高管非货币性私有收益与薪酬有关吗——基于契约参照点理论的实证检验
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摘要
突破委托代理框架下最优契约理论的分析范式,从契约参照视角出发,基于我国A股2010—2016年间的上市企业数据实证检验了高管薪酬激励与非货币性私有收益之间的作用机理,以及薪酬契约参照点效应对高管非货币性私有收益的影响机制。研究发现:(1)我国高管薪酬激励与非货币性私有收益之间存在显著负相关关系,且明显会受到契约参照点的影响,即高管薪酬激励相较于契约参照点的得益越少,其通过攫取非货币性私有收益以获取替代性补偿激励的动机就越强;(2)在"得益-损失"价值函数下,处于损失区域的高管对非货币性私有收益的攫取倾向对契约参照点效应的反应更为敏感,且二者敏感度在不同产权性质下存在显著差异;(3)以"八项规定"为代表的政府宏观政策、企业中观层面的任期垂直对特征以及微观层面的个体晋升预期对二者之间的关系都起到了有效的调节作用,抑制了高管对非货币性私有收益的攫取行为。
This study broke the optimal contract analytical paradigm which was based on the principal-agent framework, then selected the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as the sample, and empirically tested the relationship and influencing mechanism between executives' compensation incentives and non-monetary private benefits from the view of contract reference point.The results indicate as follows. Firstly, there is a negative relationship between executive compensation incentive and non-monetary private benefits, which is also influenced by contract reference point. That is, when executive compensation is lower than the reference point, the motivation of grabbing non-monetary private benefits would be more stronger being caused by loss aversion. Secondly, under the"gains and losses"value function, the negative effect of contract reference point on non-monetary private benefits is more obvious when executives' compensation belong to "losses area". The sensitivity of executives' reaction differs in companies with different property rights. Finally, there are three regulating factors in the relationship between executives' compensation incentives and non-monetary private benefits, that is, external supervision mechanism like "eight-point"rules, the features of the tenure vertical dyad linkage of corporate governance mechanism and individual promotion expectation, which effectively inhibit executives' behaviors of grabbing non-monetary private benefits.
This study broke the optimal contract analytical paradigm which was based on the principal-agent framework, then selected the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as the sample, and empirically tested the relationship and influencing mechanism between executives' compensation incentives and non-monetary private benefits from the view of contract reference point.The results indicate as follows. Firstly, there is a negative relationship between executive compensation incentive and non-monetary private benefits, which is also influenced by contract reference point. That is, when executive compensation is lower than the reference point, the motivation of grabbing non-monetary private benefits would be more stronger being caused by loss aversion. Secondly, under the"gains and losses"value function, the negative effect of contract reference point on non-monetary private benefits is more obvious when executives' compensation belong to "losses area". The sensitivity of executives' reaction differs in companies with different property rights. Finally, there are three regulating factors in the relationship between executives' compensation incentives and non-monetary private benefits, that is, external supervision mechanism like "eight-point"rules, the features of the tenure vertical dyad linkage of corporate governance mechanism and individual promotion expectation, which effectively inhibit executives' behaviors of grabbing non-monetary private benefits.
引文
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[4]宗计川.刻板印象下的比较陷阱:产品捆绑策略实验研究[J].南开管理评论,2018(2):210-218.
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[17]孔晨,陈艳.风险偏好、过度自信与国有企业管理层职务舞弊倾向研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,38(2):77-87.
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[22]徐细雄.参照点契约理论:不完全契约理论的行为与实验拓展[J].外国经济与管理,2012,405(11):52-60.
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[25]Siegel P A,Hambrick D C. Pay disparities within top management groups:Evidence of harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms[J]. Organization Science,2005,16(3):259-274.
[26]朱德胜,张伟.高管薪酬激励对股权代理成本影响的实证研究[J].经济与管理评论,2017(3):68-74.
[27]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[28]G覿chter S,Th觟ni C. Social comparison and performance:Experimental evidence on the fair wage effort hypothesis[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2010,76(3):531-543.
[29] Chen J J,Liu X,Li W. The effect of insider control and global benchmarks on Chinese executive compensation[J].Corporate Governance an International Review,2010,18(2):107-123.
[30]张涛,郭潇.高管薪酬契约与融资约束研究——基于我国沪深A股上市公司的经验数据[J].经济与管理评论,2018(1):96-107.
[31]赵刚,梁上坤,王卫星.超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益——基于IPO市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2017(4):31-37.
[32]白智奇,陈艳,王晰,等.国有上市公司业绩与高管隐性腐败研究——基于行为经济学视角[J].科研管理,2018,39(2):100-107.
[33]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[34]翟胜宝,徐亚琴,杨德明.媒体能监督国有企业高管在职消费么[J].会计研究,2015(5):57-63.
[35]何威风.高管团队垂直对特征与企业盈余管理行为研究[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):141-151.
[36]步丹璐,张晨宇,林腾.晋升预期降低了国有企业薪酬差距吗?[J].会计研究,2017(1):82-88.
[2]Liu H, Li X. Government decentralisation and corporate fraud:Evidence from listed state-owned enterprises in China[J].China Journal of Accounting Studies, 2015, 3(4):320-347.
[3]陈仕华,姜广省,李维安,等.国有企业纪委的治理参与能否抑制高管私有收益?[J].经济研究,2014(10):139-151.
[4]宗计川.刻板印象下的比较陷阱:产品捆绑策略实验研究[J].南开管理评论,2018(2):210-218.
[5]Kahneman D,Tversky A. Prospect theory:An analysis of decisions under risk[J]. Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-291.
[6]Hart O,Moore J. Contracts as reference points[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1):1-48.
[7]Donoher W J,Reed R,Storrud-Barnes S F. Incentive alignment,control,and the issue of misleading financial disclosures[J].Journal of Management,2007,33(4):547-569.
[8]姜付秀,黄继承.经理激励、负债与企业价值[J].经济研究,2011(5):46-60.
[9]Bebchuk L A,Coates J C,Subramanian G. The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards:Further findings and a reply to symposium participants[J]. Stanford Law Review,2002,55(3):885-917.
[10]Dechow P,Sloan R,Sweeney A. Cases and consequences of earnings manipulations:An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC[J]. The Accounting Review,1996,71(4):441-454.
[11]Harrast S A,Mason O L. Can audit committees prevent management fraud?[J]CPA Journal,2007,77(1):24-38.
[12]Troy C,Smith K G,Domino M A. CEO demographics and accounting fraud:Who is more likely to rationalize illegal acts[J].Strategic Organization,2011,9(4):259-282.
[13]淦未宇,徐细雄,林丁健.高管性别、权力结构与企业反伦理行为——基于上市公司违规操作PSM配对样本的实证检验[J].外国经济与管理,2015(10):18-31.
[14]陈庆杰,柯大钢.总经理特征与公司控制权——基于不同会计信息质量的经验研究[J].管理评论,2006,18(12):55-60.
[15]Hsieh T S,Bedard J C,K M J. CEO overconfidence and earnings management during shifting regulatory regimes[J]. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2014,41(9-10):1243-1268.
[16]陈艳,孔晨,王璐.决策信息心理加工、认知偏差与国有企业CEO职务舞弊行为[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016,18(2):113-122.
[17]孔晨,陈艳.风险偏好、过度自信与国有企业管理层职务舞弊倾向研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,38(2):77-87.
[18] Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C. Contracts,reference points,and competition——Behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association,2009,7(2-3):561-572.
[19]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C. Contracts as reference points——Experimental evidence[J]. American Economic Review,2011,101(2):493-525
[20]Hart O,Holmstrom B.A theory of firm scope[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2010,125(2):483-513.
[21]李维安,刘绪光,陈靖涵.经理才能、公司治理与契约参照点——中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的理论与实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(2):4-15.
[22]徐细雄.参照点契约理论:不完全契约理论的行为与实验拓展[J].外国经济与管理,2012,405(11):52-60.
[23]Yates J F,Stone E R. The risk construct[M]//Yates F J. Risk-taking behavior. New York:John Wiley&Sons,1992:1-25.
[24]Fiegenbaum A,Hart S,Schendel D. Strategic reference point theory[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1996,17(3),219-235.
[25]Siegel P A,Hambrick D C. Pay disparities within top management groups:Evidence of harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms[J]. Organization Science,2005,16(3):259-274.
[26]朱德胜,张伟.高管薪酬激励对股权代理成本影响的实证研究[J].经济与管理评论,2017(3):68-74.
[27]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[28]G覿chter S,Th觟ni C. Social comparison and performance:Experimental evidence on the fair wage effort hypothesis[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2010,76(3):531-543.
[29] Chen J J,Liu X,Li W. The effect of insider control and global benchmarks on Chinese executive compensation[J].Corporate Governance an International Review,2010,18(2):107-123.
[30]张涛,郭潇.高管薪酬契约与融资约束研究——基于我国沪深A股上市公司的经验数据[J].经济与管理评论,2018(1):96-107.
[31]赵刚,梁上坤,王卫星.超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益——基于IPO市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2017(4):31-37.
[32]白智奇,陈艳,王晰,等.国有上市公司业绩与高管隐性腐败研究——基于行为经济学视角[J].科研管理,2018,39(2):100-107.
[33]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[34]翟胜宝,徐亚琴,杨德明.媒体能监督国有企业高管在职消费么[J].会计研究,2015(5):57-63.
[35]何威风.高管团队垂直对特征与企业盈余管理行为研究[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):141-151.
[36]步丹璐,张晨宇,林腾.晋升预期降低了国有企业薪酬差距吗?[J].会计研究,2017(1):82-88.