分析哲学与现象学融合的三条路径
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摘要
哲学界通常以两个对立哲学运动来概括当代西方哲学,英美哲学属于分析哲学运动,而欧陆哲学则属于现象学运动。不过,这两个哲学运动早就开始了融合趋势,并出现了"分析现象学"的学术形态。从哲学史的角度看,其融合可以区分为三个主要路径:第一个路径是现象学的分析化,包括英国牛津学派的日常语言学派和美国从芬德莱到齐硕姆再到弗莱斯达尔的哲学活动;第二个路径是分析哲学和现象学的比较研究,代表性工作包括弗莱斯达尔早期向分析哲学家介绍现象学的活动及印裔哲学家莫汉蒂对弗雷格和胡塞尔的比较研究;第三个路径则是现象学立场在分析的心灵哲学中运用,早期代表是反人工智能的德雷弗斯和塞尔。
Western contemporary philosophy used to be characterized as two opposite movements, i.e. the one of analytical philosophy in the Britain and USA and the other of phenomenology in European Continent. But they have started to be reconciled many years before and formed a scholar community named "Analytical Phenomenology". From a historical view of philosophy, there are three paths to such reconciliation. The first is analysis of phenomenology, including the Oxford school and the studies in USA from Findlay to Chisholm and to Foellesdal; The second is the comparative studies between the two movements, such as Foellesdal's early work introducing phenomenology into analytical philosophers and Mohanty's comparison between Frege and Husserl; The third is the application of phenomenology into analytical philosophy of mind and its early influential works are against Artificial Intelligence initialed by Dreyfus and Searle.
Western contemporary philosophy used to be characterized as two opposite movements, i.e. the one of analytical philosophy in the Britain and USA and the other of phenomenology in European Continent. But they have started to be reconciled many years before and formed a scholar community named "Analytical Phenomenology". From a historical view of philosophy, there are three paths to such reconciliation. The first is analysis of phenomenology, including the Oxford school and the studies in USA from Findlay to Chisholm and to Foellesdal; The second is the comparative studies between the two movements, such as Foellesdal's early work introducing phenomenology into analytical philosophers and Mohanty's comparison between Frege and Husserl; The third is the application of phenomenology into analytical philosophy of mind and its early influential works are against Artificial Intelligence initialed by Dreyfus and Searle.
引文
(1)M.Dummet,Origins of Analytic Philosophy,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1993,p.26.Cf:P.Hylton's Bookreview,The Journal of Philosophy,1995:556-563.
(2)J.N.Mohanty,Husserl and Frege,.Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1982,p.16.Cf:D.W.Smith's bookreview,The Philosophical Review,Vol.95,No.1,1986:118-120.
(3)关于分析哲学与现象学的早期互动与中期分裂,参见拙文《分析现象学的过去》,《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2010年2期,第22-27页。
(4)H.W.Huemer,Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology:Felix Kauffmann,In The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism:Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives,F.Stadler,ed.,New Jersey:Kluwer Academic Publisher,2003:154-158.
(5)D.W.Smith,Phenomenolgy,http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/,2008.
(6)赖尔:《心的概念》,上海:上海译文出版社1988年版。
(7)G.Ryle,Critical Note:Martin Heidegger,Sein und Zeit[J].Mind,1929(38,151):355-382.
(8)关于这种类似性,德雷福斯有个暗示,参见:Dreyfus,Hubert&Dreyfus,Stuart:'From Socrates to Expert Systems',in Mind over Machine:The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer,Oxford:Blackwell,1986.当代德性论者明确注意到了这个区分,参见Annas,Julia:'Virtue Ethics',in David Copp(ed):The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006:518.
(9)J.L.Austin,"How to do Things with Words:The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955",(ed.J.O.Urmson),Oxford:Clarendon Press.1962.
(10)杨玉成:《奥斯汀:语言现象学与哲学》,北京:商务印书馆2002年版。
(11)章士嵘、王炳文(编):《当代西方著名哲学家评传(第二卷·心智哲学)》,济南:山东人民出版社1996年版,第123页。
(12)G Küng,A bookreview for Smith and Mc Intyre 1982,Nous,1984(5):158-161.D W Smith and R Mc Intyre,Husserl and Intentionality:a Study of Mind,Meaning,and Language.Dordrecht and Boston:D Reidel Publishing Company,1982.
(13)J.N.Findlay.The Discipline of the Cave,London:Allen&Unwin/New York:Humanities Press,1966:31.
(14)J.N.Findlay.Meinong's Theory of Objects,Oxford University Press,1933;2nd ed.Also see Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values,1963.
(15)R.Feldman,‘Roderick Chisholm’,http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/,2008.
(16)H.W.Huemer.Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology:Felix Kauffmann.//F.Stadler(ed.).The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism:Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives.New Jersey:Kluwer Academic Publisher,2003:152.
(17)弗莱斯达尔:《向分析哲学家介绍现象学》,《哲学译丛》1998年第2期。
(18)Dagfin Fφllesdal.Referential Opacity and Modal Logic.Routledge,2004.
(19)J.N.Mohanty.Husserl and Frege.Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1982:16.
(20)D.W.Smith.Bookreview,The Philosophical Review,1986(95,1):118-120.
(21)D.Fφllesdal.Husserl’s Notion of Noema.The Journal of Philosophy,1969(66,20):680-687.
(22)Smith,D.W.&R.Mc Intyre,Intentionality via Intentions.The Journal of Philosophy,1971(68,18):541-561
(23)索科拉夫斯基:《现象学导论》,高秉江、张建华译,武汉:武汉大学出版社2009年版,第218-219页。
(24)H.Drefus,What Computer Can't Do:a critique of artificial reason.Haper&Row Publisher,1972.
(25)塞尔:《意向性》,上海:上海译文出版社2007年版,第13、16页。
(26)J.Petitot et al(eds),Naturalizing Phenomenology:Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.Stanford,California:Stanford University Press1999.
(27)B.A.Wallace,The Taboo of Subjectivity:Toward a New Science of Consciousness.New York:Oxford University Press2000,p68.
(28)J.N.Monhanty,Intentionality and Noema,The Journal of Philosophy,1981,78(11):706-717.
(29)J.Hintikka,The intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.Boston:Reidel,1975.
(30)D.Smith,Phenomenology,in Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy,http://plato.stanford.edu,2003.
(31)J.N.Mohanty,Transcendental Phenomenology:An Analytic Account.Oxford and Cambridge.Massachusetts:Basil Blackwell,1989.
(32)H Dreyfus and H Hall(eds.),Husserl,Intentionality and Cognitive Science.Cambridge,Massachusetts:MIT Press,1982:193-194.
(33)颜青山:《意向对象与摹状词》,《哲学研究》2006年第6期。
(2)J.N.Mohanty,Husserl and Frege,.Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1982,p.16.Cf:D.W.Smith's bookreview,The Philosophical Review,Vol.95,No.1,1986:118-120.
(3)关于分析哲学与现象学的早期互动与中期分裂,参见拙文《分析现象学的过去》,《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2010年2期,第22-27页。
(4)H.W.Huemer,Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology:Felix Kauffmann,In The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism:Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives,F.Stadler,ed.,New Jersey:Kluwer Academic Publisher,2003:154-158.
(5)D.W.Smith,Phenomenolgy,http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/,2008.
(6)赖尔:《心的概念》,上海:上海译文出版社1988年版。
(7)G.Ryle,Critical Note:Martin Heidegger,Sein und Zeit[J].Mind,1929(38,151):355-382.
(8)关于这种类似性,德雷福斯有个暗示,参见:Dreyfus,Hubert&Dreyfus,Stuart:'From Socrates to Expert Systems',in Mind over Machine:The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer,Oxford:Blackwell,1986.当代德性论者明确注意到了这个区分,参见Annas,Julia:'Virtue Ethics',in David Copp(ed):The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006:518.
(9)J.L.Austin,"How to do Things with Words:The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955",(ed.J.O.Urmson),Oxford:Clarendon Press.1962.
(10)杨玉成:《奥斯汀:语言现象学与哲学》,北京:商务印书馆2002年版。
(11)章士嵘、王炳文(编):《当代西方著名哲学家评传(第二卷·心智哲学)》,济南:山东人民出版社1996年版,第123页。
(12)G Küng,A bookreview for Smith and Mc Intyre 1982,Nous,1984(5):158-161.D W Smith and R Mc Intyre,Husserl and Intentionality:a Study of Mind,Meaning,and Language.Dordrecht and Boston:D Reidel Publishing Company,1982.
(13)J.N.Findlay.The Discipline of the Cave,London:Allen&Unwin/New York:Humanities Press,1966:31.
(14)J.N.Findlay.Meinong's Theory of Objects,Oxford University Press,1933;2nd ed.Also see Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values,1963.
(15)R.Feldman,‘Roderick Chisholm’,http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/,2008.
(16)H.W.Huemer.Logical Empiricism and Phenomenology:Felix Kauffmann.//F.Stadler(ed.).The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism:Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives.New Jersey:Kluwer Academic Publisher,2003:152.
(17)弗莱斯达尔:《向分析哲学家介绍现象学》,《哲学译丛》1998年第2期。
(18)Dagfin Fφllesdal.Referential Opacity and Modal Logic.Routledge,2004.
(19)J.N.Mohanty.Husserl and Frege.Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1982:16.
(20)D.W.Smith.Bookreview,The Philosophical Review,1986(95,1):118-120.
(21)D.Fφllesdal.Husserl’s Notion of Noema.The Journal of Philosophy,1969(66,20):680-687.
(22)Smith,D.W.&R.Mc Intyre,Intentionality via Intentions.The Journal of Philosophy,1971(68,18):541-561
(23)索科拉夫斯基:《现象学导论》,高秉江、张建华译,武汉:武汉大学出版社2009年版,第218-219页。
(24)H.Drefus,What Computer Can't Do:a critique of artificial reason.Haper&Row Publisher,1972.
(25)塞尔:《意向性》,上海:上海译文出版社2007年版,第13、16页。
(26)J.Petitot et al(eds),Naturalizing Phenomenology:Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.Stanford,California:Stanford University Press1999.
(27)B.A.Wallace,The Taboo of Subjectivity:Toward a New Science of Consciousness.New York:Oxford University Press2000,p68.
(28)J.N.Monhanty,Intentionality and Noema,The Journal of Philosophy,1981,78(11):706-717.
(29)J.Hintikka,The intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.Boston:Reidel,1975.
(30)D.Smith,Phenomenology,in Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy,http://plato.stanford.edu,2003.
(31)J.N.Mohanty,Transcendental Phenomenology:An Analytic Account.Oxford and Cambridge.Massachusetts:Basil Blackwell,1989.
(32)H Dreyfus and H Hall(eds.),Husserl,Intentionality and Cognitive Science.Cambridge,Massachusetts:MIT Press,1982:193-194.
(33)颜青山:《意向对象与摹状词》,《哲学研究》2006年第6期。