environmental incidents:An evolutionary game theory perspective[J].Sustainablity,2018,10(12).
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[4] 唐云锋.我国地方政府债务的扩张机制研究——基于委托代理理论框架下的分析[J].财经论丛,2006(2):54-59.
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[6] 诸葛福民,原光.公共危机治理中的信息公开问题——政府、媒体和公众的利益博弈[J].山东社会科学,2011(11):168-171.
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[8] 姜海,李武星,雷昊,等.基于博弈实验的上级政府干预对征地交易成本影响分析[J].中国土地科学,2018,32(4):36-43.
[9] 马怀德.政府信息公开制度的发展与完善[J].中国行政管理,2018(5):11-16.
[10] 李学.法令之后:政府信息公开经验现实的反思——基于省级《政府信息公开报告》文本的内容分析[J].社会科学,2011(9):13-22.
[11] Xianshi L I.Research on the water resource management based on game model[J].Procedia Computer Science,2017,107:262-267.
[12] Zhang M,Li H.New evolutionary game model of the regional governance of haze pollution in China[J].Applied Mathematical Modelling,2018,63:577-590.
[13] 黄策,邓燕华.突发性责任事故的信息搜集与披露——基于央地信息沟通的视角[J].公共行政评论,2016,9(1):8-25.
[14] 黄荣贵,郑雯,桂勇.多渠道强干预、框架与抗争结果——对40个拆迁抗争案例的模糊集定性比较分析[J].社会学研究,2015(5):90-114.
[15] 薛可,余来辉,余明阳.媒体使用、政治信任与腐败感知——以中国网民为对象的实证研究[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2018,39(6):69-78.
[16] 王锡锌.政府信息公开制度十年:迈向治理导向的公开[J].中国行政管理,2018(5):17-22.
[17] 黄荣贵,郑雯,桂勇.多渠道强干预、框架与抗争结果——对40个拆迁抗争案例的模糊集定性比较分析[J].社会学研究,2015(5):90-114.
[18] Umehara E,Ohta T.Using game theory to investigate risk information disclosure by government agencies and satisfying the public—The role of the guardian agent[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems,Man,and Cybernetics - Part A:Systems and Humans,2009,39(2):321-330.
[19] 赖诗攀.问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(2):18-27,138.
[20] 罗德里克·M·克雷默,汤姆·R·泰勒.组织中的信任[M].北京:中国城市出版社,2003:12.
[21] 北京市行政问责办法[EB/OL].(2011-08-01).http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-08/01/content_1917424.htm.
[2] Eisenhardt K M.Agency theory:An assessment and review[J].Academy of Management Review,1989,14(1):57-74.
[3] 黄策,邓燕华.突发性责任事故的信息搜集与披露——基于央地信息沟通的视角[J].公共行政评论,2016,9(1):8-25.
[4] 唐云锋.我国地方政府债务的扩张机制研究——基于委托代理理论框架下的分析[J].财经论丛,2006(2):54-59.
[5] 郑保卫,李玉洁.博弈与共赢:《信息公开条例》三大主体互动分析[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社科版),2008,29(6):148-152.
[6] 诸葛福民,原光.公共危机治理中的信息公开问题——政府、媒体和公众的利益博弈[J].山东社会科学,2011(11):168-171.
[7] 徐风华,王俊杰.地方政府考核:双重委托人失效及其政策含义[J].社会科学,2007(10):25-33.
[8] 姜海,李武星,雷昊,等.基于博弈实验的上级政府干预对征地交易成本影响分析[J].中国土地科学,2018,32(4):36-43.
[9] 马怀德.政府信息公开制度的发展与完善[J].中国行政管理,2018(5):11-16.
[10] 李学.法令之后:政府信息公开经验现实的反思——基于省级《政府信息公开报告》文本的内容分析[J].社会科学,2011(9):13-22.
[11] Xianshi L I.Research on the water resource management based on game model[J].Procedia Computer Science,2017,107:262-267.
[12] Zhang M,Li H.New evolutionary game model of the regional governance of haze pollution in China[J].Applied Mathematical Modelling,2018,63:577-590.
[13] 黄策,邓燕华.突发性责任事故的信息搜集与披露——基于央地信息沟通的视角[J].公共行政评论,2016,9(1):8-25.
[14] 黄荣贵,郑雯,桂勇.多渠道强干预、框架与抗争结果——对40个拆迁抗争案例的模糊集定性比较分析[J].社会学研究,2015(5):90-114.
[15] 薛可,余来辉,余明阳.媒体使用、政治信任与腐败感知——以中国网民为对象的实证研究[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2018,39(6):69-78.
[16] 王锡锌.政府信息公开制度十年:迈向治理导向的公开[J].中国行政管理,2018(5):17-22.
[17] 黄荣贵,郑雯,桂勇.多渠道强干预、框架与抗争结果——对40个拆迁抗争案例的模糊集定性比较分析[J].社会学研究,2015(5):90-114.
[18] Umehara E,Ohta T.Using game theory to investigate risk information disclosure by government agencies and satisfying the public—The role of the guardian agent[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems,Man,and Cybernetics - Part A:Systems and Humans,2009,39(2):321-330.
[19] 赖诗攀.问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(2):18-27,138.
[20] 罗德里克·M·克雷默,汤姆·R·泰勒.组织中的信任[M].北京:中国城市出版社,2003:12.
[21] 北京市行政问责办法[EB/OL].(2011-08-01).http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-08/01/content_1917424.htm.