共同委托模式下存货质押融资双重激励机制研究
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摘要
构建了物流企业和银行、物流企业与中小企业之间不完全信息的委托代理模型,得到最优激励决策和物流企业的最优努力水平,并对采用共同委托模式的双重激励机制与委托监管模式的银行单一激励和没有激励机制的物流企业努力水平进行比较分析,研究结果表明,这种双重激励机制不仅可以减少银行的激励成本,也有助于提高物流企业的监管努力水平。
In this paper, we constructed the principal-agent model with incomplete information involving a logistics company, the bank, and a small and medium-sized enterprise, obtained the optimal incentive decision and the optimal effort level of the logistics company,and compared the effort levels of the logistics company respectively with the double incentive under the joint entrustment mode, with the single incentive from the bank under the delegated supervision mode and with no incentive, finding that the double incentive mechanism could not only reduce the incentive costs of the bank, but also help improve the regulation effort level of the logistics company.
In this paper, we constructed the principal-agent model with incomplete information involving a logistics company, the bank, and a small and medium-sized enterprise, obtained the optimal incentive decision and the optimal effort level of the logistics company,and compared the effort levels of the logistics company respectively with the double incentive under the joint entrustment mode, with the single incentive from the bank under the delegated supervision mode and with no incentive, finding that the double incentive mechanism could not only reduce the incentive costs of the bank, but also help improve the regulation effort level of the logistics company.
引文
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[9]何娟,蒋祥林,王建.不完全信息下存货质押业务中参与多方博弈行为分析[J].华东经济管理,2012,(12):105-109.
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[11]K Amw.Essays in the theory Of risk bearing[M].Chicago:Markham,1970.
[2]Xing H G.Channel Coordination with a Risk-Neutral Supplier and a Downside-Risk-Averse Retailer[J].Production and Operation Management,2005,14(1):80-90.
[3]曹玉贵.不对称信息下第三方物流中的委托代理分析[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(2):74-77.
[4]王文辉,冯耕中,苏潇.分散决策下存货质押融资业务的信贷合约设计[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2008,47(2):266-272.
[5]周钊,王勇,徐鹏.存货质押业务中银行对物流企业的最优激励契约[J].工业工程,2009,12(2):29-32.
[6]韦燕,孙朝苑,帅斌.存货质押业务中银行对第三方物流的激励契约设计[J].物流技术,2010,29(12):73-77.
[7]李毅学.物流与供应链金融创新-存货质押融资风险管理[M].北京:科学出版社,2010.
[8]于萍,徐渝.存货质押三方契约中银行对物流企业的激励[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(3):94-99.
[9]何娟,蒋祥林,王建.不完全信息下存货质押业务中参与多方博弈行为分析[J].华东经济管理,2012,(12):105-109.
[10]徐鹏.融通仓运作模式及其激励监督机制研究[M].成都:西南交通大学出版社,2013.
[11]K Amw.Essays in the theory Of risk bearing[M].Chicago:Markham,1970.