教育的信号效应及其市场价值——基于统计性歧视和雇主学习的视角
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摘要
文章从统计性歧视和雇主学习的理论视角,借助Altonji&Pierret (2001)和Lange (2007)提出的方法考察了教育的信号效应在中国劳动力市场的发挥情况,并测算了教育信号的市场价值。研究发现,随着工作经验的增长,教育对收入的影响显著减弱,而能力对收入的影响却有所增强。雇主学习的速度虽然很快,但雇主的初始预期生产率误差具有相对持久性。当贴现率为7. 18%时,教育信号的市场价值即多接受一年教育所带来的终生收入现值的增量中信号效应的贡献的上界约为16%。该结果对贴现率、雇主学习的速度和潜在工作经验长度的变化非常敏感,但对教育成本的变化并不敏感。
From the theoretical perspective of statistical discrimination based on education and employer learning,this paper empirically analyzes educational signaling in China' s labor market and measures its market value using the method proposed by Altonji & Pierret( 2001) and Lange( 2007). It is found that as working experience grows,the effect of education decreases while the effect of ability increases. Although the speed of employer learning is fast,the initial expected productivity error is relatively persistent. When the discount rate remains 7. 18 percent,the upper bound on market value of educational signaling,defined by the percentage contribution of signaling to the increase in lifetime earnings due to an additional year of schooling,is about 16 percent. The simulation results are very sensitive to the discount rate,the speed of employer learning,and the length of potential experience,but not sensitive to educational cost.
From the theoretical perspective of statistical discrimination based on education and employer learning,this paper empirically analyzes educational signaling in China' s labor market and measures its market value using the method proposed by Altonji & Pierret( 2001) and Lange( 2007). It is found that as working experience grows,the effect of education decreases while the effect of ability increases. Although the speed of employer learning is fast,the initial expected productivity error is relatively persistent. When the discount rate remains 7. 18 percent,the upper bound on market value of educational signaling,defined by the percentage contribution of signaling to the increase in lifetime earnings due to an additional year of schooling,is about 16 percent. The simulation results are very sensitive to the discount rate,the speed of employer learning,and the length of potential experience,but not sensitive to educational cost.
引文
范皑皑(2013),《文凭膨胀:高校扩招与毕业生就业的困境与选择》,《教育学术月刊》第4期,第16-23页。
王效仿(2003),《知识失业:一个时代的来临》,《社会》第4期,第15-17页。
张颖、任若恩、黄薇(2008),《中国代际内与代际间贴现率的实验研究》,《金融研究》第9期,第164-175页。
Aigner,Dennis&Glen Cain(1977).Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets.ILR Review,30(2),175-187.
Altonji,Joseph&Charles Pierret(1998).Employer Learning and the Signalling Value of Education.In Isao Ohashi&Toshiaki Tachibanaki(eds.),Internal Labour Markets,Incentives and Employment.London:Macmillan Press,pp.159-195.
Altonji,Joseph&Charles Pierret(2001).Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,116(1),313-350.
Arrow,Kenneth Joseph(1973).Higher Education as A Filter.Journal of Public Economics,2(3),193-217.
Bauer,Thomas&John Haisken-DeNew(2001).Employer Learning and the Returns to Schooling.Labour Economics,8(2),161-180.
Broecke,Stijn(2015).Experience and the Returns to Education and Skill in OECDCountries.OECD Journal:Economic Studies,2015(1),123-147.
Cheung,Stephen(2010).A Test of Employer Learning in the Labour Market for Young Australians.Applied Economics Letters,17(1),93-98.
Clogg,Clifford,Eva Petkova&Adamantios Haritou(1995).Statistical Methods for Comparing Regression Coefficients Between Models.American Journal of Sociology,100(5),1261-1293.
Farber,Henry&Robert Gibbons(1996).Learning and Wage Dynamics.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,111(4),1007-1047.
Freeman,Smith(1977).Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential:AModel and Application to Academic Early Retirement.The Bell Journal of Economics,8(2),419-443.
Galindo-Rueda,Fernando(2003).Employer Learning and Schooling-Related Statistical Discrimination in Britain.IZA Discussion Paper,No.778.
Greenwald,Bruce(1986).Adverse Selection in the Labor Market.The Review of Economic Studies,53(3),325-347.
Habermalz,Steffen(2011).The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signalling Revisited.Applied Economics Letters,18(7),607-610.
Hanushek,Eric&Lei Zhang(2006).Quality-Consistent Estimates of International Returns to Skill.NBER Working Paper,No.12664.
Harris,Milton&Bengt Holmstrom(1982).A Theory of Wage Dynamics.The Review of Economic Studies,49(3),315-333.
Lange,Fabian(2007).The Speed of Employer Learning.Journal of Labor Economics,25(1),1-35.
Lundberg,Shelly&Richard Startz(1983).Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets.The American Economic Review,73(3),340-347.
Mansour,Hani(2012).Does Employer Learning Vary by Occupation?Journal of Labor Economics,30(2),415-444.
Pan,Shih-Yi(2005).Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination in the Canadian Labour Market.MA.diss.,University of Saskatchewan.
Phelps,Edmund(1972).The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism.The American Economic Review,62(4),659-661.
Pinkston,Joshua(2006).A Test of Screening Discrimination with Employer Learning.ILRReview,59(2),267-284.
Schultz,Theodore(1975).The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria.Journal of Economic Literature,13(3),827-846.
Spence,Michael(1973).Job Market Signaling.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,87(3),355-374.
Stiglitz,Joseph(1975).The Theory of“Screening,”Education,and the Distribution of Income.The American Economic Review,65(3),283-300.
Strobl,Eric(2004).Do Employers Use Education as A Signal for Ability in Developing Countries?Evidence from Ghana.Applied Economics Letters,11(4),259-261.
Waldman,Michael(1984).Job Assignment,Signalling,and Efficiency.The RAND Journal of Economics,15(2),255-267.
Wolpin,Kenneth(1977).Education and Screening.The American Economic Review,67(5),949-958.
Zhangaliyeva,Aigerim&Masaki Nakabayashi(2013).Heritage from Czar:The Russian Dual System of Schooling and Signaling.ISS Discussion Paper Series,No.F163.
(1)文凭膨胀是指在一定范围内的劳动力市场中,劳动者的学历普遍得到提升,同时高学历劳动者的实际供给超过了劳动力市场对高学历劳动者的实际需求(范皑皑,2013)。知识失业是指接受过良好教育并具备一定专业知识水平与专业技能的高学历劳动者处于不得其用的状态(王效仿,2003)。学历贬值是指劳动者在社会中无法获得相应的工作岗位和发展需求,只能接受低于学历资格的工作,获取的报酬和发展机遇远远低于学历自身的预期值,来自https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%96%87%E5%87%AD%E8%B4%AC%E5%80%BC/1458737?fr=aladdin。
(1)雇主学习可分为对称雇主学习(symmetric employer learning)和非对称雇主学习(asymmetric employer learning)。对称雇主学习又被称为公共学习(public learning),指所有的雇主能够拥有相同的关于难以观测的能力信息,即员工的生产率信息是公共信息(Freeman,1977;Harris&Holmstrom,1982);非对称雇主学习又被称为私人学习(private learning),是指当前雇主比外部雇主拥有更多的关于难以观测的能力信息,即员工的生产率信息是私人信息(Waldman,1984;Greenwald,1986)。如无特殊说明,本研究所指的“雇主学习”均为对称雇主学习。
(1)所有估计系数均来源于对式(15)的估计结果。由于潜在工作经验超过26年的样本仅占全部样本的2.69%,故将这些样本的潜在工作经验一律赋值为26。
(1)Habermalz(2011)指出,之所以雇主学习的速度与教育信号的市场价值呈负相关,是因为两个基本假定:一是雇主学习是对称的,即当前雇主和外部雇主拥有相同的信息;二是雇主学习是完全的,即雇主能够获得关于员工生产率的全部信息。
王效仿(2003),《知识失业:一个时代的来临》,《社会》第4期,第15-17页。
张颖、任若恩、黄薇(2008),《中国代际内与代际间贴现率的实验研究》,《金融研究》第9期,第164-175页。
Aigner,Dennis&Glen Cain(1977).Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets.ILR Review,30(2),175-187.
Altonji,Joseph&Charles Pierret(1998).Employer Learning and the Signalling Value of Education.In Isao Ohashi&Toshiaki Tachibanaki(eds.),Internal Labour Markets,Incentives and Employment.London:Macmillan Press,pp.159-195.
Altonji,Joseph&Charles Pierret(2001).Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,116(1),313-350.
Arrow,Kenneth Joseph(1973).Higher Education as A Filter.Journal of Public Economics,2(3),193-217.
Bauer,Thomas&John Haisken-DeNew(2001).Employer Learning and the Returns to Schooling.Labour Economics,8(2),161-180.
Broecke,Stijn(2015).Experience and the Returns to Education and Skill in OECDCountries.OECD Journal:Economic Studies,2015(1),123-147.
Cheung,Stephen(2010).A Test of Employer Learning in the Labour Market for Young Australians.Applied Economics Letters,17(1),93-98.
Clogg,Clifford,Eva Petkova&Adamantios Haritou(1995).Statistical Methods for Comparing Regression Coefficients Between Models.American Journal of Sociology,100(5),1261-1293.
Farber,Henry&Robert Gibbons(1996).Learning and Wage Dynamics.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,111(4),1007-1047.
Freeman,Smith(1977).Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential:AModel and Application to Academic Early Retirement.The Bell Journal of Economics,8(2),419-443.
Galindo-Rueda,Fernando(2003).Employer Learning and Schooling-Related Statistical Discrimination in Britain.IZA Discussion Paper,No.778.
Greenwald,Bruce(1986).Adverse Selection in the Labor Market.The Review of Economic Studies,53(3),325-347.
Habermalz,Steffen(2011).The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signalling Revisited.Applied Economics Letters,18(7),607-610.
Hanushek,Eric&Lei Zhang(2006).Quality-Consistent Estimates of International Returns to Skill.NBER Working Paper,No.12664.
Harris,Milton&Bengt Holmstrom(1982).A Theory of Wage Dynamics.The Review of Economic Studies,49(3),315-333.
Lange,Fabian(2007).The Speed of Employer Learning.Journal of Labor Economics,25(1),1-35.
Lundberg,Shelly&Richard Startz(1983).Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets.The American Economic Review,73(3),340-347.
Mansour,Hani(2012).Does Employer Learning Vary by Occupation?Journal of Labor Economics,30(2),415-444.
Pan,Shih-Yi(2005).Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination in the Canadian Labour Market.MA.diss.,University of Saskatchewan.
Phelps,Edmund(1972).The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism.The American Economic Review,62(4),659-661.
Pinkston,Joshua(2006).A Test of Screening Discrimination with Employer Learning.ILRReview,59(2),267-284.
Schultz,Theodore(1975).The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria.Journal of Economic Literature,13(3),827-846.
Spence,Michael(1973).Job Market Signaling.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,87(3),355-374.
Stiglitz,Joseph(1975).The Theory of“Screening,”Education,and the Distribution of Income.The American Economic Review,65(3),283-300.
Strobl,Eric(2004).Do Employers Use Education as A Signal for Ability in Developing Countries?Evidence from Ghana.Applied Economics Letters,11(4),259-261.
Waldman,Michael(1984).Job Assignment,Signalling,and Efficiency.The RAND Journal of Economics,15(2),255-267.
Wolpin,Kenneth(1977).Education and Screening.The American Economic Review,67(5),949-958.
Zhangaliyeva,Aigerim&Masaki Nakabayashi(2013).Heritage from Czar:The Russian Dual System of Schooling and Signaling.ISS Discussion Paper Series,No.F163.
(1)文凭膨胀是指在一定范围内的劳动力市场中,劳动者的学历普遍得到提升,同时高学历劳动者的实际供给超过了劳动力市场对高学历劳动者的实际需求(范皑皑,2013)。知识失业是指接受过良好教育并具备一定专业知识水平与专业技能的高学历劳动者处于不得其用的状态(王效仿,2003)。学历贬值是指劳动者在社会中无法获得相应的工作岗位和发展需求,只能接受低于学历资格的工作,获取的报酬和发展机遇远远低于学历自身的预期值,来自https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%96%87%E5%87%AD%E8%B4%AC%E5%80%BC/1458737?fr=aladdin。
(1)雇主学习可分为对称雇主学习(symmetric employer learning)和非对称雇主学习(asymmetric employer learning)。对称雇主学习又被称为公共学习(public learning),指所有的雇主能够拥有相同的关于难以观测的能力信息,即员工的生产率信息是公共信息(Freeman,1977;Harris&Holmstrom,1982);非对称雇主学习又被称为私人学习(private learning),是指当前雇主比外部雇主拥有更多的关于难以观测的能力信息,即员工的生产率信息是私人信息(Waldman,1984;Greenwald,1986)。如无特殊说明,本研究所指的“雇主学习”均为对称雇主学习。
(1)所有估计系数均来源于对式(15)的估计结果。由于潜在工作经验超过26年的样本仅占全部样本的2.69%,故将这些样本的潜在工作经验一律赋值为26。
(1)Habermalz(2011)指出,之所以雇主学习的速度与教育信号的市场价值呈负相关,是因为两个基本假定:一是雇主学习是对称的,即当前雇主和外部雇主拥有相同的信息;二是雇主学习是完全的,即雇主能够获得关于员工生产率的全部信息。