Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma

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• 作者：Luca Moretti ; Tommaso Piazza
• 刊名：Erkenntnis
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：December 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：80
• 期：6
• 页码：1271-1290
• 全文大小：430 KB
• 参考文献：Bergmann, M. (2006). Justification without awareness. New York: OUP.CrossRef
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  Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74, 30-5.CrossRef
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  McGrath, M. (2013). Phenomenal conservatism and cognitive penetration: The “bad basis-Counterexamples. In C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and justification: new essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism (pp. 225-47). New York: OUP.CrossRef
  Moretti, L. (2015). Phenomenal conservatism. Forthcoming in Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  Pollock, J. (1986). Contemporary theories of knowledge. Towata, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
  Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Nous, 34, 517-49.CrossRef
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  Tucker, C. (2013). Seemings and justification: An introduction. In C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and justification: New essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism (pp. 1-9). New York: OUP.CrossRef
  
• 作者单位：Luca Moretti (1) (2)
  Tommaso Piazza (3)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Old Brewery, High St, Aberdeen, AB24 3UB, UK
  2. Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539, Munich, Germany
  3. Department of Humanities, University of Pavia, Piazza Botta 6, 27100, Pavia, Italy
  
• 刊物主题：Philosophy; Epistemology; Ontology; Ethics; Logic;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8420

文摘

In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s (PC) phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that (PC) is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification of a belief: the direct way and the indirect way. We identify a straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed indirectly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. Then we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to the claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. As (PC) is the view that seemings or appearances contribute justification directly, we infer that Bergmann’s contention that his dilemma applies to (PC) is unmotivated. In the final part, we suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types of internalist justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-grounded justification can be combined with justification of one of these types to form the basis of a promising version of internalist foundationalism.